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7ABSTRACT
Each of the three chapters of my dissertation Essays in Robust Mechanism Design belong to
a developing subfield of mechanism design that seeks to provide foundations for simple and
intuitive mechanisms that perform well in a wide variety of settings. In particular, my work
seeks to identify contracts and mechanisms that exhibit robustness to large-scale uncertainty
about agent preferences.
My job market paper A Revealed Preference Approach to Multidimensional Screening
develops a model of data-driven multidimensional screening, with applications to multi-good
monopoly pricing and the design of complex products. In this paper, the monopolist observes
a population of consumers each purchase products from one or more sets of alternatives, and
she uses this choice data as the basis for her beliefs about the distribution of the buyer’s
preferences. However, there are many distributions of preferences that rationalize the data,
and the monopolist evaluates product lineups according to their worst-case payo  against
this set of distributions, in the spirit of robustness. I identify circumstances under which the
monopolist can do better than to simply re-create one of the product lineups in her data
set, and more broadly show how the form of the optimal selling mechanism changes under
various natural restrictions to the buyer’s preferences. In particular, if the monopolist is
uncertain about complementarity or substitutability between product attributes, I show that
it is optimal for her to sell only products that are vertically but not horizontally di erentiated
from the products in her data set.
As part of larger project studying incentives for risk-taking, the second chapter of my
dissertation Robust Contracting with Uncertain Risk Preferences studies a moral hazard
problem in which the principal does not know the agent’s risk preferences. The agent chooses
not only how much e ort to exert, but also potentially from a variety of safe and risky actions.
While the existing moral hazard literature has almost uniformly employed the assumption
that the principal exactly knows the agent’s risk preferences, I consider a principal who seeks
a contract that performs well for all types of agents. I show that all such contracts are capped
bonus contracts which do not reward the agent for producing output that is either very small
8or very large. As a special case of my model, I identify restrictions to e ort costs under
which binary contracts that pay the agent a base salary and reward him with a fixed bonus
payment for achieving a specified output quota are optimal.
In a related paper, the third chapter of my dissertation Risk Alignment considers a moral
hazard problem in which the principal is slightly uncertain about the agent’s risk preferences.
As before, the agent chooses not only how much e ort to exert, but also what sort of risks
to take. The principal’s payo  depends on both the output produced by the agent and
on transfers, and her risk preferences generally di er from those of the agent. In the first
part of the paper, I completely characterize the set of risk aligned contracts, which provide
the agent with incentives to choose risks as if his goal were to maximize the principal’s
payo . Very generally, all such contracts “pay the agent in probability”, akin to the lottery
mechanisms that are used by researchers in experimental economics to induce risk preferences
in laboratory subjects. In the second part of the paper, I show how risk aligned contracts are
worst-case optimal for the principal.
9CHAPTER 1
A REVEALED PREFERENCE APPROACH TO MULTIDIMENSIONAL SCREENING
1.1 Introduction
A monopolist hires an analyst to design and price a lineup of products to be sold to consumers.
The monopolist possesses population-level purchasing data, and she wishes for the analyst
to incorporate this data into his designs. In particular, the data is useful for the analyst
because it reflects information about the distribution of the consumers’ preferences. Although
the analyst might himself have prior beliefs about consumer tastes, the monopolist desires
an objective analysis that is entirely data-driven. What might the analyst infer about the
consumers’ preferences from data? How can he use these inferences to design an optimal
product lineup for the monopolist? In particular, are there product lineups that perform
better than those that merely recreate one of the choice environments in the monopolist’s
data?
This paper studies a general multidimensional screening problem in which a principal
makes allocations to an agent with private information. Allocations consist of a characteristic
and a price. For example, in the application of our model to multi-good monopoly selling, a
characteristic might be a bundle consisting of various quantities of two or more distinct goods.
Alternatively, a characteristic might describe the quality of each feature of a multi-attribute
good, as in Mussa and Rosen (1978); Wilson (1993); Amstrong (1996); Rochet and Chone
(1998). More broadly, we interpret the multidimensional screening exercise as one in which
the set of objects to be potentially allocated to the agent is an abstract partially-ordered set,
and abstain from tailoring our analysis to the details of any particular application.
In our model, prior to interacting with the agent, the principal observes the joint
distribution of choices made by a population of decision makers from one or more sets
of exogenous reference allocations. Because decision makers maximize their utility and the
agent is a typical member of the population, the decision makers’ choices are informative
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about the agent’s preferences. However, the set of preferences potentially held by the decision
makers is rich. Consequently, there are many distributions of preferences that are consistent
with the choice data, and the principal ranks mechanisms according to the expected payo 
that they guarantee her against this set of distributions.
This paper is primarily concerned with the relationship between the principal’s optimal
mechanisms and the choice environments constituent to her data. In particular, an immediate
question is the matter of whether or not there are mechanisms that outperform those
mechanisms that merely recreate one of the choice environments in the data. If there are,
what sort of characteristics do they allocate to the agent? What prices do they use?
In the leading specification of our model — which we call the monotone environment —
the principal knows only that the agent prefers better characteristics to worse ones.1 Even
in this arguably extreme case, mechanisms that re-create one of the choice environments in
her data yield predictable distributions of choices by the agent. This feature is attractive for
a principal who faces distributional uncertainty about the agent’s preferences, as does the
principal in our paper. However, when the principal’s data includes more than one choice
environment, there are sometimes mechanisms that actually outperform every mechanism in
her data.2
To see why it is sometimes possible for the principal to find a mechanism that outperforms
the choice sets in her data, suppose for example that the principal is a two-good monopolist
facing unit demand. She observes in her data two choice environments: first, in which
good A is sold at price p, and second in which good B is sold at price q. Every member of
the population in her data obeys one of two choice patterns: the first group of consumers
purchases good A but not good B, and the second group purchases B but not A. Both goods
are profitable for the monopolist to sell at these prices. In this situation, it is strictly more
profitable for the monopolist to sell both goods than it is for her to sell only one. To see
1Formally, the principal knows that the agent’s utility function is increasing in the partial order on the set
of characteristics. For instance, in the multi-good monopoly application, the agent e.g. prefers more of any
particular good to less of that same good.
2Even if the principal only observes choices from a single choice set, there might be mechanisms that
outperform those that recreate the choice environment in the data. This is true even in the monotone
environment. However, this is only true if the data includes allocations that yield a strictly negative payo  for
the principal. Our results hold in the more interesting cases in which there are multiple choice environments
in the data and every allocation yields a positive payo  for the principal.
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why this is true, note that the first group of consumers revealed that they are unwilling to
purchase good B at price q, and similarly the second group revealed that they are unwilling to
purchase A at price p. Accordingly, the monopolist need not be concerned about unprofitable
substitutions between the two goods, and selling both goods is better for her than selling
only one.
As our example demonstrates, our problem is interesting to study even when the set of
agent preferences is completely unstructured. However, the monotone environment might
be viewed as a situation of extreme uncertainty, and in some cases the principal might
desire a mechanism that is designed to accommodate some additional restrictions on the
agent’s preferences. Accordingly, we allow for arbitrary rich sets of agent preferences, and
show that various forms of richness are su cient for the optimality of various classes of
mechanisms. After developing this general optimality result, we study in detail the following
three informational environments. First, we consider the monotone environment described
above. Second, we consider the homogeneous environment in which the agent’s preferences
are known to be homogeneous. Third, we analyze the diminishing returns environment, in
which the agent’s utility is known to su er diminishing returns to quantity or quality.
For reasons that we describe in detail below, we view the first of these three environments
as privileged. In accordance with this view, we devote more attention to the monotone
environment than either the homogeneous environment or the diminishing returns environment.
Nevertheless, one unifying theme of these three special cases of our problem is that the principal
possesses some information about the relative valuations that the agent assigns to vertically
di erentiated allocations, but has no such information about horizontally di erentiated
allocations. For example, consider an automobile manufacturer who sells a lineup of vehicles
to consumers. The manufacturer believes that consumer preferences are homothetic3, so
that e.g. consumers who value safety more than performance do so for both low- and high-
performing vehicles. Suppose that in most years, the manufacturer updates vehicle models
by increasing the quality of each attribute of the vehicle. It is intuitive that updating her
3Recall that preferences are said to be homothetic if they admit a homogeneous degree 1 utility
representation: i.e., a function is homothetic if it is the monotonic transformation of a homogeneous
degree 1 function. Some authors impose the stronger definition that a homothetic utility function is itself
homogeneous degree 1. We clarify that in this paper, we adopt the former definition.
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product lineup in this way makes the vehicle unambiguously better from the perspective of
the consumer, and provided that products are appropriately priced, the manufacturer should
not necessarily expect substitutions between vehicle types, or to the outside option.
We formalize updates of the sort described above as update mechanisms, via which the
firm screens the agent with allocations that are vertically di erentiated from the reference
allocations in her data. Although we describe additional features of optimal mechanisms
for each of the three environments described above, all of these mechanisms belong to the
broader family of update mechanisms.
This paper aspires to make two types of contributions. First, from a practical perspective,
our model speaks descriptively and perhaps even prescriptively to the wide-spread exercise
of “A-B testing” — along with other types of direct market research — in which firms use
experiments to gauge consumer reactions to new or modified products. In particular, we
hope that our observation that the principal can sometimes do better than simply adopting
the best-performing experiment might be valuable for firms. More generally, we imagine that
our analysis might be valuable to principals who possess choice data and want to use this
data as the basis for conducting a real-world screening exercise.
Second, this paper hopes to make a theoretical contribution by proposing a new way to
think about information in screening. In particular, the informational environment in our
paper is considerably di erentiated from not only the usual Bayesian approach in which the
principal evaluates mechanisms against a single prior, but also from other prior-free work
in which the principal evaluates mechanisms against a set of distributions that is specified
by the analyst. In our model, the set of preference distributions considered possible by the
principal is exactly the set of distributions that are compatible with her data.
What might be the value of our approach, then, from a theoretical perspective? The
lead specification of our model — in which the principal imposes only minimal technical
restrictions on the agent’s preferences — might be viewed as a novel extension of the standard
revealed preference exercise to a certain class of mechanism design problems. To see why,
note that in general, there are many preferences that are consistent with any particular
revealed preference. In our paper, this multiplicity is resolved without an appeal to additional
exogenous information: i.e., in the monotone environment, the principal uses only the
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revealed preference information contained in the choice data. This lies in contrast to Bayesian
approaches, in which the choice data is used to update a subjective prior belief about the
agent’s preferences. Accordingly, our paper arguably provides a “pure” revealed preference
approach to screening, to an extent that existing work does not.4
This paper joins a growing literature that studies mechanism design problems in which the
principal has worst-case objectives
1
López-Cunat (2000); Chung and Ely (2007); Bergemann
and Schlag (2008, 2011); Chassang (2013); Frankel (2014); Garrett (2014); Carroll (2015,
2017); Madarász and Prat (2017); Auster (2018); Antic (2014); Bergemann et al. (2017);
Marku and Díaz (2017); Dai and Toikka (2017); Rosenthal (2018, 2019)
2
. One goal of
this literature is to identify simple mechanisms that perform well in the face of one or
more dimensions of uncertainty about the environment, and provide foundations for these
mechanisms by identifying domains in which they are worst-case optimal. We take up this
goal, and do so in an environment in which the principal’s beliefs are naturally founded in
choice data.
Several papers that belong to a partially overlapping body of work identify simple optimal
— or approximately optimal — mechanisms for multidimensional screening. For example,
Carroll (2017) shows that if the agent’s utility is additively separable and the principal knows
the marginal distributions of each component of his preferences but not the joint distribution,
it is worst-case optimal to screen the agent separately along each dimension of his private
information. In particular, this general separation result yields a “no-bundling” result for
multi-product monopolists. Elsewhere, there is a literature studying approximately optimal
mechanisms for selling multiple indivisible goods: recently published work develops revenue
bounds for simple selling mechanisms
1
Hart and Nisan (2017)
2
, and related work by other
authors does so when the buyer has sub-additive utility
1
Rubinstein and Weinberg (2015)
2
.
Finally, this paper complements existing work that studies data-driven mechanism design1
Braverman and Chassang (2015)
2
, and more broadly various forms of learning by principals
4There are a variety of alternative prior-free criteria for evaluating mechanisms. However, unlike ad
hoc criteria, the worst-case criterion of this paper can be justified either on the basis of robustness —
as appears throughout the literature on prior-free mechanism design cited below — or alternatively via
behavioral axiomatizations, as in e.g. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). Furthermore, while one might reasonably
instead consider regret minimization with either additive or multiplicative criteria, there are no finite-regret
mechanisms for the monotone environment. Consequently, regret-based criteria are ill-suited for our problem.
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1
Segal (2003); Caillaud and Robert (2005); Brooks (2013); Cole and Roughgarden (2014);
Morgenstern and Roughgarden (2015); Chawla, Hartline, and Nekipelov (2017)
2
. In particular,
Braverman and Chassang (2015) study the usefulness of large data sets in reducing adverse
selection in capitation schemes. Aside from di erences in setting, one important distinction
between the authors’ work and our own lies with our consideration of population-level data.
This is not merely a technical distinction: while inference is di cult in both environments, the
cited work emphasizes finite sample issues which do not arise in our asymptotic framework.
Less closely related is applied work that studies the identification of parametric models which
allow for both complementarity between goods and correlated tastes
1
Gentzkow (2007)
2
, and
also work that considers stochastic revealed preference
1
Kitamura and Stoye (2018)
2
.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 1.2, we describe the model in full detail.
Section 1.3 provides examples. In section 1.4, we develop general tools to analyze our
problem. In section 1.5, we study the monotone environment in detail. Section 1.6 treats
the homogeneous and diminishing returns environments. Finally, we conclude in section
1.7. Proofs with content of interest are mostly given in the body of the paper, while purely
technical material is presented in appendix A.
1.2 Model
Allocations (x, p) œ X ◊ R+ consist of characteristics x and non-negative prices p. The
set of characteristics (X,Æ) is a complete lattice.5 We label as 0 the minimal element of
X, and interpret the allocation (0, 0) loosely as the agent’s outside option. Finally, we call
comparable characteristics vertically di erentiated, incomparable characteristics horizontally
di erentiated, and say that allocation (x, p) dominates (y, q) if x Ø y and p Æ q.
5Recall that a complete lattice is a partially ordered set (X,Æ) with the property that every subset of X
has both a supremum and an infimum. Elements x, y œ X are said to be comparable if x Æ y or y Æ x. If
neither relation holds, x and y are said to be incomparable. Our model is most interesting to study when X
includes incomparable elements. We give X the order-interval topology and the Borel sigma algebra.
15
1.2.1 The agent’s preferences
The agent’s payo  from allocation (x, p) is as follows, for u : X æ R+:
u(x)≠ p.
Assumption 1. (Monotonicity) The agent’s utility function u is weakly increasing, upper
semicontinuous, and satisfies u(0) = 0.
We call u the agent’s type. The agent’s type belongs to some set of feasible types U6, the
identity of which is known to the principal.
1.2.2 Mechanisms
We restrict attention to direct mechanisms, as justified by the revelation principle. Accordingly,
mechanisms M = (y, q) consist of a measurable assignment y : U æ X of characteristics
and a measurable assignment q : U æ R+ of transfers to agent types u. The agent’s outside
option yields utility zero, and mechanisms are incentive compatible and individually rational:
u
1
y(u)
2
≠ q(u) Ø u
1
y(‚u)2≠ q(‚u) ’u, ‚u œ U
u
1
y(u)
2
≠ q(u) Ø 0 ’u œ U.
In places, given a mechanism M = (y, q), we use the notation (x, p) œ M to indicate that
(x, p) =
1
y(u), q(u)
2
for some feasible type u.
1.2.3 Information
The principal interacts with only a single agent. However, she observes choice data for a
continuum population of anonymous decision makers with idiosyncratic preferences. Formally,
let B1, ...,BK µ X ◊ R+ be exogenously-specified sets of allocations, with 1 Æ K <Œ. Each
set Bk is itself finite, includes the outside option (0, 0), and at least one distinct allocation
6We give U the sup-norm topology and the Borel sigma algebra.
16
(x, p). Define as follows:
B := B1 ◊ ...◊ BK
X0 :=
Ó
x œ X|(x, p) œ B1 ﬁ ... ﬁ BK
Ô
.
The principal observes the distribution µ0 œ  (B) of choices by the population of decision
makers.7 The decision makers’ choices are informative about their preferences, because each
decision maker maximizes his utility. Just as the agent’s preferences belong to U , so too does
each decision maker’s preference. We use the notation bk(u) for the choice by u from choice
set Bk, and b(u) for the corresponding list of choices
1
b1(u), ..., bK(u)
2
.8 For each b œ B,
define as follows:
U(b) :=
Ó
u œ U |b(u) = b
Ô
.
The set U(b) is the set of types that choose b from B, and collectively these sets partition U .
We will periodically refer to these sets U(b) as cells of agent types. Define as follows:
 0 :=
Ó
µ œ  (U)|µ
1
U(b)
2
= µ0(b) ’b œ B
Ô
.
The agent is representative of the population of decision makers, in the sense that the
distribution of his preferences is identical to the population distribution of preferences.
Consequently, because  0 is the set of distributions that rationalize the choice data µ0, it is
also the set of potential distributions of the agent’s type u.
Assumption 2. (Consistency) The set  0 is non-empty.
Consistency should be viewed as a joint restriction to U and µ0. In particular, because we
require monotonicity, consistency rules out distributions µ0 that assign positive probability
7We write  (B) for the set of (discrete) probability distributions over B, and  (U) for the set of Borel
probability distributions over U .
8We assume that ties are broken uniformly in the principal’s data B: i.e., every feasible type u breaks
ties according to some hierarchy on the set of reference characteristics X0 that is independent of prices. For
example, if u(x)≠ p = u(y)≠ q and uÕ(x)≠ pÕ = uÕ(y)≠ qÕ, then ties are resolved in favor of (x, p) by u if
and only if ties are resolved in favor of (x, pÕ) by uÕ.
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to dominated alternatives. One natural objection is thus that we are imposing restrictions
on data µ0. However, we interpret µ0 as a population-level statistic, and if the principal’s
interpretation of the data requires the assignment of positive probability at the population
level to dominated alternatives, then it seems plausible that her model might be misspecified.
1.2.4 The principal’s preferences
The principal’s costs for characteristic x are given by c : X æ R+, where c is weakly increasing.
The principal’s payo  from allocation (x, p) is as follows:
ﬁ(x, p) = p≠ c(x).
Given mechanism M and agent type distribution µ œ  (U), the principal’s payo  is as
follows:
ﬁ(M |µ) :=
⁄
U
ﬁ
1
y(u), q(u)
2
dµ.
The set  0 generically contains multiple distributions, and the principal does not assign
primacy to any one of these distributions. Instead, she evaluates mechanisms M by their
worst-case performance against the entire set of distributions that are compatible with the
choice data µ0 :
ﬁ(M) := inf
µœ 0
ﬁ(M |µ).
We study the problem of identifying mechanisms that maximize the principal’s guarantee
ﬁ(M).
1.3 Examples and counterexamples
This section provides three examples, and its purpose is two-fold. First, we illustrate the
informational environment studied in our paper in simple settings. Second, we consider
and reject a series of conjectures about properties that the optimal mechanism might have.
Suppose that the set of feasible types U is as follows:
U =
Ó
u : X æ R+|u is increasing, upper semicontinuous, and u(0) = 0
Ô
.
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Given that the principal only knows that the agent’s preferences are consistent with the
order Ø, it seems natural to expect that the principal might not be able to do better than
recreating one of the choice environments in her data set. In general, however, this turns out
not to be the case.
Example 1. The principal observes each member of the population’s preferred alternative
from each of the four following choice sets:
1. purchase good A for a price of 1, or pay nothing and receive nothing;
2. purchase good A for a price of 2, or pay nothing and receive nothing;
3. purchase good B for a price of 1, or pay nothing and receive nothing;
4. purchase good B for a price of 2, or pay nothing and receive nothing.
The principal observes that every member of the population chooses one of two distinct choice
patterns. One half of the population purchases good A at both prices, but does not purchase
good B at either price. The other half of the population purchases good B only at the lower
price, and does not purchase good A at either price. Production of both goods is free, and
thus the principal’s objective reduces to revenue maximization.
In example 1, one half of the population is willing to pay at least 2 for good A, but
unwilling to pay 1 for good B. The other half of the population is willing to pay between
1 and 2 for good B, but unwilling to pay 1 for good A. Consider the mechanism M that
provides the agent with the following choices:
• purchase good A for a price of 2;
• purchase good B for a price of 1;
• pay nothing and receive nothing.
The mechanism M sells the first good for a price of 2 and the second good for a price of 1.
See figure 1.1 for illustration.
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(0, 0)(A, 2)(0, 0)(A, 1) (B, 1) (0, 0) (B, 2)
B1 B2 B3 B4
M
Figure 1.1: The four choice sets in example 1, labeled B1, ...,B4, and mechanism M .
Remark 1. In example 1, the principal’s worst-case payo  from selling the first good for a
price of 2 and the second good for a price of 1 exceeds her payo  from any mechanism that
corresponds directly to one of the four choice sets in her data.
Proof. Given the choice data, it is straightforward to see that M guarantees the principal a
payo  at least 3/2. The largest payo  from a mechanism that corresponds to one of the data
sets is given by selling the first good for a price of 2. Because the agent is willing to purchase
the first good at a price of 2 with probability 1/2, this mechanism guarantees the principal a
payo  of 1.
Although we have deliberately chosen the example to be as simple as possible, we
nevertheless see that it is not in general optimal for the principal to recreate one of the choice
environments in her data. Here, we see that when the principal observes the population make
multiple choices, she sometimes gains information that helps her to predict how the agent
will respond to choices that are more complicated than those in her data.
We have just seen that the conjecture that optimal mechanisms recreate one of the choice
environments in the principal’s data is false. But what about the weaker conjecture that they
should at least use the same prices as in the data? This too turns out to be false. To see
why, consider the following counterexample:
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Example 2. The principal observes each member of the population’s preferred alternative
from each of the two following choice sets:
B1 =
Ó
(A, p), (B, 1), (0, 0)
Ô
B2 =
Ó
(B, 2), (0, 0)
Ô
.
The principal observes that every member of the population purchases good A at price p and
good B at price 2. Production of both goods is free, and thus the principal’s objective reduces
to revenue maximization.
Remark 2. In example 2, if the price p in the principal’s data is strictly larger than 1, then it
is optimal to sell only good A, for price p+ 1.
Proof. With certainty, the agent’s utility function u satisfies the following inequalities:
u(A)≠ p Ø u(B)≠ 1
u(B)≠ 2 Ø 0.
Combining these two inequalities yields the following:
u(A) Ø p+ 1.
Accordingly, while it is certainly individually rational to assign the agent the allocation
(A, p+ 1), it is not necessarily individually rational to assign the agent A at any price larger
than p+ 1. Similarly, it is certainly individually rational to assign the agent the allocation
(B, 2), but not so for any price larger than 2. Because the goods are costless to produce, it
is thus better for the monopolist to sell A if she sells only one of the two goods. Moreover,
because every consumer in the population is willing to purchase good A, the monopolist does
not benefit from screening the agent with multiple allocations.
Finally, we consider the conjecture that optimal mechanisms at least uses the same number
(or fewer) of allocations as the choice sets in her data. Just as above, this does not hold:
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Example 3. The principal observes each member of the population’s preferred alternative
from each of the three following choice sets:
1. purchase good A for a price of 1, good B for a price of 0, or pay nothing and receive
nothing;
2. purchase good C for a price of 2, or pay nothing and receive nothing;
3. purchase good B for a price of 1, good D for a price of 0, or pay nothing and receive
nothing.
The principal observes that every member of the population chooses one of two distinct choice
patterns. One half of the population purchases good A for a price of 1, good C for a price of
2, and good D for a price of 0. The other half of the population purchases good B at a price
of 0, the outside option, and good B for a price of 1. Production of both goods is free, and
thus the principal’s objective reduces to revenue maximization.
Remark 3. The optimal mechanism sells good A for a price of 2, good C for a price of 2, and
good B for a price of 1.
Why more allocations than choice patterns? The presence of (A, 2) serves to ensure that
the first group does not choose (B, 1), while the presence of (C, 2) serves to ensure that the
first group does not choose the outside option. Neither objective can be accomplished with
only one good o ered at price 2.
1.4 Analysis
Our formal analysis is organized as follows. First, we propose a class of richness criteria.
Second, we show how these criteria are su cient for the optimality of corresponding classes
of mechanisms. Third, we show how various natural restrictions on the agent’s preferences
lead to certain forms of richness, which in turn yields the optimality of certain types of
mechanisms. Although our optimality result is more general, we emphasize the study of
environments in which the principal is uncertain about how the agent values horizontally
di erentiated characteristics, but might have some information about how he values vertically
di erentiated characteristics.
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1.4.1 Richness
C
x1
x2
x3
 uC(x1)
 uC(x2)
 uC(x3)
 uC
 uC
 uC
Figure 1.2: The reduction „uC onto C with respect to arbitrary utility function u.
Definition 1. Given a closed set of characteristics C that includes every reference allocation
and a feasible type u, define the reduction „uC : X æ C as follows:
„uC(x) := argmax
Ó
u(y)|y Æ x,y œ C
Ô
.
The reduction „uC maps characteristics x into the best characteristic „uC(x) in C that is
smaller than x itself, as weighted by the utility function u, with ties broken arbitrarily. See
figure 1.2 for illustration. We use the reduction maps to construct families of agent types,
which play a central role in our analysis.
Definition 2. Given a closed set of characteristics C that includes every reference allocation
and a parent type u, define the dual type uC : X æ R+ as follows:
uC(x) := u
1
„uC(x)
2
.
The dual type evaluates each characteristic x as if it were the reduction of x onto C.
Importantly, the parent type and the dual type assign the same utility to each characteristic
in C. These preferences might be viewed as a generalization of Leontief utility:
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Example. Suppose that X = R2+. Consider the following utility functions u, uC : X æ R+ :
u
1
(x, y)
2
= 12(x+ y)
uC
1
(x, y)
2
= min{x, y}.
The Leontief preference uC is the dual type to the linear preference u, with respect to the set
of characteristics C =
Ó
(x, y) œ X ◊X|x = y
Ô
.
We introduce the following richness criterion, which classifies the set of feasible types U
according to whether or not it is su ciently large to include all of the dual types against a
given set of characteristics C.
Definition 3. Given a closed set of characteristics C that includes every reference allocation,
the set of feasible types U is C≠rich if the dual type uC is feasible for each feasible type u.
Our presentation of richness as a criterion rather than an assumption is deliberate. Rather
than assuming richness directly, we show later how various forms of richness are embedded in
more natural restrictions on the set of types that the principal considers feasible. Nevertheless,
C≠richness leads to the optimality of the following class of mechanisms:
Definition 4. Mechanism M = (y, q) is a C≠mechanism if y(u) œ C for all feasible types u.
The presence of the dual types in the type space is su cient for the optimality of C
mechanisms, for three reasons. First, the dual type uC evaluates each characteristic x as if it
were instead its reduction „uC(x) onto C. Because the principal’s costs are increasing, it is
wasteful to allocate to the dual type any characteristic outside of C. Thus, it is without loss
of generality to restrict our search for optimal mechanisms to those that allocate to every
dual type some characteristic in C.
Second, the parent type u and the dual type uC derive the same utility for every
characteristic in C. Consequently, ifM is a C≠mechanism, then the allocation
1
y(uC), q(uC)
2
assigned to the dual type uC is individually rational and incentive compatible for the parent
type u.
Third, that principal can not distinguish between the the parent type u and the dual
type uC . To see why, note simply that if C ∏ X0, then u(x) = uC(x) for each characteristic
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x œ X0. Thus, the parent type and the dual type behave identically in the principal’s data.
We proceed now to the formalization of these arguments.
1.4.2 Optimal mechanisms
Suppose that U is C-rich for some closed set of characteristics C that includes every reference
allocation. Given an arbitrary mechanism M , we modify M into a C-mechanism MC that
guarantees the principal a larger payo . This establishes the optimality of C-mechanisms, up
to the existence of an optimal mechanism.
Our construction might be viewed as a two-step exercise. First, given an arbitrary feasible
type, we modify the characteristics allocated to its dual type by reducing these characteristics
onto the set C. By design, this reduction leaves the dual type agent indi erent, every other
type of agent worse o , and the principal better o . Consequently, in addition to providing
the principal with a higher payo , these modified allocations are both individually rational
and incentive compatible for the dual type agent.
In the second step, we show that it is individually rational and incentive compatible to
assign these modified allocations to the parent type agent. Because the parent type and dual
type belong to the same cell of agent types, this is su cient to establish that the modified
mechanism guarantees the principal a better payo  than the original mechanism. Formally,
define the truncation MC = (yC , qC) of M as follows:
yC(u) := „uC
1
y(uC)
2
qC(u) := q(uC).
See figure 1.3 for an illustration of this construction.
Lemma 1. If the set of feasible types U is C≠rich for some closed set of characteristics C
that includes every reference allocation, then the truncation MC of M is incentive compatible
and individually rational.
Proof. The proof has two parts. First, we show that MC is incentive compatible and
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yC(uC)
qC(uC)
y(uC)
q(uC)
y(u)
q(u)
uuC
M
„uC
MMCMC
Figure 1.3: Construction of the truncated mechanism MC .
individually rational on the restriction of U to UC . That is, we show that the following:
u
1
y(u)
2
≠ q(u) Ø u
1
y(‚u)2≠ q(‚u) ’u, ‚u œ UC
u
1
y(u)
2
≠ q(u) Ø 0 ’u œ UC .
Second, we extend this argument to all of U . Proceeding, let u œ U . By construction, we
have:
uC
1
yC(uC)
2
= uC
1
y(uC)
2
. (1.1)
Moreover, because (uC)C = uC , we have:
qC(uC) = q(uC). (1.2)
In words, equalities 1.1 and 1.2 establish respectively that the agent with type uC is indi erent
between the characteristics assigned him under the mechanisms M and MC , and also that
his transfer to the principal is the same. It follows immediately that MC is individually
rational for uC . Furthermore, by construction we have yC(‚u) Æ y1‚u2 for each ‚u œ UC . In
turn, monotonicity yields:
uC
1
yC(‚u)2 Æ uC1y(‚u)2. (1.3)
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Combining 1.1 and 1.3 yields:
uC
1
y(uC)
2
≠ uC
1
y(‚u)2 Æ uC1yC(u)2≠ u1y(‚u)2. (1.4)
Inequalities 1.2 and 1.4 establish that MC is incentive compatible for uC . Because we chose u
arbitrarily, this establishes that MC is individually rational and incentive compatible on UC .
To see why this extends to all of U , recall that MC assigns the same allocation to u as to uC :
yC(u) = yC(uC) (1.5)
qC(u) = q(uC). (1.6)
Moreover, because yC(uC) œ C, 1.5 and our definition of uC jointly yield the following:
u
1
yC(u)
2
= uC
1
yC(uC)
2
. (1.7)
Equalities 1.6 and 1.7 establish that MC is individually rational and incentive compatible
for u. Because we chose u arbitrarily, this establishes that MC is individually rational and
incentive compatible on U . This completes the proof.
As we have alluded to above, lemma 1 itself comes close to establishing that the truncated
mechanism MC provides a larger guarantee than the original mechanism M . To see why,
note that the truncated allocation yC(uC) is less in every component than y(uC). Because
costs are increasing and transfers to the principal are identical, the former allocation yields
the principal a higher payo . Moreover, the allocation intended for uC is also individually
rational and incentive compatible for u. Accordingly, in light of the fact that u and uC belong
to the same cell U(b) of agent types, the principal might as well allocate the two agent types
the same allocation.
Theorem 1. Suppose that the set of feasible types U is C≠rich for some closed set of
characteristics C that includes every reference allocation. Given any mechanism M , the
truncation MC of M yields a better guarantee than M :
ﬁ(M) Æ ﬁ(MC).
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Proof. It will be technically convenient to restrict our attention to discrete type distributions,
as justified by lemma 5, presented in the appendix. Our proof approach is to take an arbitrary
discrete type distribution µC œ  0, and construct a (potentially distinct) discrete type
distribution µ œ  0 such that:
ﬁ(M |µ) Æ ﬁ(MC |µC).
Because we do so for an arbitrary distribution µC œ  0, in doing so we establish the following
inequality, as desired:
ﬁ(M) Æ ﬁ(MC)
Accordingly, let µC œ  0 have finite support. For each u in the support of µC , let µ be the
distribution that satisfies the following equality:
µ(uC) = µC(u).
In words, µ assigns the same probability to the dual type uC as µC does to u. In light of our
hypothesis that C ∏ X0, we have that u(x) = uC(x) for all x œ X0. In turn, our assumption
of uniform tie-breaking implies that there exists b œ B such that u, uC œ U(b). Accordingly,
we have µ œ  0. Moreover, for each u œ U we have the following inequality, by construction:
ﬁ
1
y(uC), q(uC)
2
Æ ﬁ
1
yC(u), qC(u)
2
.
Consequently, we have the following:
ﬁ(M |µ) Æ ﬁ(MC |µC).
Because µC was chosen arbitrarily, this is su cient to establish ﬁ(M) Æ ﬁ(MC), as desired.
Theorem 1 establishes the optimality of C≠mechanisms, up to the existence of an optimal
mechanism. For the sake of completeness, we include an existence proof in the appendix,
under the additional hypotheses that the set of characteristics X is finite and the set of
feasible types U is compact.
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1.5 The monotone environment
In this section, we formalize the intuitive result that if the principal has no information about
the agent’s preferences outside of monotonicity, then it is optimal to only o er allocations
that coincide with the reference allocations in the principal’s data set. First, define as follows:
U0 : =
Ó
u : X æ R+|u(0) = 0, u is upper semicontinuous and increasing
Ô
.
We refer to the situation in which the set of feasible types U is equal to U0 as the monotone
environment. Knowledge that the agent’s type belongs to U0 reflects only the knowledge that
the agent prefers larger characteristics to smaller ones: e.g., that better products are weakly
preferred to worse products.
1.5.1 Characteristics
Given the paucity of information su ered by the principal in the monotone environment, the
following result follows naturally:
Proposition 1. Consider the monotone environment. Given any mechanism M , there exists
an X0≠mechanism M0 that yields a better guarantee than M :
ﬁ(M) Æ ﬁ(M0).
The proof of proposition 1 is structured as follows. First, we argue that the monotone
environment is X0≠rich. Given the permissive nature of the set U0, this is straightforward.
Having established the appropriate form of richness, we apply theorem 1 to obtain the result.
1.5.2 Incentive compatibility
In light of the lack of restrictions that the monotone environment imposes on the agent’s
preferences, proposition 1 should not be viewed as a theoretically surprising result. However,
the proposition is useful for obtaining stronger optimality results, the development of which
is the subject of the remainder of this section. Proceeding, it is useful to first introduce some
additional terminology:
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Definition. Given choice list b œ B, if either (x, p) dominates (y, q) or if there exists constant
  and index k such that:
(x, p+ ) = bk
(y, q + ) œ Bk,
then we say that (x, p) is revealed directly preferred to (y, q) for agent types in U(b).
The allocation (x, p) is revealed directly preferred to (y, q) if the choice data (or
monotonicity of the agent’s preferences) directly implies that (x, p) is preferred to (y, q).
Because the agent’s preferences are transitive, it is furthermore possible to string together
sequences of direct revealed preferences to make more subtle inferences:
Definition. Given choice list b œ B, if there exists a finite sequence (x1, p1), ..., (xJ , pJ) such
that:
1. (x1, p1) = (x, p);
2. (xJ , pJ) = (y, q);
3. (xj, pj) is directly revealed preferred to (xj+1, pj+1) for each j < J ,
then we say that (x, p) is revealed preferred to (y, q) for agent types in U(b) and write
(x, p) ≤b (y, q).
We say that (x, p) is revealed preferred to (y, q) if it is possible to construct a sequence of
allocations directly revealed preferred to one another that begins with (x, p) and ends with
(y, q).
Given an X0≠mechanism M , what can we say about which allocations included in M
are individually rational and incentive compatible for particular types of agents? Define as
follows:
Cb(M) : =
Ó
(x, p) œM |(y, q) œM, (y, q) ≤b (x, p) =∆ (y, q) = (x, p)
Ô
.
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The set Cb(M) is the set of allocations (x, p) œM with the property that no distinct allocation
(y, q) œ M is revealed preferred by the agent types in U(b) to (x, p). By construction, we
have the following:
Fact. Suppose that M is an X0≠mechanism. If allocation (x, p) œ Cb(M), then there exists
an agent type u œ U(b) to whom the allocation (x, p) is assigned by mechanism M .
Thus, if the principal’s choice data does not rule out the allocation of (x, p) to some agent
type in the group U(b), then the mechanism M necessarily allocates (x, p) to some type
u œ U(b). Furthermore, notwithstanding a caveat pertaining to tie-breaking that is presented
in the technical appendix as part of our proof of lemma 2, the converse essentially obtains:
every allocation that is assigned by mechanism M to some agent type in u œ U(b) belongs to
the choice set set Cb(M). Define as follows:
 b(M) := min(x,p)œCb(M)
ﬁ(x, p).
The quantity  b(M) is the worst-case payo  for the principal against the set Cb(M). Thus,
we obtain an expression of the principal’s payo :
Lemma 2. Consider the monotone environment, and suppose that X0≠mechanism M breaks
ties in favor of the principal. Then M guarantees the principal the following payo :
 (M) :=
⁄
B
 b(M)dµ0(b). (1.8)
Thus-far, we have shown both that X0≠mechanisms are optimal, and also how to compute
the payo  to a given X0≠mechanism. The next step is to study optimal pricing.
1.5.3 Prices
Optimal mechanisms use prices that are tightly related to the bounds on utility di erences
implied by the principal’s data. It will be useful to introduce a notation for these bounds.
For each choice list b œ B and reference characteristic x œ X0, define the set Pb(x) as follows:
Pb(x) := {y œ X0|there exist prices p, q such that (x, p) ≤b (y, q)}.
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Given reference characteristic x œ X0, the set Pb(x) is the set of reference characteristics y
such that (x, p) is certainly preferred to (y, q) by agents in group U(b), for appropriate prices
p and q. Put di erently, these are the characteristics y for which the following di erence is
bounded above:
u(x)≠ u(y).
It will be useful to introduce a notation for this upper bound. For each x œ X0 and y œ Pb(x),
define Vb(x, y) as follows:
Vb(x, y) := max{p≠ q|(x, p) ≤b (y, q)
Ô
.
The significance of this quantity is as follows:
(x, p) ≤b (y, q) ≈∆ Vb(x, y) Ø p≠ q.
Thus, if a mechanism M includes both allocations and the principal would like to allocate
(x, p) to agents who choose choice list b œ B in her data, it must be the case that prices p, q
satisfy the above inequality. Moreover, as we demonstrate, optimal mechanisms use prices
for which this bound is tight.
Definition 5. Given an X0≠mechanism M , we call M a reference mechanism if for each
(x, p) œM there exists a sequence of allocations (x1, p1), ..., (xJ , pJ) œM and a sequence of
choice lists b1, ..., bJ such that:
1. (x1, p1) = (x, p);
2. (xJ , pJ) = (0, 0);
3. (x1, p1) ≤b1 ... ≤bJ (xJ , pJ);
4. p = qJ≠1j=1 Vbj(xj, xj+1).
Reference mechanisms use prices that are derived from “summing up” the inequalities
implied by the principal’s data.
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Lemma 3. Given any mechanism M0, there exists a reference mechanism M that yields a
better guarantee than M0:
ﬁ(M0) Æ ﬁ(M).
1.5.4 Optimal mechanisms
We o er two remarks. First, our proof of lemma 3, which is presented in the appendix,
provides guidance on how to construct optimal prices. Second, because there are only finitely
many reference mechanisms, and we have already shown how to compute the payo  to a given
reference mechanism, we have thus established both that there exists a reference mechanism
that is optimal for the monotone environment, and provided a procedure for identifying it.
Theorem 2. There exists a reference mechanism that yields the highest-possible guarantee.
Equivalently, this mechanism is a maximizer for the function  .
1.6 Extrapolation
This section studies the form of optimal mechanisms for environments other than the monotone
environment considered in section 1.5. In particular, we consider two cases: first, in which the
principal knows that utility is homogeneous degree t for some range of values T , and second
in which the principal knows that utility exhibits diminishing returns. These environments
are unified by the feature that the principal has some information about how the agent’s
preferences scale across vertically di erentiated allocations, but has no information about how
the agent values horizontally di erentiated allocations. Because we restrict attention to the
case in which the set of characteristics is a vector space — e.g., a characteristic x is a vector
of quality or quantity attributes — we interpret this exercise as one in separability-robust
multidimensional screening. It will be convenient to introduce the following notation:
Xú :=
Ó
x œ X|x is vertically di erentiated from some nonzero characteristic ‚x œ X0Ô.
In words, Xú is the set of characteristics that are unambiguously better (or worse) than some
reference characteristic ‚x.
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Definition. Call mechanism M = (y, q) an update mechanism if M is an Xú≠mechanism.
All of the optimal mechanisms of this section will be update mechanisms.
1.6.1 The homogeneous environment
Thus-far, we have focused our attention on the case in which the set of feasible types U
includes every increasing utility function. As we have just seen, this informational environment
naturally yields optimal mechanisms that only allocate to the agent characteristics in the
principal’s data set. However, this specification of the type space might be viewed as an
extreme case, and our model yields richer results when the principal has more information.
For a first example, consider the additional hypothesis that the agent’s utility is
homogeneous.9 Given set T µ R+, define as follows:
UÏ :=
Ó
u œ U0|u is homogeneous degree t for some t œ T
Ô
.
We refer to the situation in which the set of feasible types U is equal to UÏ as the homogeneous
environment.
In the homogeneous environment, the principal’s data is informative about not only
the agent’s valuations for characteristics in X0, but also for many other characteristics.
Consequently, in general it is not the case that optimal mechanisms only allocate to the agent
reference allocations. Define as follows:
XÏ :=
Ó
x œ X|x = ⁄‚x for some reference allocation ‚x œ X0 and some scalar ⁄Ô.
Proposition 2. Suppose that the set of characteristics X is convex, and consider the
homogeneous environment. Given any mechanism M , there exists an XÏ≠mechanism MÏ
that yields a better guarantee:
ﬁ(M) Æ ﬁ(MÏ).
9Throughout this section, we assume that X is a subset of an arbitrary vector space V . We say that
u : X æ R+ is homogeneous degree t if u is the restriction to X of some function v : V æ R+ with the
property that v(⁄x) = ⁄tv(x) for each x œ V and each ⁄ Ø 0. We use t for degree rather than the typical k
to avoid confusion with the index for our choice sets Bk.
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In section A.4 of the appendix, we use proposition 2 to explicitly solve a special case of
the homogeneous environment, with some additional restrictions on the principal’s data and
her cost function c. More broadly, the proposition shows that if the set of characteristics X is
convex and the agent is known to have homogeneous utility of some degree t, then there are
optimal mechanisms that allocate to the agent characteristics that are proportional to the
reference allocations. The interpretation of this result is straightforward: while homogeneity
provides the principal with information about how the agent’s utility might scale vertically, it
says nothing about how the agent values horizontally di erentiated characteristics. Because
monotonicity also imposes no requirements on how the agent values horizontally di erentiated
characteristics, the principal does best to avoid assigning such allocations to the agent.
1.6.2 The diminishing returns environment
One natural environment in which a particular class of update mechanisms arise as optimal
is when the agent’s utility exhibits diminishing returns.10 Given constant u0, define the
diminishing returns environment as follows:
U¿ :=
Ó
u œ U0|u su ers diminishing returns
Ô
.
Much of our discussion in this section mirrors our discussion of the homogeneous environment.
As before, knowledge that the agent is willing to pay price p for allocation x contains
non-trivial information about the agent’s willingness to pay for every allocation that is
smaller than x. Unlike in the homogeneous environment, however, the principal’s data is
not informative about how the agent values characteristics that are larger than the reference
allocations. Define as follows:
X¿ :=
Ó
x œ X|x = ⁄‚x for some reference allocation ‚x œ X0 and some scalar ⁄ Æ 1Ô.
Proposition 3. Suppose that the set of characteristics X is convex, and consider the
10Throughout this subsection of the paper, we again assume that X is a subset of a vector space V . We
say that u exhibits diminishing returns if u : X æ R+ is the restriction to X of some function v : V æ R+
with the property that v(⁄x)/⁄ is decreasing in ⁄ for each x œ V .
35
diminishing returns environment. Given any mechanism M , there exists an X¿≠mechanism
M¿ that yields a better guarantee:
ﬁ(M) Æ ﬁ(M¿).
1.7 Discussion
Stepping back from the particulars of our model, what is the economic content of our finding
that update mechanisms are optimal? Simply put, update mechanisms are optimal because
they only assign allocations to the agent that are unambiguously better or worse than the
reference allocations in the data set. Because the agent’s preferences are monotone — which
corresponds to free disposal under quantity interpretations — the principal has information
about how the agent might value two goods when the first is superior to the second in every
component. Consequently, there are circumstances in which it is payo -improving for her to
o er allocations that di er from those in her data set, as is generically the case when she
uses an update mechanism.
However, because the agent’s utility in our model is not separable, it is not possible for the
principal to make useful extrapolations about his willingness-to-pay for alternatives that are
horizontally di erentiated from those in her data set, even when she observes population-level
choices from many data sets. Consequently, the principal does not have any information
about how the agent might value two goods when the first is superior to the second in some
components but inferior in others, unless she directly observes the agent choose between the
two goods in her data set (or between some dominating or dominated alternatives). This
unpredictably in the agent’s preferences can lead to both failures of individual rationality
and also unpredictable substitution patterns.
How should our results be interpreted? One way to evaluate our contribution from a
normative perspective is to consider the complexity of our optimal mechanisms. Arguably,
update mechanisms are simple for two reasons. First, update mechanisms assign the same
allocation to every agent type u with a common dual type uú. Interpreting the mechanism
design exercise as one in which the agent literally announces his type to the principal, update
mechanisms thus use a (potentially much) smaller message space than some other types of
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mechanisms.
A second way in which our optimal update mechanisms might be viewed as simple is
at the level of the individual allocation. Our result that update mechanisms are optimal
becomes increasingly sharper as the complexity of the set of characteristics X increases. For
example, if X is the Cartesian product of N totally ordered sets (Xn,Æn), then the ratio of
the size of the set of vertically di erentiated characteristics Xú to the size of entire design
space X declines exponentially as the number of reference allocations |X0| and N increase
proportionally. Of course, this observation is more meaningful for some applications — e.g.,
for a monopolist who sells complex multi-attribute products — than for others.
As a positive description of behavior, the predictions of our model seems to be at least
anecdotally consistent with observation. For example, automobile manufacturers seem to in
many (but not all) years o er updated model-year versions of their products that more closely
resemble an improved version of last year’s model than an entirely new vehicle. Similarly,
technology companies that sell a variety of e.g. computers or cell phones might regularly
o er improved versions of existing products, and less frequently drop existing products or
introduce inexpensively-priced products that are horizontally di erentiated from flagship
o erings. At the very least, our results highlight virtues of these strategies.
Finally, this paper hopes to be useful by providing an example of how the tools of robust
mechanism design can be integrated with choice data to provide solutions to economic design
problems. In particular, this approach seems to be promising for problems in which data
contains useful but somehow limited information about preferences or other features of the
environment.
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CHAPTER 2
ROBUST INCENTIVES FOR RISK
2.1 Introduction
Consider the problem faced by a principal in designing incentives for a risk-taking agent with
unknown risk preferences. The principal would like for the agent to exert e ort1, which is
unobserved and costly for the agent, and so she uses a contract that conditions transfers to
the agent on the output that he produces. Because output is stochastic, such contracts expose
the agent to risk. In the face of risk, di erent types of agents take di erent types of risks:
risk-neutral agents prefer actions that yield large average transfers, risk-averse agents seek
safety, and risk-seeking agents choose high-risk actions that are likely to produce undesirable
outcomes. If the principal desires a contract that performs well in all possible circumstances,
what sort of contract should she use?
This paper studies a general moral hazard problem in which the principal is uncertain
about the agent’s risk preferences and production technology. The principal evaluates
contracts according to their worst-case payo  against the set of potential agent preferences
and production technologies.
In this environment, contracts that specify transfers that are not constant over any interval
of outputs — which we call fully-contingent — do not guarantee the principal a payo  that
is larger than her payo  if the agent shirks, even if e ort is costless for the agent. To see
why, suppose that the agent can choose to either shirk and produce no output, or exert
high e ort and choose from several output distributions. If the agent exerts high e ort, he
chooses between a risky action that produces high expected output and a safe action that
rarely produces low output. If the principal uses a contract with transfers that are strictly
increasing in output, then the safe action is less likely to yield a small transfer than the risky
action. Accordingly, su ciently risk-averse agents prefer the safe action, even if it produces
1We use the term e ort generically to refer to the agent’s disutility from actions.
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little output in expectation. For analogous reasons, fully-contingent contracts provide risk-
seeking agents with incentives to take all-or-nothing risks that are again undesirable from the
principal’s perspective.
There are simple conditions under which a contract does not provide the agent with
incentives to take extreme risks, regardless of his preferences. We call a contract flat at the
bottom if it assigns its minimum transfer to an interval that includes the smallest possible level
of output. Contracts that are flat at the bottom do not reward the agent for producing low
output, and thus do not provide risk-averse agents with incentives to choose very safe actions.
Symmetrically, contracts that assign their maximum transfer to an interval that includes the
largest possible level of output belong to a class of contracts that we call flat at the top. Just
as contracts that are flat at the bottom do not provide risk-averse agents with incentives to
choose very safe actions, contracts that are flat at the top do not provide risk-seeking agents
with incentives to choose very risky actions. There are many partially-contingent contracts
that satisfy both of these conditions, and all such contracts guarantee the principal a payo 
that is larger than if the agent shirks, provided that transfers are appropriately-sized and
e ort is not too costly for the agent.
The contributions of this paper are twofold. First, we demonstrate that partially-contingent
contracts protect the principal from risk-taking, even when the agent has extreme risk
preferences. Such contracts are widely used in practice, especially in executive compensation,
where they have been identified as typical
1
Murphy (1999, 2013)
2
. These contracts are
sometimes identified as “80/120 plans”, which refers to an especially prevalent contractual
form in which the executive’s compensation varies only when his performance measure is
between 80% and 120% of a specified target. The use of these contracts in practice is not
theoretically well-understood2, and they are regarded as sub-optimal by researchers who
propose that they be replaced with piece-rate compensation schemes
1
Murphy and Jensen
(2011)
2
. In particular, these bonus plans do not provide stronger incentives for performance
at 75% of the target level than they do for 10%, nor do they reward the executive who doubles
his target any more than one who exceeds it by 25%. While this feature is a deficiency
2Partially-contingent contracts do appear as solutions to special cases of canonical contracting models —
for example, in the setting studied in Hölmstrom (1979) — if e.g. the monotone likelihood ratio property fails
to hold but the principal nevertheless demands a contract with transfers that are strictly increasing in output.
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when the agent’s risk preferences are known, it is also exactly why these contracts exhibit
robustness to risk-taking by an agent with unknown risk preferences.
The second contribution of the paper lies in complementing the surprisingly limited
literature on contracting with diversely risk-averse agents
1
de Meza and Webb (2001); Jullien,
Salanié, and Salanié (2007)
2
. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to study
risk-taking by an agent with unknown risk preferences.3
There is a growing body of work that considers mechanism design problems with worst-
case objectives or other related criteria, often where agents have complex private information1
López-Cunat (2000); Chung and Ely (2007); Chassang (2013); Frankel (2014); Garrett (2014);
Carroll (2015, 2016); Carroll and Meng (2016a,b); Carroll (2017); Auster (2018); Antic (2014);
Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris (2017); Marku and Díaz (2017); Dai and Toikka (2017)
2
.
This literature includes at least two papers in which the agent’s preferences are unknown
to the principal
1
Frankel (2014), Garrett (2014)
2
, in contexts other than moral hazard.
Authors in this literature and elsewhere o er a variety of justifications for worst-case analysis,
including both tractability
1
Hansen and Sargent (2007)
2
and its tendency to select simple
mechanisms. More directly, Carroll (2015) argues that the exhibition of mechanisms that
perform well in a wide variety of environments is a useful exercise when studying situations
in which real-world principals might themselves work with approximate models. We adopt a
worst case criterion in the present paper in part because it provides the simplest language
in which to communicate our central finding, which is that partially-contingent contracts
exhibit robustness to risk-taking in ways that fully-contingent contracts do not.
The paper is organized as follows. We describe our model in section 2.2, and present our
analysis in section 2.3. Lastly, we discuss the related literature in greater detail and conclude
in section 2.4. Technical material is given in appendix B, along with extensions.
3The author is engaged in an ongoing research project that studies the use of stochastic contracts in
aligning the agent’s risk-taking behavior with the principal’s objectives
!
Rosenthal (2018)
"
. This project
considers an environment in which the principal is subject to only local uncertainty about the agent’s risk
preferences, but has much less information about his choice technology than in the present paper. Furthermore,
the present paper restricts attention to deterministic contracts, which seems to be a sensible restriction for
many applications.
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2.2 Model
2.2.1 Output, actions, and contracts
The set of potential values Y µ R+ for output y is an interval Y = [0,Y ], with Y > 0. Actions
are pairs (F, e) œ  (Y)◊ R+, where output y is distributed according to F and the agent’s
non-negative private cost e is referred to generically as e ort. The agent chooses actions from
compact4 set A µ  (Y)◊ R+, which we refer to as the agent’s technology. The principal is
constrained by limited liability, and upper semicontinuous contracts w : Y æ R+ reward the
agent with a non-negative transfer w(y) when his chosen action produces output y.
2.2.2 The agent’s preferences
The agent in our model chooses both how much e ort to exert and also what risks to take.
His preferences thus describe the extent of his disutility from e ort, and also his preferences
over financial lotteries. The agent is an expected utility maximizer with additively separable
preferences:
Assumption 3. The agent is an expected utility maximizer. His utility function v : R+ ◊
R+ æ R over transfer-e ort pairs (t, e) is additively separable:
v(t, e) = u(t)≠ k(e).
The function u is strictly increasing, continuous, and satisfies u(0) = 0. The function k is
non-decreasing, continuous, and satisfies k(0) = 0.
We call v the agent’s type, and emphasize that both the risk preference u and the
cost-of-e ort function k are idiosyncratic to the agent’s type.
4We give the set of Borel probability distributions  (Y) the topology of weak convergence, R+ the
Euclidean topology, and  (Y)◊ R+ the corresponding product topology. We write ”x for the distribution
that assigns probability 1 to the event x, and ”px for the distribution that assigns probability p to event x and
probability 1≠ p to event 0. Weak convergence is naturally compatible with the continuous and bounded
utility functions and upper semicontinuous contracts considered in our model: in particular, our choice of
topology endows the agent’s expected utility functional with upper semicontinuity. In addition to providing
for the existence of a solution to the agent’s problem, our choice of topology plays a substantive role in our
problem, because our results rely on an assumption that the principal is (at least) locally uncertain about the
agent’s production technology.
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In this paper, the principal does not know the agent’s type. Instead, she knows the
identity of some set V to which it belongs. We call V the environment, and focus our analysis
on cases in which V is large. In particular, define as follows:
UA =
Ó
u : R+ æ R|u is strictly increasing, continuous, weakly concave, and u(0) = 0
Ô
U =
Ó
u : R+ æ R|u is strictly increasing, continuous, and u(0) = 0
Ô
.
Assumption 4. The environment V includes at least one type v with risk preference u for
each risk preference in either UA or U .
We emphasize that throughout the paper, we consider only environments V that satisfy
assumption 4. If V includes at least one type v with risk preference u for every risk preference
u in UA, we call V an environment with risk aversion. If V includes at least one type v with
risk preference u for every risk preference u in the larger set U , we call V an environment
without risk aversion. For the purposes of assumption 4, we identify risk preferences that are
a ne transformations of one another.
2.2.3 The agent’s production technology
In addition to her uncertainty about the agent’s type v, the principal is also uncertain about
the agent’s production technologyA. In particular, at the time of contracting, the principal
knows only a lower bound A0 and an upper bound A1 for the agent’s technologyA in the set
inclusion order µ.
Assumption 5. The agent’s technology A satisfies A0 µ A. The lower bound A0 is compact
and satisfies the following criteria:
1. (shirking) A0 contains (”0, 0);
2. (costly production) A0 contains (F, 0) only if F = ”0;
3. (risky production) if (F, e) œ A0 and e > 0, then F has full support on Y;
4. (non-triviality) A0 contains at least one action (F, e) with F ”= ”0.
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Assumption 6. The agent’s technology A satisfies A µ A1. The upper bound A1 is open in
 (Y)◊ R+.
Label as A the set of feasible technologies A that satisfy assumptions 5 and 6. At the
time of contracting, the principal does not know the identity of the agent’s technology A,
but does know the identity of the set of feasible technologies A .
This environment is a bounded version of the framework developed in Carroll (2015). In
particular, assumption 6 admits the special case5 A1 =  (Y)◊ R+, in which our model of
the agent’s technology reduces to that of Carroll (2015), augmented with some additional
restrictions. With regards to assumption 5, the costly production assumption is for technical
convenience only6, and the non-triviality assumption ensures that our problem is interesting
to study. The full support assumption, feasible shirking assumption, and assumption 6 are
more substantive. In brief, the combination of these assumptions provides for two important
possibilities:
1. the agent faces a trade-o  between risky actions that produce high expected output,
and safe actions that produce low expected output;
2. the agent faces a trade-o  between risky actions that produce high expected output, and
all-or-nothing actions that produce very high output with relatively high probability
but no output otherwise.
The interaction of the first type of technology with risk-averse agents, and the second type
of technology with risk-seeking agents, lead to our necessary conditions for contracts that
exhibit robustness to risk-taking. We discuss this point in detail in section 2.3.
The agent’s choice correspondence and payo  are respectively indicated as follows, for
5Our results hold under all specifications of A1, except in proposition 8, wherein we study the optimality of
binary contracts in a special case of our model that assumes — along with other restrictions —A1 =  (Y)◊R+.
More generally, were we to restrict our attention to this case throughout the paper, the feasible shirking
assumption would be unnecessary.
6Because the shirking action does not yield an output distribution with full support, requiring that
expected output vanishes as e ort approaches 0 streamlines some of our proofs. This assumption can be
readily relaxed, at the cost of introducing some mild complications.
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technology A, type v, and contract w:
c(A|v, w) := argmax
(F,e)œA
EF
Ë
v
1
w(y), e
2È
V (A|v, w) := max
(F,e)œA
EF
Ë
v
1
w(y), e
2È
.
In lemma 8, stated in the appendix, we demonstrate that c(A|v, w) is non-empty.
2.2.4 The principal’s preferences
The principal has strictly increasing and concave utility function up : Ræ R with u(0) © 0.
Her payo  when the agent’s technology is A and his type is v is as follows:
ﬁ(A|v, w) := min
(F,e)œc(A|v,w)
EF
Ë
up
1
y ≠ w(y)
2È
.
We normalize up(0) © 0. In order to ensure that our problem is well-defined, we break ties
against the principal.7 The principal’s worst-case payo  against the environment V and the
set of feasible technologies A is as follows:
ﬁ(A |V , w) := inf
(v,A)œV◊A
ﬁ(A|v, w).
We call ﬁ(A |V , w) the guarantee provided by contract w, and say that w provides a guarantee
if ﬁ(A |V , w) > 0.
2.2.5 Timing and summary
The interaction between the principal and the agent is as follows:
1. the principal — knowing the environment V and the set of feasible technologies A —
chooses a contract w;
7We allow for upper semicontinuous contracts because there are discontinuous contracts that warrant
discussion in our problem. Because y ≠w(y) is thus lower semicontinuous but not necessarily continuous, the
principal’s payo  achieves its minimum on the compact set c(A|v, w) but does not necessarily achieve its
maximum. We break ties against the principal in order to ensure that our problem is well-defined. Technical
details aside, our tie-breaking rule seems conceptually compatible with the worst-case criterion considered in
this paper.
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2. the agent — knowing his type v and his technology A — chooses the action (F, e) in
the set c(A|v, w) that minimizes the principal’s expected payo  EF
Ë
up
1
y ≠ w(y)
2È
;
3. output y is drawn from distribution F ;
4. the agent’s payo  is u
1
w(y)
2
and the principal’s payo  is up
1
y ≠ w(y)
2
.
2.3 Analysis
In our model, the agent’s production technology is multi-dimensional, in the sense that he
chooses both e ort and also the distribution of output. Consequently, in addition to the
usual problem of providing incentives for e ort, the principal must also provide incentives for
the agent to take risks that are desirable from her perspective. Both of these considerations
are complicated by the principal’s uncertainty about the agent’s risk preferences. We proceed
by first studying the set of contracts that guarantee the principal a positive payo  when
e ort is costless for the agent. In doing so, we focus our discussion entirely on the problem of
providing robust incentives for risk-taking to agents with unknown risk preferences. After
doing so, we return to the usual case in which e ort is costly for the agent, and discuss the
extent to which our results hold in this more general setting. In addition, we exhibit a special
case of our model in which binary contracts with only two transfer levels are optimal.
2.3.1 Partially-contingent contracts
First, we describe our contractual forms of interest. Given a contract w, define as follows:
B(w) := argmin
yœY
w(y)
T (w) := argmax
yœY
w(y).
Simply put, B(w) is the set of minimizers for w and T (w) the set of maximizers. We introduce
two corresponding criteria, which we show to be necessary conditions for the principal to
secure a guarantee.
Definition 6. Call a contract w flat at the bottom if [0, x] µ B(w) for some x > 0.
45
wFC
Output y
T
ra
n
sf
er
w
(y
)
(a) fully-contingent
wB
B(wB)
Output y
T
ra
n
sf
er
w
(y
)
(b) flat at the bottom
wT
T (wT )
Output y
T
ra
n
sf
er
w
(y
)
(c) flat at the top
Figure 2.1: Contracts which satisfy our flatness criteria.
Definition 7. Call a contract w flat at the top if PF [T (w)] > 0 for some (F, e) œ A0 with
e > 0.
Contracts that are flat at the bottom are constant on some neighborhood of 0 output.
Moreover, the transfer assigned to this neighborhood is the minimum transfer assigned by
the contract. Contracts that are flat at the top assign their maximum transfer to a set
of outputs T (w) that the agent is capale of producing with positive probability. We call
contracts that satisfy both of these criteria partially-contingent, and contracts which satisfy
neither fully-contingent. See figure 2.1 for illustration.
There are asymmetries between our two criteria. First, flat at the bottom is a physical
requirement, while flat at the top is statistical. Second, the precise analogue to our flat
at the bottom criterion is an alternative version of definition 7 in which we require that
[x,Y] µ T (w) for some x < Y. Accordingly, there is a sense in which our flat at the top
criterion is strictly more permissive than our flat at the bottom criterion.8 Why?
When the principal uses a contract that fails to be flat at the bottom, the agent might
choose safe actions that produce a small quantity of positive output with high probability,
as we demonstrate. However, when she uses a contract that fails to be flat at the top, the
agent might choose actions that produce a high level of output with low probability — and
no output otherwise — as we also demonstrate. In the former situation, what drives the
principal’s payo  is the low quantity of output. Hence, the physical nature of our flat at the
8Definition 7 and the alternative criterion proposed in this paragraph are identical if we restrict our
attention to monotone contracts and assume that actions (F, e) œ A0 other than (”0, 0) have continuous
output distributions. Although the latter assumption seems innocuous, the restriction to monotone contracts
seems more heavy-handed, and is not pursued here.
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Figure 2.2: The incentive region I(w), shaded.
bottom criterion. However, in the latter situation, what drives the principal’s low payo  is
the low probability that positive output is produced. Hence, the statistical nature of our flat
at the top criterion.
We proceed with a concrete example. It will be useful to introduce some terminology
related to definitions 6 and 7. Define as follows:
I(w) := inf Y \ B(w)
I(w) := inf T (w).
In words, I(w) and I(w) are the smallest and largest levels of output that the agent has
strict incentives to produce, respectively. We call I(w) := [I(w), I(w)] the incentive region.
See figure 2.2 for illustration.
Consider full support output distribution F œ  (Y). We ask: what sort of distributions
G might the agent prefer to F under a particular non-constant contract w? If the agent is
risk-averse, he might prefer distributions G that assign a smaller probability than F to the
bottom of the output range B(w):
PF [B(w)] > PG[B(w)]. (2.1)
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Inequality 2.1 yields a lower bound for EG[y]:
EG[y] >
1
1≠ PF [B(w)]
2
· I(w).
A necessary condition for this quantity to be positive is I(w) > 0, which in turn yields our
flat at the bottom criterion.9 Relatedly, suppose that the agent is risk-seeking. He might
prefer distributions G that assign a larger probability than F to the top of the output range
T (w):
PG[T (w)] > PF [T (w)]. (2.2)
As above, inequality 2.2 yields a lower bound for EG[y]:
EG[y] > PF [T (w)] · I(w).
A necessary condition for this quantity to be positive is PF [T (w)] > 0, which in turn yields
our flat at the top criterion.10 There are two situations in which T (w) might not be a
non-degenerate interval [x,Y ] for a contract w that is nevertheless flat at the top. First, if F
has a mass point at the top of the output range Y , then T (w) might only include Y . Second,
if w only achieves its maximum on the interior of Y , then T (w) might exclude Y .
Our discussion thus far suggests that contracts that do not satisfy our flatness criteria
might give the agent an incentive to choose either extremely safe or extremely risky actions.
This turns out to indeed be the case, and we formalize this observation in section 2.3.2.
Conversely, is it true that contracts that do satisfy these criteria do not provide perverse
incentives for risk-taking, regardless of the agent’s preferences? It turns out that the answer
is yes, up to some mild additional mild conditions.
Definition 8. Call w a capped bonus contract if w is flat at the bottom; flat at the top;
increasing; non-constant; and satisfies w(y) Æ y for all y, with equality if and only if y = 0.
In addition to satisfying both of our flatness criteria, capped bonus contracts reward
the agent with appropriately-sized transfers. We also require monotonicity, for expository
9It is also necessary that 1≠ PF [B(w)] > 0, but the full support assumption ensures that this is vacuously
satisfied by any contract that is not almost-everywhere constant.
10It is also necessary that I(w) > 0, but this is vacuously satisfied by any contract that is not constant.
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Figure 2.3: A capped bonus contract wCB.
purposes only. See figure 2.3 for illustration.
To see why capped bonus contracts might perform well in our environment, return to our
example with full support output distribution F . Suppose that w is a capped bonus contract,
and that some alternative output distribution G is preferred by the agent to F under w.
First, because w is increasing, it must be the case that the following inequality holds for
some quantity of output x in the incentive region I(w):
PG[y Ø x] Ø PF [y Ø x]. (2.3)
Second, because w is a capped bonus contract — i.e., because transfers are not too large —
by definition we have that y≠w(y) Ø 0 for all output levels y, with equality only if y = 0. In
turn, we obtain the following bound for the principal’s payo  under output distribution G:
EG
Ë
up
1
y ≠ w(y)
2È
Ø PG[y Ø x] · up
1
x≠ w(x)
2
. (2.4)
Because F has full support and w is flat at the top, PF [y Ø x] > 0. Accordingly, combining
2.3 and 2.4 reveals that the payo  to the principal from G is bounded below by some quantity
strictly larger than 0. Thus, we see that capped bonus contracts yield at least partial
alignment between the principal’s objectives and the agent’s risk-taking behavior, regardless
of his preferences.
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Figure 2.4: A binary contract wbin.
Of course, there are many examples of capped bonus contracts, some of which are quite
complex. As a final matter, we introduce a particularly simple class of contracts that that
satisfy both of our flatness criteria. Define as follows:
Definition 9. Call w a binary contract if w is as follows, for Q µ Y closed and b > 0:
w(y) =
Y__]__[
s y /œ Q
s+ b y œ Q.
Binary contracts pay the agent a salary s, and a bonus payment b for achieving quota
Q. See figure 2.4 for illustration. Provided that the principal chooses a reasonable quota Q,
binary contracts do not provide incentives for the agent to take extreme risks, regardless of
his preferences. For example, return for a final time to our example with full support output
distribution F . Given alternative output distribution G and risk preferences u, uÕ, we have
the following:
EG
Ë
u
1
w(y)
2È
Ø EF
Ë
u
1
w(y)
2È
≈∆ PG[Q] Ø PF [Q]
≈∆ EG
Ë
uÕ
1
w(y)
2È
Ø EF
Ë
uÕ
1
w(y)
2È
.
Thus, binary contracts provide the same incentives for risk-taking to each type of agent. As a
50
partial consequence of this fact, there are special cases of our model in which these contracts
are optimal for the principal.
2.3.2 Costless e ort
This section formalizes the discussion of section 2.3.1. First, we make concrete the notion
that e ort is costless for the agent. Define as follows:
V0A :=
Ó
v|v(t, e) = u(t) for u œ UA
Ô
V0 :=
Ó
v|v(t, e) = u(t) for u œ U
Ô
.
We clarify that V0A includes the agent type v(t, e) = u(t) for every u œ UA, and similarly for
V0 and u œ U . We call the case of our model in which V = V0A the costless e ort environment
with risk aversion, and similarly the case with V = V0 the costless e ort environment without
risk aversion.
We proceed now to the statement of our formal results. First, contracts that provide
guarantees are flat at the bottom, in both the costless e ort environment with risk aversion
and the costless e ort environment without risk aversion:
Proposition 4. Consider either the costless e ort environment with risk aversion or the
costless e ort environment without risk aversion. If contract w guarantees the principal a
positive payo , then w is flat at the bottom.
Contracts that are not flat at the bottom provide some types of agents with incentives to
choose safe actions that produce little output in expectation, provided that such actions are
feasible.
To see why, suppose for the purposes of simplicity that A0 contains only two actions:
a high-e ort risky action (F, e), and the shirking action (”0, 0). In our model, the agent’s
technology A might include additional actions that are similar to those in A0. For any fixed
agent type, if the principal’s uncertainty about the agent’s technology is su ciently minor
— that is, if A1 is not much larger than A0 — then the principal is assured that the agent
will choose either the high-e ort action (F, e), or a di erent action with a similar output
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distribution. This is a natural consequence of the continuity of our choice of topology on
 (Y)◊ R+, in which the agent’s payo  is upper semicontinuous.
However, regardless of the extent of the principal’s uncertainty about the agent’s technology,
if the principal uses a contract that is not flat at the bottom, there are low-output feasible
actions that some agent types strictly prefer to (F, e). In particular, su ciently risk-averse
agents prefer actions (”x, 0) for which x is assigned a non-minimal transfer w(x). To see
why, note that because output distribution F has full support over Y, the agent receives
transfers that are strictly smaller than w(x) with positive probability if he chooses the action
(F, e). This is not the case when he chooses the risk-less11 action (”x, 0). Thus, if the agent is
su ciently risk-averse, he strictly prefers the latter action to the former. Because we assume
that the principal is at least somewhat uncertain about the agent’s production technology,
the safe action (”x, 0) is feasible for all x su ciently small. Straightforward generalizations of
this argument yield a proof of proposition 4.
One interpretation of proposition 4 is that contracts that are not flat at the bottom do
not provide the agent with adequate incentives to take on risk, because such contracts are too
generous in rewarding the agent for producing low levels of output. However, the principal
only likes for the agent to choose risky actions that produce high output in expectation.
This is not a feature of all high-risk actions. If the agent is not necessarily risk-averse,
fully-contingent contracts provide incentives for some types of agents to engage in excessive
risk-taking:
Proposition 5. Consider the costless e ort environment without risk aversion. If contract
w guarantees the principal a positive payo , then w is flat at the top.
The mechanics of proposition 5 are symmetric to that of proposition 4. If the principal
uses a contract that provides the strongest incentives only for output levels that the agent is
unlikely to produce, the principal provides some types of agents with incentives to choose
high-risk, low-expected-output actions, provided that such actions are feasible.
11There is inconsistency in our application of the full support assumption: in particular, we require F to
have full support for (F, e) œ A0, but do not extend this requirement to other actions in A1. While this is a
natural objection, every output distribution F œ  (Y) can be continuously transformed into a full support
output distribution by mixing F with full support distribution G œ  (Y). Consequently, extending the full
support assumption to A1 is vacuous and does not change our results.
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To see why, suppose again that A0 contains only the high-e ort action (F, e) and the
shirking action (”0, 0). Just as is in our discussion of proposition 4: for any fixed agent type,
the principal is protected from extreme risk-taking if she is only slightly uncertain about
the agent’s production technology. This is true regardless of what sort of contract that the
principal uses.
However, if the principal uses a contract that is not flat at the top, there are again
low-output feasible actions that some agent types prefer to (F, e): in particular, actions (”px, 0)
with w(x) large and p small. To see why, suppose for the purposes of illustration that w is
strictly increasing, and further that F is continuous. The probability with which the agent
earns a transfer that is at least w(x) if he chooses the high-output action (F, e) vanishes
to 0 as x approaches the maximum feasible output level Y. Consequently, if the agent is
su ciently risk-seeking, he might prefer long-shot actions (”px, 0) with p > PF [y Ø x] to
(F, e), even if p is small. Because the principal is at least slightly uncertain about the agent’s
technology, it is again the case that (”px, 0) is feasible for all p su ciently small, regardless of
the size of output x. The proof of proposition 5 is then a generalization of this logic.12
The above discussions suggest that the presence of even minor uncertainty about the
agent’s technology has a considerable role to play in our problem. In appendix B.6, we
demonstrate by counterexample that propositions 4 and 5 do not hold as stated if there is
instead no uncertainty about technology. Accordingly, if the principal uses a fully-contingent
contract, then she su ers discontinuous payo  losses from the introduction of uncertainty
about the agent’s technology. However, capped bonus contracts do not share this feature:
Proposition 6. Consider the costless e ort environment with risk aversion or the costless
e ort environment without risk aversion. If contract w is a capped bonus contract, then w
guarantees the principal a positive payo .
In presenting proposition 6 as stated, we acknowledge that we have not provided an exact
converse to propositions 4 and 5. In particular, although we require that capped bonus
12The full support assumption does not play a prominent role in the proof of proposition 5. Instead, one
can imagine a loosely analogous role to be played by a continuity restriction to each (F, e) œ A0 with e > 0.
Under this alternative hypothesis, it is possible to strengthen our flat at the top criterion, so that contracts
which are flat at the top are required to achieve their maximum on a set of outputs with positive Lebesgue
measure. This is not pursued here.
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contracts are increasing, this is for expository purposes only. Separately, contracts that
guarantee the principal a positive payo  need not be flat at the top if the agent is known to
be risk-averse. Finally, recall that definition 8 stipulates restrictions to the size of transfers
to the agent. Without such restrictions, it need not be true that capped bonus contracts
guarantee the principal a positive payo , even in the costless e ort environment.13
Having described the set of contracts that provide the principal with a guarantee in
the costless e ort environment, what can we say about which contracts provide the largest-
possible guarantee? In fact, no such contracts exist in this setting, because the principal does
best to use a contract with arbitrarily small transfers. However, if the principal’s objective
depends only on output, rather than net output, then binary contracts guarantee her the
largest-possible quantity of expected revenue:
Proposition 7. Consider the costless e ort environment without risk aversion, and suppose
that the agent’s production technology is unbounded above, so that A1 =  (Y)◊R+. Suppose
further that the principal’s objective is to maximize expected revenue, so that her payo  when
she uses contract w is as follows:
ﬁú(A|v, w) := min
(F,e)œc(A|v,w)
EF [y]
ﬁú(A |V , w) := inf
(v,A)œV◊A
ﬁú(A|v, w).
There exists a binary contract that provides the largest-possible revenue guarantee for the
principal: i.e., a binary contract that maximizes the quantity ﬁú.
The substance of the proof of proposition 7 lies in establishing that there are risk
preferences that respond to any contract as if that contract were instead a binary contract.
Consequently, the principal does just as well in terms of revenue to indeed use a binary
contract.14
13It is possible to reformulate our flatness criteria and the definition of a capped bonus contract so that
proposition 8 is a tight converse to propositions 4 and 5, but this is not pursued here.
14In interpreting the proposition, it should be acknowledged that in the context of economic theory, revenue
maximization is perhaps an unusual objective. On the other hand, it seems plausible that there might be
practical circumstances for which it is relevant.
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2.3.3 Costly e ort
In propositions 4 and 5, we provide necessary conditions for contracts that guarantee the
principal a positive payo , in the form of our two flatness criteria. For expository purposes,
we state these propositions for the special cases of the costless e ort environments. However,
both propositions hold broadly, as long as assumption 4 is satisfied:
Remark 4. Consider any environment with risk aversion or any environment without risk
aversion. If contract w guarantees the principal a positive payo , then w is flat at the bottom.
Remark 5. Consider any environment without risk aversion. If contract w guarantees the
principal a positive payo , then w is flat at the top.
The proofs of propositions 4 and 5 presented in the appendix are written for the general
cases described in remarks 4 and 5, respectively.
Relatedly, in proposition 6 we show that if e ort is costless for the agent, then capped
bonus contracts guarantee the principal a positive payo . It is not the case that this result
can be extended to arbitrary environments, as is the case with the earlier two propositions.
However, it is also not necessary that e ort be costless in order for there to be contracts that
guarantee the principal a positive payo . The principal might also obtain a guarantee if the
agent has more moderate preferences.
In particular, provided that the quota and bonus payment are su ciently generous and
e ort is not too burdensome for the agent, binary contracts provide strong enough incentives
for e ort to guarantee the principal a positive payo . Moreover, there are special cases in
which these contracts provide the largest-possible guarantee:
Proposition 8. There exists an environment V without risk aversion and a binary contract
w such that:
1. w guarantees the principal a positive payo  for environment V; and
2. if the agent’s production technology is unbounded above — that is, A1 =  (Y)◊ R+ —
then w yields the largest-possible payo  guarantee for the principal.
Proposition 8 should be interpreted with caution: binary contracts are not in general
optimal in our model. Instead, our result should be viewed as a finding of optimality for
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particular environments V , which we describe in appendix B.3. Specifically, binary contracts
are optimal when the agent is not necessarily risk-averse, the agent has quasilinear preferences,
the set of feasible potential production technologies is unbounded above15, and certain types
of risk-seeking agent types su er (weakly) higher disutility from e ort than agents with other
types of risk preferences.
In detail, the optimality of binary contracts in the environment of proposition 8 arises
as a consequence of three considerations. First, su ciently risk-seeking agents interpret
every contract approximately as if it were a binary contract. More precisely, we show that
for any contract w, there exists a similarly generous binary contract wÕ under which these
risk-seeking agent types choose (approximately) identical risks. Second, because binary
contracts provide uniform incentives for risk-taking, the principal thus provides no worse
incentives for risk-taking when she uses the binary contract w than she does when she uses
the original contract wÕ, regardless of the agent’s preferences. Third, if the same agents
that choose identical risks under w and wÕ also exert less e ort than other agents, then wÕ
guarantees the principal a payo  that is no worse than that guaranteed by w. While the first
two elements of the above argument are true in general, the third element follows from our
choice of the environment V . Thus, the relationship between risk preferences and e ort costs
is an important determinant of the form of the optimal contract.16
2.4 Discussion and conclusions
This paper develops a model of moral hazard in which the principal does not know the agent’s
risk preferences. We establish circumstances under which fully-contingent contracts do not
guarantee the principal a larger payo  than her payo  if the agent shirks, regardless of how
costly e ort is for the agent. Conversely, we see that contracts which are flat at the bottom
and flat at the top, as appropriate, do not share this feature, provided that transfers are
not too large. Partially-contingent contracts that satisfy these criteria are widely used in
practice, and we highlight virtues of these incentive schemes.
Our results depart from classic results in agency theory that fully-contingent contracts are
15That is, A1 =  (Y)◊ R+, as in Carroll (2015).
16The characterization of optimal contracts for our model in general is di cult and we do not pursue this
endeavor here.
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generically optimal for strictly risk-averse agents
1
Hölmstrom (1979)
2
.17 Here, the agent’s
risk preferences are known to the principal and his choice technology is one-dimensional, so
that risk-taking is not an ingredient of the model. The principal would like to insure the agent
because doing so lessens the cost of providing incentives for e ort, and the optimal way to
provide both insurance and incentives is to use a contract with transfers that vary everywhere
with output. On the other hand, providing insurance in the form of strict incentives for even
low levels of productivity is dangerous for our principal, as we have seen.
Recent papers have considered environments in which the principal knows the agent’s risk
preferences, but the agent’s production technology is multi-dimensional
1
Chassang (2013);
Carroll (2015); Antic (2014); Barron et al. (2017)
2
. In such environments, it is possible for the
principal to tailor a fully-contingent contract so that the agent chooses actions that maximize
her own payo  (conditional on e ort), and this is sometimes a first-order consideration for
the principal. For example, there are natural environments in which linear contracts are
optimal when the principal and the agent are both financially risk-neutral
1
Chassang (2013);
Carroll (2015)
2
.
More generally — and of particular relevance for our paper — an early version18 of Carroll
(2015) establishes that utility-a ne contracts are optimal if the principal and the agent have
non-linear utility functions. Just as linear contracts align the risk-taking behavior of a risk-
neutral agent with a risk-neutral principal, utility a ne contracts do so for fixed, non-linear
preferences. However, utility-a ne contracts do not satisfy either of our flatness criteria, and
furthermore our partially-contingent contracts are not utility a ne for any specification of
preferences. This is easy to see: because the principal strictly prefers more output to less,
utility-a ne contracts reward the agent with transfers that are strictly increasing in output.
Of course, such contracts are neither flat at the bottom nor flat at the top.
Thus, we see that if a principal seeks a contract that provides a guarantee in the
environment of this paper, she must give up not only on providing the agent with insurance,
17Unlike in our model, in Hölmstrom (1979) the agent does not enjoy limited liability. Elsewhere, researchers
have established contracts that satisfy our flat at the bottom criterion as optimal, in the presence of limited
liability
!
Innes (1990); Poblete and Spulber (2012)
"
. However, our results obtain without limited liability, as
we demonstrate in section B.5 of the appendix.
18Version dated December 21, 2012. Accessed online at http://www.bu.edu/econ/files/2013/03/May-4-
Caroll.pdf.
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but also on aligning his risk-taking behavior with her own preferences.
Contracting with agents with uncertain risk preferences has received only limited attention
in the moral hazard literature, regardless of the other details of the environment. One approach
to this problem that is more standard than ours is to consider a single-parameter family
of agent types and solve for the menu of contracts that maximizes the principal’s expected
payo  against an exogenous prior. This is the setting of Jullien, Salanié, and Salanié (2007),
and this is the only other paper of which we are aware that considers a general moral hazard
problem in which the principal does not know the agent’s risk preferences. A related paper
by de Meza and Webb (2001) considers an insurance problem, also with only two agent
types. While these papers employ technical assumptions that might be regarded as restrictive,
we consider a richer model. More substantively, while we identify contracts that provide
incentives for e ort and also account for risk-taking by the agent, the aforementioned papers
consider only e ort provision. Less closely related work studies the implications of extreme
risk preferences for the size of the rationalizable set in games
1
Weinstein (2016)
2
.
Given that we emphasize the agent’s risk-taking behavior throughout the paper, it seems
appropriate to o er some justification for this focus. In particular, our model has little to say
about how to design contracts when risk is not an element of the agent’s decision problem.
Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) o er the following remarks about the role of risk-taking as
an ingredient of principal-agent problems:
At first sight, the overall structure of this package is di cult to relate to the
optimal contracts considered in this chapter. This di culty should not come as a
surprise given that the problem of providing adequate incentives to managers is
much richer than the stylized principal-agent problems we have considered [...]
perhaps most importantly, the managerial incentive problem does not just boil
down to eliciting more e ort from the manager. It also involves issues of risk
taking [...]
We embrace the authors’ comments as motivation for our exercise, particularly given that
partially-contingent contracts are widely-used for managerial compensation, as we discuss in
our introduction.
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This paper hopes to serve as a useful starting point for the study of incentive provision
to risk-taking agents with unknown preferences. Except in proposition 8, we have avoided
making assumptions about the relationship between risk preferences and e ort costs, and we
have also not endeavored elsewhere to characterize the principal’s optimal contract. Just as
we provide restrictions to the agent’s preferences that yield optimal binary contracts in a
special case of our model, perhaps it is possible to extend this approach in di erent directions
and recover other types of interesting optimal contracts.
This paper employs the admittedly severe assumption that the principal does not have
any information whatsoever about the agent’s risk preferences. Why go this route, rather
than the intermediate route of studying bounded uncertainty? A first answer is that our
approach is in some ways a natural counterpart to the assumption that the principal knows
exactly the agent’s risk preferences, in that we consider perhaps the most simply form of
uncertainty about risk preferences that one might imagine. Given that risk-taking by agents
with unknown risk preferences is a mostly unstudied topic, it seems reasonable to begin by
considering a simple environment.
Second, while most of our formal results depend on the possibility that the agent has
extreme risk preferences, it is straightforward to establish that any particular contract provides
optimal incentives for risk-taking to at most one type of agent. Consequently, it is indeed
possible to develop bounds on the performance of various types of contracts, as a function
of the extent of the principal’s uncertainty about the agent’s preferences. By showing that
the payo  consequences of risk-taking by the agent might be severe for the principal who
does not know the agent’s risk preferences, we provide motivation for the more complicated
exercise of considering bounded uncertainty, rather than total uncertainty as we do here.
From this perspective, this paper might be viewed as providing clear rationale for considering
robustness to risk-taking when designing incentives, even where it is reasonable to rule out
extreme risk preferences.
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CHAPTER 3
RISK ALIGNMENT
3.1 Introduction
The celebrated informativeness principle
1
Hölmstrom (1979); Shavell (1979)
2
establishes
circumstances in which optimal contracts for moral hazard condition transfers to the agent only
on signals that are informative about e ort.1 Contracts that are contingent on uninformative
signals expose the agent to additional risk without providing more powerful incentives,
and risk-averse agents demand remuneration from the principal in return. Consequently,
individuals should only be compensated on the basis of variables other than their own
performance if doing so reduces risk for the agent, as in common-shock tournaments
1
Lazear
and Rosen (1981)
2
and relative performance evaluation
1
Hölmstrom (1982)
2
. However,
evidence on the use of relative performance evaluations in executive compensation is mixed1
De Angelis and Grinstein (2018)
2
, salespeople are assigned to separate territories, and team
members undertake independent tasks.
Why then might we observe contracts that condition transfers on uninformative signals?
We provide a unified explanation that does not rely on the details of the underlying contracting
environment or on correlated measures of performance: if the agent’s risk preferences are
unknown, all contracts that align the agent’s risk-taking behavior with the principal’s own
objectives have this feature.
This paper studies a general moral hazard problem. In our model, as in the standard
formulation of the problem, the agent chooses an unobserved action. Actions consist of a
disutility borne by the agent, which we refer to generically as e ort, and an output distribution.
The principal, who strictly prefers more output to less, uses a contract that compensates the
agent on the basis of observable outcomes.
In a departure from the vast majority of the existing literature, the principal in this
1Formally, informativeness is defined in terms of su cient statistics. See Proposition 3, Hölmstrom (1979).
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paper is at least slightly uncertain about the agent’s risk preferences. We allow for the
possibility that the agent is known to be risk-averse, but do not require it. Accordingly, the
principal might know that the agent is approximately risk-neutral, or be certain that he is very
risk-seeking, or she might have no information whatsoever about the agent’s risk preferences.
The principal also does not know what sort of risks the agent might take: instead, she only
knows the relationship between e ort and expected output. In the face of uncertainty, the
principal seeks robustness: she evaluates contracts in terms of their worst-case performance
against the set of potential risk preferences and production technologies.
This is a challenging environment for the principal to contract in. In addition to the usual
problem of motivating the agent to exert e ort, the principal must also be careful to avoid
providing the agent with incentives to take risks that are undesirable from her perspective.
If the principal pays the agent only on the basis of the output that he produces, contracts
that provide optimal incentives for risk-taking to some types of agents necessarily provide
suboptimal incentives to others. This has payo  consequences for the principal, and the
severity of these consequences is proportional to the extent of her uncertainty.
The principal might instead use a contract that additionally conditions transfers to the
agent on factors other than his own output. For example, consider a contract that specifies a
base salary and pays the agent a fixed bonus transfer when certain exogenous conditions are
satisfied. Suppose that the principal designs the contract to reward the agent with the bonus
payment with a probability that is proportional to the output that he produces. When the
principal uses such a contract, the agent chooses risks that maximize expected net output,
regardless of his own preferences. Consequently, if the principal is financially risk-neutral, the
agent chooses actions as if his objective were to maximize the principal’s payo , conditional
on e ort. We call contracts with this feature risk-aligned.
We devote the first part of the paper to the characterization of risk alignment for a very
general class of principal objectives. Regardless of the principal’s preferences, we find that
risk-aligned contracts must condition transfers on exogenous factors. In the second part of
the paper, we incorporate the agent’s choice of e ort into our analysis and specialize to a
financially risk-neutral principal. In this setting, risk-aligned contracts are optimal.
To see the intuition for why contracts that depend only on the agent’s output are not risk-
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aligned, note that such contracts have two features. First, they provide the same incentives
for risk-taking to each type of agent. Contracts that have this feature are necessarily binary
contracts that reward the agent with a low prize in some circumstances and a high prize in
all others. Second, because the principal strictly prefers more output to less, risk-aligned
contracts provide strictly more powerful incentives for the production of high output than for
moderate output, and similarly for moderate output and low output. While binary contracts
that reward the agent only on the basis of his own performance evidently do not have this
feature, there are more complicated contracts that do. For example, an agent who competes
against other agents in a rank-order tournament has strict incentives to produce as much
output as possible — even when prizes are homogeneous — because doing so improves his
chances of winning a prize.2
This paper connects to several strands of literature. From a technical perspective, the
contracts studied in this paper are related to the lottery mechanisms that are used by
researchers to induce risk preferences in laboratory subjects. This approach is pioneered by
Roth and Malouf (1979), and its theoretical foundations are further developed in Berg, Daley,
Dickhaut, and O’Brien (1986). More recently, these “paying in probability” mechanisms have
been identified as useful for belief elicitation
1
Karni (2009); Hossain and Okui (2013)
2
. Our
contribution to the understanding of these mechanisms is three-fold. First, we completely
characterize the set of mechanisms that induce the desired preferences, which includes lotteries
with non-degenerate prizes. Second, we explicitly incorporate the principal’s preferences into
our risk alignment criterion, which may or may not depend on transfers to the agent. Third,
we show how the alignment achieved by these mechanisms has payo  implications for the
principal.
There is a small literature in economic theory that considers moral hazard problems in
which the agent has unknown risk preferences and a one-dimensional3 production technology1
de Meza and Webb (2001); Jullien et al. (2007)
2
. Separately, there is a larger literature in
which the agent has known risk preferences and a multi-dimensional production technology1
Diamond (1998); Chassang (2013); Carroll (2015); Antic (2014); Barron, Georgiadis, and
Swinkels (2017)
2
. As in the present paper, an earlier paper by the author studies a moral
2More precisely, incentives are everywhere strict provided that the relevant order statistic has full support.
3We call production technologies in which there is exactly one action for each level of e ort one-dimensional.
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hazard problem in which the agent has unknown preferences and a multi-dimensional
technology
1
Rosenthal (2019)
2
.4
Along with several of the aforementioned papers
1
Chassang (2013); Antic (2014); Carroll
(2015); Rosenthal (2019)
2
, this paper belongs to a growing body of work that studies
mechanism design problems with worst-case objectives or other related criteria
1
López-Cunat
(2000); Chung and Ely (2007); Carroll (2016); Carroll and Meng (2016a,b); Carroll (2017);
Auster (2018); Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris (2017); Marku and Díaz (2017); Dai and Toikka
(2017)
2
. This literature includes at least two additional papers that study environments
in which the principal does not know the agent’s preferences over deterministic outcomes1
Frankel (2014); Garrett (2014)
2
. Our risk alignment criterion is related to the analysis of
Frankel (2014) and Carroll (2015) in important ways, and we discuss these relationships in
detail in the concluding section of the paper. This paper also adds to the literature studying
local robustness in mechanism design, including one aforementioned paper
1
Carroll and
Meng (2016b)
2
and other less closely related papers
1
Aghion, Fudenberg, Holden, Kunimoto,
and Tercieux (2012); Madarász and Prat (2017)
2
. We emphasize that our local uncertainty
framework implies that our results are not driven by the possibility that the agent has extreme
preferences.
We aim to make two contributions. First, we provide a theoretical contribution by
identifying a simple and robust solution to the complex problem of providing incentives
to a risk-taking agent with unknown risk preferences. In particular, when the agent is
known to be risk-averse, our undominated optimal contracts are stochastic bonus contracts
with only two distinct payment levels. Second, we provide an explanation for the use of
stochastic mechanisms for incentive provision. While authors elsewhere have identified a role
for stochastic mechanisms in principal-agent problems, recent papers have emphasized the
restoration of the optimality of deterministic mechanisms under various conditions
1
Strausz
(2006); Ková  and Mylovanov (2009)
2
.
4The research question, model, analysis, and results presented here are neither a special case nor a
generalization of the author’s earlier work. The present paper emphasizes risk alignment and optimality when
the principal is slightly uncertain about the agent’s risk preferences, while the earlier paper characterizes the
set of contracts that guarantee the principal a positive payo  when the agent’s preferences over lotteries are
unrestricted. In the earlier paper, the principal has much more information about the agent’s production
technology than in the present paper, and contracts are restricted to depend only on output.
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The body of the paper is organized as follows. We describe our model in section 3.2. In
section 3.3, we provide examples and characterize the set of risk-aligned contracts. In section
3.4, we study the optimality of risk-aligned contracts for a financially risk-neutral principal.
Lastly, discuss the relationship of this paper to the existing literature and conclude in section
3.5. Technical material is given in appendix C.
3.2 Model
We write R+ for the positive real numbers and R++ for the strictly positive real numbers.
Rk has the Euclidean topology, and we write  (K) for the set of Borel probability measures
over K µ Rk, equipped with the topology of weak convergence. Finally, we write ”k for the
discrete distribution that assigns probability 1 to the event k œ K. Product spaces have
their natural product topologies, and sets of utility functions have the topology of uniform
convergence.
3.2.1 Technology and contracts
The set of potential values Y µ R+ for output y is compact. We normalize minY © 0,
and label maxY := Y. Our results hold but are vacuous when Y has only two elements,
and so we assume that there are at least three distinct output levels. Actions are pairs
(F, e) œ  (Y)◊ R+, where output y ≥ F and e determines the agent’s disutility from action.
We refer to e generically as e ort. The agent chooses from compact set of actions A, which
we call the agent’s technology.
The principal has some information about the relationship between e ort costs and feasible
expected output. In particular, for non-empty and compact set of e ort levels E µ R++ and
a continuous map µ : E æ (0,Y), the agent’s technology is known to satisfy the following
criterion:
Assumption 7. For each e ort level e œ E, the agent’s technology A includes at least one
action (F, e) with EF [y] Ø µ(e). Moreover, the agent is always free to exert no e ort and
produce no output: (”0, 0) œ A.
The principal knows a set of feasible e ort levels E available to the agent. Second, the
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principal also knows a lower bound µ(e) to how much expected output the agent is capable
producing when he exerts e ort e, for each e ort level e œ E . The principal does not know
the identity of the agent’s technology A, but instead knows the identity of the set E and the
map µ, and that A satisfies assumption 7. We call such technologies feasible, and label the
set of feasible technologies A .
The principal and the agent do not contract on actions, which are unobserved. Instead,
they contract on output y and signal x. The set of potential values X µ RN for x is compact,
convex, and has a nonempty interior. The signal x ≥ G œ  (X ) is statistically independent
from output y: F ‹ G for all F œ  (Y). The distribution G is continuous, has full support,
and is known to both the agent and the principal at the time of contracting.
The agent enjoys limited liability, and the principal provides incentives to the agent by
paying him with an upper semicontinuous contract w : Y ◊ X æ T , where T µ R+ is
compact5, convex, and includes Y as a subset.6
3.2.2 Preferences
Assumption 8. The agent’s expected utility7 preferences over the set of lottery-e ort pairs
 (T )◊ R+ are represented by continuous Bernoulli utility function v : T ◊ R+ æ R, with
u : T æ R and k : R+ æ R both strictly increasing:
v(t, e) = u(t)≠ k(e).
We call u the agent’s risk type, and allow the e ort-cost function k to vary with the agent’s
type v. We normalize u(0) © 0 and k(0) © 0, label the set of all risk types U , and label the
set of all concave risk types UA.
5Our requirement that transfers belong to an exogenously-specified compact set T facilitates our proof of
the existence of a solution to the principal’s problem if the agent is not necessarily risk-averse.
6One natural alternative to the framework presented here is to directly define contracts as continuous
maps T : Y æ  (T ). There are no substantive di erences between this formulation of the problem and ours.
However, our problem is well-defined under upper semicontinuity of w, which is meaningfully more permissive
than continuity of T . In particular, binary quota contracts play a part in our discussion, and these do not
correspond to any continuous map T . In lieu of developing ad hoc continuity requirements for T , we opt for
the state-space formulation presented here.
7Expected utility maximization is not essential, and can be replaced with the weaker requirement that
preferences respect first- or second- order stochastic dominance.
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In this paper, the principal is uncertain about the agent’s risk preferences. The set
of feasible risk types U and feasible types V are as follows:
Assumption 9. The agent’s risk type belongs to U , which is open in either U or UA. The
agent’s type belongs to V, which includes at least one type v with risk type u if and only if u
belongs to U .
The principal’s preferences are as follows:
Assumption 10. The principal’s expected utility preferences over the set of output-transfer
lotteries  (Y ◊ T ) are represented by continuous Bernoulli utility function ﬁ : Y ◊ T æ R,
with ﬁ strictly increasing in y and decreasing in t.
We call ﬁ the principal’s objective, and normalize ﬁ(0, 0) © 0. We say that the principal is
financially risk-neutral if her objective is as follows:
ﬁ(y, t) = y ≠ t.
We suppress the joint distribution of (y, x) in our notation and instead work directly with
output distributions. Given a contract w, the map Tw : Y æ  (T ) gives the distribution of
transfers w(y, x) to the agent when output is y and signal x is distributed according to G.
We identify contracts w and wÕ if Tw = TwÕ . Define uw, ﬁw : Y æ R as follows:
uw(y) := EG
Ë
u
1
w(y, x)
2È
(3.1)
ﬁw(y) := EG
Ë
ﬁ
1
y, w(y, x)
2È
. (3.2)
The agent chooses actions that maximize his expected utility. Label as follows:
c(A|v, w) := argmax
(F,e)œA
1
EF [uw(y)]≠ k(e)
2
V (A|v, w) := max
(F,e)œA
1
EF [uw(y)]≠ k(e)
2
(3.3)
V (A |v, w) := inf
AœA
V (A|v, w).
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As contracts are upper semicontinuous and technologies are compact, the agent’s problem
has a solution.8 In order to ensure that the principal’s payo  is well-defined, ties are broken
against the principal. She evaluates contracts by their worst-case expected payo  against A
and V . Label as follows:
 (A|v, w) := min
(F,e)œc(A|v,w)
EF [ﬁw(y)]
 (A |v, w) := inf
AœA
 (A|v, w)
 (A |V , w) := inf
vœV  (A |v, w).
3.2.3 Timing
The timing of the interaction between the principal and the agent is as follows:
1. the principal — knowing A ,V , and G — chooses a contract w;
2. the agent chooses the action (F, e) œ c(A|v, w) that minimizes EF [ﬁw(y)];
3. output y and signal x are drawn independently and simultaneously from F and G,
respectively;
4. the principal’s payo  is ﬁ
1
y, w(y, x)
2
and the agent’s payo  v
1
w(y, x), e
2
.
3.3 Optimal incentives for risk-taking
In this paper, the agent chooses both e ort and an output distribution. Moreover, he has
separable tastes: his preferences over lotteries do not vary with e ort. We interpret the
non-e ort component of the agent’s decision problem as a choice of risk. In this section, we
restrict our attention entirely to the agent’s risk-taking behavior.
3.3.1 Risk alignment
Our first step is to formalize the notion that a contract provides uniformly optimal incentives
for risk-taking to the agent:
8See lemma 14.
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Criterion 1. Call contract w risk-aligned if it has the following property, for all u œ U and
F, F Õ œ  (Y):
EF [uw(y)] Ø EF Õ [uw(y)] ≈∆ EF [ﬁw(y)] Ø EF Õ [ﬁw(y)].
Contracts are risk-aligned when the agent chooses risks as if his objective were to maximize
the principal’s payo , regardless of his preferences. Consider for the moment an alternative
environment9 in which the principal does know the agent’s risk preferences:
Example 4. The agent is risk-neutral: U = {uRN}, with uRN(t) = t. The principal is
financially risk-neutral.
Claim 1. The set of risk-aligned contracts for example 4 is the set of contracts w with
EG[w(y, x)] = –y + —, for – œ (0, 1) and — Ø 0.
Proof of claim 1. First, we show that w is risk-aligned if it has the stated form. Second, we
show the converse. Suppose that w is as described. Let F, F Õ œ  (Y). We have the following:
EF [uw(y)] Ø EF Õ [uw(y)] ≈∆ –EF [y] + — Ø –EF Õ [y] + —
≈∆ (1≠ –)EF [y]≠ — Ø (1≠ –)EF Õ [y]≠ —.
≈∆ EF [ﬁw(y)] Ø EF Õ [ﬁw(y)].
Accordingly, w is risk-aligned. Conversely, suppose that w is not as described. Suppose first
that one of the following two inequalities holds for ⁄ œ (0, 1):
EG
Ë
w
1
⁄Y , x
2È
>
1
1≠ ⁄
2
EG
Ë
w
1
0, x
2È
+ ⁄EG
Ë
w
1
Y , x
2È
(3.4)
EG
Ë
w
1
⁄Y , x
2È
<
1
1≠ ⁄
2
EG
Ë
w
1
0, x
2È
+ ⁄EG
Ë
w
1
Y , x
2È
. (3.5)
9Example 4 does not satisfy assumption 9. However, our choice of singleton sets of risk types is purposeful,
because it allows us to relate our risk alignment criterion to earlier work on robust contracting. We discuss
this relationship in section 3.5.
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Set F = ”⁄Y and F Õ = (1≠ ⁄)”0 + ⁄”Y . If inequality 3.4 obtains, we have the following:
EF [uw(y)] > EF Õ [uw(y)] (3.6)
EF [ﬁw(y)] < EF Õ [ﬁw(y)]. (3.7)
If inequality 3.5 obtains, the sense of inequalities 3.6 and 3.7 is reversed. In either situation,
w is not risk-aligned. Finally, suppose instead that EG[w(y, x)] = –y + —, but – /œ (0, 1). Set
F = ”0 and F Õ = ”Y to see that w is not risk-aligned.
In example 4, risk-aligned contracts are a ne in expectation. As a special case, this includes
linear contracts w(y, x) = –y with share parameter – œ (0, 1). Linear contracts are known to
be worst-case optimal for contracting environments with uncertain production technologies
and two-sided financial risk-neutrality
1
Chassang (2013); Carroll (2015)
2
.
In terms of the amount of information that the principal has about the agent’s risk
preferences, example 4 might be viewed as an extreme case. Consider then the alternative
extreme:
Example 5. The principal does not have any information about the agent’s risk preferences:
U = U .
Claim 2. Let w(y, x) = W (y) for W : Y æ T strictly increasing. Given any pair of distinct
output distributions FA, FB œ  (Y) that are not ordered by first-order stochastic dominance10,
there exist uA, uB œ U such that:
EFA [uwA(y)] > EFB [uwA(y)]
EFB [uwB(y)] > EFA [uwB(y)].
Proof. Our proof is closely related to the utility function characterization of first-order
stochastic dominance
1
Hadar and Russell (1969)
2
. Let TA œ  (T ) be the distribution of
W (y) when output y ≥ FA and TB œ  (T ) the distribution of W (y) when y ≥ FB. As FA
and FB are not ordered by first-order stochastic dominance and W is strictly increasing, TA
10Recall that F is said to first-order stochastically dominate F Õ if F (x) Æ F Õ(x) for all x.
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and TB are also not ordered by first-order stochastic dominance. Thus, there exist tA, tB œ T
such that:
TA(tA) < TB(tA)
TB(tB) < TA(tB).
For ◊ œ {tA, tB}, define u◊ = 1(y Ø ◊). We have the following:
ETA [utA(t)] > ETB [utA(t)]
ETB [utB(t)] > ETA [utB(t)].
As there exist sequences of risk types in U that converge pointwise to utA and utB , respectively,
Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem yields the desired risk types uA, uB.
If the principal knows the agent’s risk preferences, there are many risk-aligned contracts.
Conversely, as example 5 suggests, risk alignment is a more demanding criterion if she is
instead uncertain. As in our example, if the principal has no information whatsoever about
the agent’s risk preferences, there are familiar contractual forms under which the agent might
choose either one of a pair of undominated output distributions, even if one produces much
more (expected) output than the other. This failure of risk alignment has severe payo 
consequences for a principal who seeks a contract that performs well even if the agent has
extreme risk preferences
1
Rosenthal (2019)
2
.
However, regardless of the principal’s own preferences and the extent of her uncertainty
about U , there are always contracts under which the agent chooses risks as the principal
would:
Example 6. The principal — who has any objective ﬁ that satisfies 10 — knows that the
agent’s risk preferences belong to U , for any set U that satisfies assumption 9.
Claim 3. There exists a risk-aligned contract w.
Proof. Because ﬁ(y, t) is continuous and strictly increasing in y, there exist transfers b > 0
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such that ﬁ(Y , b) > 0. Choose such a transfer b. Let w be as follows:
⁄(y) = ﬁ(y, 0)
ﬁ(y, 0) + ﬁ(Y , b)≠ ﬁ(y, b)
Tw(y) =
1
1≠ ⁄(y)
2
”0 + ⁄(y)”b.
Substituting ⁄ directly into our definitions 3.2 and 3.1 for ﬁw and uw, respectively, yields:
ﬁw(y) = ⁄(y)ﬁw(Y).
uw(y) = ⁄(y)uw(Y).
Thus, we have:
ﬁw(y) = ﬁ
w(Y)
uw(Y)u
w(y).
Because ﬁw(Y) = ﬁ(y, b) > 0 and uw(Y) = u(b) > 0 per our choice of b, ﬁw is a positive a ne
transformation of uw. Moreover, because we chose u arbitrarily, this holds for each u œ U .
By the same argument given in the proof of claim 1, w is risk-aligned.
In the proof of claim 3, we construct a risk-aligned contract w. The features of this
contract do not depend on the identity of the set U in any way, but do depend on the
principal’s own preferences. Furthermore — unlike in example 4 — it is not in general true
that ⁄(y) is proportional to ﬁ(y, 0): the principal’s problem is more complex than simply
inducing her own preferences in the agent, because she needs to account for the cost of
providing incentives. Instead, the coincidence of the preference-induction problem and the
problem of finding a risk-aligned contract is a special feature of additively separable principal
objectives, as with the financially risk-neutral preference discussed above.
3.3.2 Payo  a nity
For the remainder of the paper, we devote our attention to the full development of example
6, in which the principal is locally uncertain about the agent’s risk preferences. As in the
example, the results of this section do not depend in any way on the identity of the set of
feasible risk types.
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Criterion 2. Call contract w payo  a ne if there exist functions – : U æ R++ and
— : U æ R such that the following relationship holds for all u œ U :
ﬁw(y) = –(u)uw(y) + —(u).
In addition to providing motivation for our exercise, example 4 highlights an important
relationship between a nity and risk alignment. When the principal and the agent are both
risk-neutral, risk-aligned contracts are a ne (in expectation) functions of output. Moreover,
these contracts are payo  a ne, in the sense of criterion 2. This property characterizes risk
alignment:
Proposition 9. Contract w is risk-aligned if and only if w is payo  a ne.
A basic result of economic theory is that utility representations of preferences are unique
up to positive a ne transformation. If the principal uses a payo  a ne contract, the agent’s
induced utility function uw : Y æ R is a positive a ne transformation of the principal’s own
induced utility function ﬁw : Y æ R, regardless of his own preferences. Consequently, risk
alignment coincides exactly with payo  a nity.
3.3.3 Stochastic binary contracts
Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 identify properties that contracts might possess. In this section, we
identify contracts that possess these properties. It is convenient to first exclude a class of
pathological contracts. Call a contract w aligned at extremes 11 if it satisfies the following
condition for all u œ U :
ﬁw(Y)≠ ﬁw(0)
uw(Y)≠ uw(0) > 0.
Contracts that are not aligned at extremes are not risk-aligned, and furthermore do not yield
a positive worst-case payo  for the principal.12 Proceeding, call a continuous and strictly
11This property allows for the case in which the principal and the agent mutually prefer low output to high
output. Although we demonstrate in lemma 15, appendix C.2, that such contracts are severely sub-optimal,
the permissive nature of assumptions 9 and 10 prevents us from ruling out that such contracts are risk-aligned.
12Because we work with an arbitrary open set of risk preferences U and permissive assumptions about
ﬁ, it is di cult to provide an informative characterization of the set of contracts that satisfy this criterion.
However, provided that the high-output reward Tw(Y) is not excessively costly for the principal compared to
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increasing function ⁄ : Y æ [0, 1] a weight if it satisfies ⁄(0) = 0 and ⁄(Y) = 1. Our contracts
of interest are as follows:
Definition 10. Call a contract w which is aligned at extremes a stochastic binary contract
if its transfer distribution Tw is as follows, for weight ⁄ and TL, TH œ  (T ):
Tw(y) =
1
1≠ ⁄(y)
2
TL + ⁄(y)TH .
In this section, we prove two primary results. Given a fixed principal objective ﬁ, theorem
3 characterizes the set of risk-aligned contracts as the set of stochastic binary contracts with
appropriately chosen weights. Given a fixed stochastic binary contract w, theorem 4 identifies
a principal objective for which w is risk-aligned.
Theorem 3. There exists weight ⁄ú — depending on the principal’s objective and rewards
TL, TH — such that contract w is risk-aligned if and only if w is a stochastic binary contract
with weight ⁄ú.
Risk alignment is the conjunction of two criteria. First, risk-aligned contracts unify
risk-taking behavior across the set of potential agent types. Second, risk-aligned contracts
align the agent’s risk-taking behavior with the principal’s objective. To see why these criteria
can only be simultaneously achieved with a stochastic binary contract, note that contracts
that condition transfers only on output only satisfy the first criterion if they specify at most
two distinct transfer levels. However, contracts that satisfy the second criterion must provide
incentives with strength that is strictly increasing in output, and binary contracts that reward
the agent only on the basis of his own output evidently do not have this feature. Accordingly,
if the principal seeks risk alignment, she must condition transfers on uninformative signals.
The proof of theorem 3 has two steps. In the first step, we show that if the relative payo 
assigned to each level of output does not vary with the agent’s risk type, then the distribution
of transfers to the agent must be a mixture of some fixed pair of rewards TL and TH , for each
level of output. At the heart of this argument lies the following lemma:
Lemma 4. All risk types in U are indi erent between T, T Õ œ  (T ) ≈∆ T = T Õ.
the low-output reward Tw(0), it is su cient that the former first-order stochastically dominate the latter.
For example: the contract w with Tw(Y) = ”b and Tw(0) = ”0 is aligned at extremes for b su ciently small.
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Proof. Suppose that T ”= T Õ. The second-order stochastic dominance13 relation is
antisymmetric on  (T ). Consequently, the utility function characterization of second-order
stochastic dominance
1
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970)
2
implies that there exists increasing
and concave utility function uú : T æ R for which ET [uú(t)] ”= ET Õ [uú(t)]. Let u œ U and
define u⁄ as follows, for ⁄ œ (0, 1):
u⁄ := ⁄u+ (1≠ ⁄)uú.
First, by construction it is not the case for any ⁄ that both of the following equalities hold:
ET [u(t)] = ET Õ [u(t)]
ET [u⁄(t)] = ET Õ [u⁄(t)].
Second, u⁄ is strictly increasing and concave, and thus belongs to UA. Because U is open
and u⁄ converges uniformly to u as ⁄ æ 1, u⁄ œ U for ⁄ su ciently large. Accordingly, if
T ”= T Õ, then there exists u œ U such that:
ET [u(t)] ”= ET Õ [u(t)].
Conversely, if T = T Õ, it is clear that ET [u(t)] = ET Õ [u(t)] for all u œ U .
The next step of the proof is to show that for each pair of lotteries TL and TH that are
compatible with our aligned at extremes requirement, there is a unique weight ⁄ú that aligns
the agent’s risk-taking behavior with the principal’s objective.14
Having characterized the set of contracts which are risk-aligned for a particular principal
objective, we pose the following question: which contracts are risk-aligned for some principal
objective?
There exists a principal objective that rationalizes any stochastic binary contract as
risk-aligned, provided that the high-output reward is preferred to the low-output reward by
13Recall that F is said to second-order stochastically dominate F Õ if
s x
≠Œ F (x) Æ
s x
≠Œ F
Õ(x) for all x.
14The risk-aligned weight ⁄ú depends both on the principal’s objective ﬁ and potentially the rewards
TL, TH . Although we do not emphasize the identity of this function in discussion of our results, we provide
an explicit expression for ⁄ú in C.1, appendix C.1.
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the agent:
Theorem 4. For each weight ⁄ and pair of rewards TL, TH with TL first-order stochastically
dominated by TH , there exists a principal objective for which the stochastic binary contract
with weight ⁄ and rewards TL, TH is risk-aligned.
Whenever the principal uses a stochastic binary contract and the agent chooses between
equal-e ort actions, the agent’s choice of risk reduces to the problem of either maximizing
or minimizing the expected value of ⁄. Consequently, stochastic binary contracts tie down
the agent’s choice of actions, conditional on e ort. Thus, all such contracts align the agent’s
risk-taking behavior to some principal objective.15
3.4 Optimal incentives for e ort and risk-taking
Theorem 3 characterizes the set of risk-aligned contracts for a broad class of principal
objectives. With this characterization in hand, we study a moral hazard problem in which
risk-aligned contracts are optimal. We maintain the following assumption for the remainder
of our analysis:
Assumption 11. The principal is financially risk-neutral.
In this section, we identify contracts w that provide the largest-possible guarantee
 (A |V , w) for the principal. That is, we analyze the following maximization problem:
max
w
 (A |V , w). (3.8)
The principal’s problem 3.8 has a solution, and there are gains from trade16:
Assumption 12. For some fixed share s < 1Y and fixed lottery T œ  (T ) with ET [t] < Y,
for each v œ V the following inequality is satisfied for some e(v) œ E:
k
1
e(v)
2
µ
1
e(v)
2 Æ sET [u(t)].
15In constructing the desired principal objective, we hold the set of feasible risk types U fixed.
16See lemma 20 for an existence proof. Although our statement is admittedly more complicated than we
would like, see lemma 18 for proof that there are gains from trade if and only if assumption 12 is satisfied.
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We emphasize that while the e ort level e(v) in the statement of assumption 12 is allowed
to vary with the agent’s type v, the share s and reference lottery T are fixed. Our results are
strongest when the following restriction to U is satisfied:
Definition 11. Call the agent’s preferences regular if:
1. the set of feasible risk types U µ UA; and
2. the set of feasible risk types U includes a risk-neutral type; and
3. if un converges to u in U , then vn converges to v in V .17
We say that the agent has regular preferences when he is known by the principal to be
risk-averse, the principal does not rule out the possibility that the agent is risk-neutral,
and the agent’s e ort disutility varies continuously with his risk preferences. We establish
uniqueness results in the form of typewise dominance when the agent has regular preferences:
Definition 12. Contract wÕ typewise dominates contract w if  (A |v, w) Æ  (A |v, wÕ) for
all v œ V , with strict inequality for some vÕ.
The first two assumptions presented in definition 11 are substantive, and we discuss their
role in our dominance results below. The third assumption is technical.18
3.4.1 Output a ne contracts
In section 3.3, we define contracts to be payo  a ne if they induce an a ne relationship
between the principal’s payo  and the agent’s payo , for each type of agent. In proving the
results of this section, we make use of a related criterion:
Criterion 3. Say that w is output a ne if there exist functions a, b : U æ R and constants
a(ﬁ), b(ﬁ) such that the following equalities hold, where a(u) and a(ﬁ) are all strictly positive
17Here, each vn has risk type vn and type v has risk type u.
18The continuity assumption constituent to definition 11 serves to rule out uninteresting corner cases in
which contracts that do not guarantee the principal a positive payo  might nevertheless remain undominated.
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or all strictly negative:
uw(y) = a(u)y + b(u)
ﬁw(y) = a(ﬁ)y + b(ﬁ).
Output a ne contracts are those for which the principal’s payo  and the agent’s payo 
are a ne in output, for each type of agent. For general principal objectives, output a ne
contracts need not exist. However, if the principal is financially risk-neutral, they do exist,
and output a nity is equivalent to payo  a nity:
Proposition 10. Contract w is payo  a ne if and only if w is output a ne.
3.4.2 Stochastic bonus contracts
As in section 3.3, the contracts of interest in this section are stochastic binary contracts.
There are many such contracts, and all are risk-aligned when their weight ⁄ coincides with the
risk-aligned weight ⁄ú. Substitution of the principal’s objective ﬁ(y, t) = y ≠ t into equation
C.1 yields the following:
⁄RN := ⁄ú(y) =
y
Y . (3.9)
Although risk-neutrality on the part of the principal yields an especially simple form for
the risk-aligned weight ⁄RN , the rewards TL, TH associated with risk-aligned contracts may
be quite complicated: our only requirement is that they are compatible with our aligned
at extremes criterion, which is permissive. However, the set of stochastic binary contracts
admits a natural refinement:
Definition 13. Call contract w a stochastic bonus contract if its transfer distribution Tw is
as follows, for weight ⁄ and b œ T with b > 0:
Tw(y) =
1
1≠ ⁄(y)
2
”0 + ⁄(y)”b.
In addition to their simplicity, stochastic bonus contracts are naturally compatible with
risk aversion on the part of the agent. We state the main result of this section of the paper:
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Theorem 5. There exists a risk-aligned stochastic binary contract that maximizes the
principal’s payo . If the agent has regular preferences, then there exists a risk-aligned
stochastic bonus contract that maximizes the principal’s payo , and all typewise undominated
contracts are risk-aligned stochastic bonus contracts.
Theorem 5 summarizes two results. First, we show that stochastic binary contracts are
optimal. Second, we show that if the agent has regular preferences, stochastic bonus contracts
typewise dominate other types of contracts. The first step of the proof is to improve an
arbitrary contract to a stochastic binary contract:
Proposition 11. If w is not a risk-aligned stochastic binary contract, then there exists a
risk-aligned stochastic binary contract wÕ such that for all v œ V:
 (A |v, w) Æ  (A |v, wÕ).
The proof of proposition 11 has two steps. First, we compute an upper bound for the
guarantee provided by an arbitrary contract w, as a function of the transfer distributions Tw(0)
and Tw(Y). Second, we show that because stochastic binary contracts with appropriately
chosen weights are risk-aligned, this bound is tight for such contracts.
Although proposition 11 yields a strong form of optimality, there are a multiplicity of
risk-aligned stochastic binary contracts. However, all of these contracts that fail definition 13
impose more risk on the agent than equally generous stochastic bonus contracts. Consequently,
if the agent has regular preferences, typewise undominated contracts are stochastic bonus
contracts:
Proposition 12. If w is not a risk-aligned stochastic bonus contract and the agent has
regular preferences, then there exists a risk-aligned stochastic bonus contract wÕ that typewise-
dominates w.
The proof of proposition 12 has two parts. In the first part, we strengthen proposition
11 by showing that if the agent has regular preferences, contracts that are not risk-aligned
stochastic binary contracts are typewise-dominated. To see the role of the risk-neutral type in
the proof, let uRN be the risk type with uRN(t) = t for all t œ T . The following relationship
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holds for all contracts w:
ﬁw(y) = y ≠ uwRN(y).
Regardless of the form of the contract w, the principal faces a tradeo  between her own payo 
ﬁw and the agent’s payo  uwRN . This need not be the case when the agent is not risk-neutral.
In the second part of the argument, we refine the set of undominated contracts to those
with degenerate rewards. This has two steps. First, we show that optimal contracts do not
reward the agent for being unproductive, because they satisfy Tw(0) = ”0. The interpretation
of this result is straightforward: contracts that pay the agent when he produces no output
provide weaker incentives for e ort and are more costly for the principal. Second, we show
that contracts with Tw(Y) = ”b provide stronger incentives for e ort to risk-averse agents
than their equally-generous counterparts, at no additional cost to the principal. To see why,
suppose that w is a stochastic binary contract with TL = ”0 and TH = T , for non-degenerate
T œ  (T ). Let wÕ be the stochastic bonus contract with b = ETH [t], and suppose risk type u
is strictly risk-averse. We have the following, for all F œ  (Y) with F distinct from ”0:
EF [uw
Õ(y)]≠ E”0 [uwÕ(y)] > EF [uw(y)]≠ E”0 [uw(y)]
EF [ﬁw
Õ(y)] = EF [ﬁw(y)].
In addition to providing stronger incentives for e ort than their more complicated counterparts,
stochastic bonus contracts provide the principal with an equally large payo  for any fixed
action.
3.4.3 Screening
In our paper, the agent is privately informed about his preferences and production technology.
This suggests that the principal might benefit from screening the agent. Suppose that the
agent observes both his type v and his technology A before contracting with the principal,
and the principal o ers the agent a nonempty menu of contracts W .
Under what circumstances might the principal benefit at all from screening the agent?
Only when there are no types of agents that are uniformly less willing to exert e ort than
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other types of agents. In particular, suppose that the agent has quasilinear preferences: that
is, each v œ V has the following form:
v(t, e) = u(t)≠ “e,
where the constant “ > 0 is chosen so that V satisfies our gains from trade assumption 12.
Given a set of quasilinear agent types V, call v(t, e) = u(t) ≠ “e a low-e ort type if the
following condition is satisfied for all vÕ œ V with vÕ(t, e) = uÕ(t)≠ “Õe:
u(t)
“
Æ u
Õ(t)
“Õ
’t œ T .
If V includes a low-e ort type, then the principal does not benefit from screening the agent:
Proposition 13. Suppose that V includes a low-e ort type v. Then the principal’s payo 
when she screens the agent is no larger than when she uses an optimal contract.
More generally, if these conditions are not satisfied, the principal does at least as well to
screen the agent with a menu consisting exclusively of risk-aligned stochastic binary contracts.
Proposition 14. For each menu of contracts, there exists a menu of risk-aligned stochastic
binary contracts that provides a larger guarantee.
Consequently, our model retains explanatory power for stochastic binary contracts under
screening.
3.5 Conclusions
This paper presents a model of moral hazard in which the principal is uncertain about the
agent’s risk preferences and production technology. We characterize the set of risk-aligned
contracts that provide the agent with incentives to choose risks as if he shared the principal’s
objectives, regardless of his own preferences. Very generally, such contracts condition transfers
to the agent on variables that do not directly a ect the principal’s payo . When the agent is
known to be either risk-neutral or risk-averse, undominated optimal contracts are stochastic
bonus contracts with only two transfer levels.
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Why might the principal be concerned with risk alignment? As suggested by example 5,
when the principal knows little about the agent’s risk preferences, certain types of contracts
provide him with incentives to choose risks that are very undesirable from her perspective.
In particular, if she only knows that the agent is risk-averse but does not know bounds to his
risk aversion, the agent might choose actions that are — up to approximation — no better
for the principal than when he shirks, regardless of how much e ort he is willing to exert.
This topic is explored in depth in Rosenthal (2019). We take this result as motivation for the
exercise undertaken in the present paper, wherein we show how to align the agent’s behavior
with the principals objective, but place relatively little emphasis on developing the extent of
the consequences for the principal when she uses an unaligned contract.
Our emphasis on alignment mechanisms is shared with Frankel (2014), who considers
a transfer-free mechanism design problem in which a principal delegates multiple decisions
to an agent with unknown preferences. Here, the author calls a mechanism an aligned
delegation mechanism if all types of agents choose actions as the principal would, were she
given his information about the state of the world. As in the author’s aligned delegation
mechanisms, our risk-aligned contracts exploit commonly-held preference monotonicities to
provide uniformly-interpreted incentives to agents with heterogeneous tastes. While ranking
mechanisms achieve aligned delegation in Frankel’s environment because all agents prefer
higher actions in higher states, stochastic binary contracts achieve risk alignment in our
environment because all agent preferences respect first- or second- order stochastic dominance.
Risk alignment is also related in important ways to Carroll (2015), who studies a model of
moral hazard in which the principal is uncertain about the agent’s production technology19
and there is two-sided risk-neutrality. Here, the author presents an intuition for the worst-
case optimality of linear contracts that is conceptually very similar to our risk alignment
criterion. Furthermore, in an unpublished version of the paper, Carroll includes an analysis
of the optimality of utility-a ne contracts if the principal and the agent are not necessarily
19Although assumption 7 is arguably the simplest assumption under which the principal’s problem is
interesting to study, it is admittedly the case that the principal in Carroll (2015) has strictly more information
about the agent’s production technology than in our model. In Carroll’s model, the principal knows a
non-empty lower bound A0 to the agent’s technology A, in the set inclusion order. The results of section
3.3 of our paper obtain in Carroll’s environment, as do the results of section 3.4 under restrictions to the
relationship between risk preferences and e ort costs. These arguments are not presented here.
81
financially risk-neutral.20 Linear contracts — and utility-a ne contracts more broadly — are
risk-aligned for the appropriate preferences if we generalize assumption 9 to include the case
in which U contains a single risk type, as in example 4. Moreover, as the author emphasizes,
the optimality of linear contracts in his environment is driven by the alignment that they
achieve between the principal’s interests and the agent’s payo , which is precisely the content
of our own risk alignment criterion.
20Version December 21, 2012. Accessed online at http://www.bu.edu/econ/files/2013/03/May-4-Caroll.pdf.
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APPENDIX A
Appendix to Chapter One
This appendix is organized as follows. First, section A.1 provides technical results not stated
in the body of the paper. Second, section A.2 treats the monotone environment. Third,
section A.3 provides omitted proofs for section 1.6. Finally, section A.4 provides an explicit
solution for the homogeneous environment.
A.1 Omitted technical material, section 1.4
The following technical lemma supports our proof of theorem 1:
Lemma 5. Given any mechanism M and type distribution µ œ  0, there exists discrete type
distribution µD œ  0 such that:
ﬁ(M |µD) Æ ﬁ(M |µ).
Proof. Let M and µ be as described. For each b œ B, there exists ub œ U(b) such that:
ﬁ
1
y(ub), q(ub)
2
µ
1
U(b)
2
Æ
⁄
U(b)
ﬁ
1
y(u), q(u)
2
dµ.
Define µD as follows:
µD(u) =
Y__]__[
µ
1
U(b)
2
u = ub
0 else.
We have ﬁ(M |µD) Æ ﬁ(M |µ), as desired.
Next, we provide a proof of the existence of an optimal mechanism, under some technical
hypotheses not imposed in the body of the paper:
Lemma 6. Suppose that the set of characteristics X is finite and the set of feasible types U
is compact. If the set of feasible types is C≠rich, then there exists an optimal C≠mechanism.
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Proof of lemma 6. First, we show that the principal’s payo  ﬁ(M) has a finite supremum.
Because the set of feasible types U is uniformly bounded, there exists a finite price P such that
all individually rational mechanisms include only allocations (x, p) with p < P . Accordingly,
sup ﬁ(M) <Œ.
Second, letMn be a sequence of mechanisms with guarantees that approach this supremum.
Without loss of generality, suppose that each Mn breaks ties in favor of the principal, for
every type of agent. Note that this is a well-defined criterion, because each Mn includes only
finitely many distinct allocations. It will be convenient to interpret mechanisms as sets of
allocations rather than as direct mechanisms.
Proceeding, because X is finite, there are only finitely many subsets of X. Consequently,
there exists a fixed set A µ X and subsequence nk of n such that the set of distinct
characteristic vectors allocated to some type of agent is exactly A for each Mnk . Thus, each
Mnk can be expressed as follows:
Mnk =
;1
x, pnk(x)
2
|x œ A
<
,
where pnk : A æ R+ gives the price assigned to characteristic x œ A by mechanism Mnk .
Furthermore, because the sequence pnk is uniformly bounded and has a finite domain, pnk
converges uniformly to some pŒ : Aæ R+. Define the mechanism MŒ as follows, with ties
again broken in favor of the principal:
MŒ =
;1
x, pŒ(x)
2
|x œ A
<
.
We claim that ﬁ(MŒ) Ø lim ﬁ(Mnk). To see why, let b œ B, and consider the cell of
agent types U(b). Because MŒ includes only finitely many distinct allocations, there are
consequently only finitely many allocations assigned by MŒ to types in U(b). Let u œ U(b).
Denote by
1
x, pŒ(x)
2
his allocation under MŒ, and similarly
1
xnk , pnk(xnk)
2
his allocation
under Mnk . We claim the following:
lim inf
k
ﬁ
1
xnk , pnk(xnk)
2
Æ ﬁ
1
x, pŒ(x)
2
. (A.1)
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To see why, note that because A is finite, there exists subsequence nkj of nk such that
xnkj = x
Õ for some xÕ œ A for all j. Moreover, we have the following:
u(xÕ)≠ pnkj (xÕ) Ø u(x)≠ pnkj (x)’k =∆ u(xÕ)≠ pŒ(xÕ) Ø u(x)≠ pŒ(x).
Consequently,
1
xÕ, pŒ(xÕ)
2
is individually rational and incentive compatible for u, under
mechanism MŒ. Finally, we have the following limit:
ﬁ
1
xÕ, pnkj (x
Õ)
2
æ ﬁ
1
xÕ, pŒ(xÕ)
2
.
Thus, because MŒ breaks ties in favor of the principal, inequality A.1 obtains. Assembling
the pieces, we have established that for any allocation assigned to some type u œ U(b) by
MŒ, we can find a sequence of allocations assigned to u by Mnkj that do no better (in
the limit) for the principal than the MŒ allocation. Because there are only finitely many
distinct allocations assigned to each cell of agents, and only finitely many cells of agents,
this is su cient to establish that ﬁ(MŒ) Ø lim ﬁ(Mnk) = sup ﬁ(M). Having established the
existence of an optimal mechanism, the existence of an optimal update mechanism follows
directly from theorem 1.
A.2 Omitted technical material, section 1.5
A.2.1 Subsection 1.5.1
Proof of proposition 1. In light of theorem 1, it is su cient to show that U0 is X0≠rich.
Proceeding, let u œ U0: i.e., suppose that u(0) = 0, that u is upper semicontinuous, and that
u is increasing. Let uX0 be the corresponding dual type with respect to the set of reference
allocations X0. We claim that uX0 œ U0.
First, because 0 is the minimal element of X, we have that uX0(0) = 0, as required. Second,
we claim that uX0 is increasing. Suppose that x Ø y, and let z œ X0. If z Æ y, then the
transitivity of Ø implies directly that z Æ x. Thus, by definition, uX0 is increasing. Finally,
we claim that uX0 is upper semicontinuous. This follows from the upper semicontinuity of u
and that X0 is closed. Accordingly, uX0 œ U0. Thus, U0 is X0≠rich.
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A.2.2 Subsection 1.5.3
It will be useful to first make an intermediate refinement to the set of potentially optimal
mechanisms for the monotone environment. Accordingly, define as follows:
Definition 14. Given X0≠mechanism M , we say that M has empirical prices if for each
(x, p) œM there exists a sequence of allocations (x1, p1), ..., (xJ , pJ) œM and a sequence of
choice lists b1, ..., bJ such that:
1. (x1, p1) = (x, p);
2. (xJ , pJ) = (0, 0);
3. (x1, p1) ≤b1 ... ≤bJ (xJ , pJ).
We say that a mechanism M uses empirical prices if each allocation is priced in order
to be consistent with the inferences that the principal is able to make from her choice data.
There is no loss of optimality to restrict attention to mechanisms that use empirical prices:
Lemma 7. Suppose that M is an X0≠mechanism that assigns only positive-payo  allocations
to the agent. Then there exists an X0≠mechanism M Õ with empirical prices that guarantees
the principal a payo  that is at least as large as M :
ﬁ(M) Æ ﬁ(M Õ).
Proof of lemma 7. Let M be as described, and fix choice list b œ B. Define M+ as the set
of allocations (x, p) œ M that satisfy the criteria of definition 14, and as M≠ the set of
allocations in M which do not. How does excluding the allocations in M≠ from M change
the choice set Cb(M)? We claim that one of the two following conditions must hold:
1. Cb(M+) µ Cb(M);
2. (0, 0) œ Cb(M).
To see why, suppose that the choice set Cb(M+) contains some allocation (x, p) that is not
contained in Cb(M). By definition of M+, there exists a sequence (x, p)j in M satisfying
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the criteria of definition 14, with (x, p)1 = (x, p). Furthermore, if (x, p) /œ Cb(M), then there
exists (y, q) œM≠ such that:
(y, q) ≤b (x, p).
Combining these two facts yields the existence of a sequence of allocations (y, q)j in M
satisfying the criteria of definition 14, with (y, q)1 = (y, q). This is contrary to our hypothesis
that (y, q) œ M≠. Thus, we conclude that one of the two conditions above holds. Given
our hypothesis that M assigns only profitable allocations, this is su cient to establish our
claim.
It is possible to refine lemma 7 considerably. To see why, note that while mechanisms
that use empirical prices use prices that lie within some constraints that are implied by the
data, this criterion says nothing about whether or not these constraints are tight. This is the
content of lemma 3, which we state in the body of the paper.
Proof of lemma 3. In light of proposition 1 and lemma 7, we restrict attention to the case
in which M0 is an X0 mechanism with empirical prices. Our approach will be to consider a
constrained maximization problem that is related to the problem of maximizing the principal’s
guarantee, and show that the solution to this maximization problem is a reference mechanism
M . We then verify that this mechanism M indeed guarantees the principal a larger payo 
than the original mechanism M . Define as follows:
XM0 :=
Ó
x|(x, p0) œM0 for some p0
Ô
.
The set XM0 µ X0 is the set of characteristics that appear in the mechanism M0. For
the entirety of the proof, we restrict attention to mechanisms M with the property that
(x, p) œM for some price p if and only if x œ XM0 . Thus, we restrict attention to mechanisms
M that allocate exactly the same characteristics to the agent as does the mechanism M0, but
at potentially di erent prices than the latter.
It will be convenient in places to interpret mechanisms as a price lists p : XM0 æ R+,
rather than as sets of allocations M µ XM0 ◊ R+.We reserve the notation p0 for the price
vector that corresponds to mechanism M0, so that
1
x, p0(x)
2
œM0 for each x œ XM0 .
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Proceeding, for each pair of characteristics x, y œ XM0 and each price list p : XM0 æ R+,
there are potentially between 0 and |B| choice lists b œ B for which the following binary
relation is satisfied: 1
x, p(x)
2
≤b
1
y, p(y)
2
. (A.2)
Equivalently, p(x) and p(y) satisfy the following inequality:
Vb(x, y) Ø p(x)≠ p(y). (A.3)
Given a pair of allocations x, y œ XM0 and a choice list b œ B, we label inequality A.3 as
[xæ y|b]. Finally, we label the set of all such inequalities that are satisfied by the given price
list p0 as C. We interpret these inequalities as constraints, and study the set P of price lists
p that satisfy each constraint in C. In particular, we claim that P has a maximum element in
the product order:
÷pú œ P : pú(x) Ø p(x)’x œ XM0 ’p œ P.
Establishing the existence of this maximum price list is straightforward. First, note that while
increasing the price p(x) assigned to characteristic x tightens each constraint [z æ y|b] œ C
with z = x, it either relaxes or does not a ect every constraint [z æ y|b] œ C with z ”= x.
Consequently, if price lists p, pÕ belong to the set P , then so does their pointwise-maximum.
Second, by construction the set P is compact. These two facts establish the existence of a
maximal element pú, as desired.
There are two remaining details to our argument. First, we need to establish that the
mechanism Mú that corresponds to the price list pú provides a larger guarantee than M , as
promised. To see why this is true, note that by construction Mú satisfies every constraint in
C. This is su cient to establish the following:
Cb(Mú) µ Cb(M0)’b œ B.
Because pú(x) Ø p0(x), this in turn establishes the following:
 b(Mú) Ø  b(M0)’b œ B.
88
This establishes that Mú provides a larger guarantee than M0, as desired. Finally, we are left
to show that Mú is indeed a reference mechanism. To see why this holds, note that because pú
is the maximum of P , for every characteristic x œ XM0 there exists a characteristic y œ XM0
and a choice list b œ B such that the constraint [xæ y|b] both belongs to C and is binding.
This is su cient to establish that Mú is a reference mechanism.
A.2.3 Subsection 1.5.4
Proof of theorem 2. Suppose that M is an X0≠mechanism, and let M break ties in favor of
the principal. The substance of the proof lies in establishing that the map   indeed gives the
correct payo  for an X0≠mechanism M . That is, we first demonstrate that the following
equality holds for M :
ﬁ(M) =  (M).
Fix choice list b œ B. Because U = U0 includes every utility function u : X æ R+ that is
consistent with monotonicity, there exists a type u œ U(b) that corresponds to any choice
pattern that is consistent with both the choice list b and the monotonicity requirement.1
Because the set Cb(M) excludes exactly the allocations that are inconsistent with the data
and monotonicity, every allocation (x, p) œ Cb(M) is assigned by M to some type of agent
u œ U(b).
As a final detail, there are knife-edge circumstances in which it might be incentive
compatible to assign allocations (y, q) /œ Cb(M) to agent types u œ Cb(M), in cases of
indi erence. Our hypothesis that M breaks ties in favor of the principal ensures that the
principal’s payo  is una ected by this complication. To see why, note that if ﬁ(y, q) Ø  b(M),
then doing so does not a ect the principal’s worst-case payo . If alternatively it is true that
ﬁ(y, q) <  b(M), then M breaks ties against the allocation (y, q). Thus, ﬁ(M) =  (M), as
desired.
Finally, lemma 3 justifies restricting our search for an optimal mechanism to reference
mechanisms. Because there are only finitely many reference mechanisms, the existence of a
reference mechanism that maximizes the principal’s payo  is immediate. This completes the
1Because we work with X0≠mechanisms — i.e., mechanisms with only finitely many distinct allocations
— our requirement that u be upper semicontinuous does not complicate our argument.
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proof.
A.3 Omitted technical material, section 1.6
Proof of proposition 2. In light of theorem 1, it is su cient to show that UÏ is XÏ≠rich.
Proceeding, let u œ UÏ: i.e., suppose that u(0) = 0, that u is increasing, that u is homogeneous
degree t for some t œ T , and that u is upper semicontinuous. We write uÏ as shorthand for
the dual type uXÏ with respect to the set of allocations XÏ. We claim that uÏ belongs to UÏ.
First, we claim that uÏ œ U0. That u(0) = 0 and that uÏ is increasing is inherited
directly from u; see the proof of proposition 1 for details. Furthermore, because u is upper
semicontinuous and XÏ is closed, uÏ is upper semicontinuous. Thus, uÏ œ U0.
Second, we claim that uÏ is homogeneous of the same degree t as the parent type u. Thus,
we show that for each x œ X and each ⁄ Ø 0 with ⁄x œ X, we have the following:
uÏ(⁄x) = ⁄tuÏ(x). (A.4)
Proceeding, choose x œ X and ⁄ Ø 0 with ⁄x œ X. There are two cases to consider.
Suppose first that x œ XÏ. By construction, ⁄x œ XÏ. Because u = uÏ on XÏ, equality A.4
follows immediately. Suppose alternatively that x /œ XÏ. The following equality obtains
straightforwardly from e.g. argument by contradiction:
„uXÏ(⁄x) = ⁄„uXÏ(x).
This is su cient to establish that equality A.4 again holds, as desired. Accordingly, uÏ is
homogeneous degree t. Because we have already argued that uÏ œ U0, this is su cient to
establish that uÏ œ UÏ. Thus, UÏ is XÏ≠rich.
Proof of proposition 3. In light of theorem 1, it is su cient to show that U¿ is X¿≠rich.
Proceeding, let u œ U¿: i.e., suppose that u œ U0 and that u exhibits diminishing returns, .
We write u¿ as shorthand for the dual type uX¿ with respect to the set of allocations X¿.
We claim that u¿ belongs to U¿. As in the proof of proposition 2, it is straightforward to
establish that u¿ œ U0. More substantively, we claim that u¿ su ers diminishing returns. Let
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x œ X and let ⁄ > 1 with ⁄x œ X. We claim the following:
u¿(⁄x) Æ ⁄u¿(x).
To see why, note that by definition of X¿, there exist characteristic x0 œ X0 and scalar ⁄0 Æ 1
such that:
u¿(⁄x) = u(⁄0x0).
Moreover, ⁄0/⁄x0 œ X¿. Consequently, by definition we have the following:
u¿(x) Ø u¿
3
⁄0
⁄
x0
4
= u
3
⁄0
⁄
x0
4
.
Because ⁄ Ø 1 and u exhibits diminishing returns, this is su cient to establish that u¿(⁄x) Æ
⁄u¿(x). Thus, u¿ exhibits diminishing returns. Accordingly, u¿ œ U¿. We conclude that U¿ is
X¿≠rich, as desired.
A.4 Explicit solution for special case of the homogeneous environment
Suppose that the principal is a monopolist who sells complex products to a consumer with
unit demand. Each product has N quality dimensions, for N finite, and the set of products
X = RN+ . The monopolist’s marginal costs for each quality dimension are constant, and the
agent’s utility is homogeneous degree t for t < 1 known to the monopolist:
U =
Ó
u : X æ R+|u is increasing,u(0) = 0, and u is homogeneous degree t
Ô
.
The monopolist observes choices from only one set of products. Moreover, these products are
strongly horizontally di erentiated, prices are strictly positive, and more expensive products
have a larger markup than their cheaper counterparts.2
2By strongly horizontally di erentiated, we mean that for each allocation (x, p), (xÕ, pÕ) œ B, there exist
quality dimensions i, iÕ such that x(i), xÕ(iÕ) > 0 and x(iÕ), xÕ(i) = 0, where we write x(i) for the ith quality
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Proposition 15. There exists an optimal mechanism with only as many distinct allocations
as there are contained in the data set B. These allocations are as follows, for each (x, p) œ B :
⁄ =
A
p
tc(x)
B 1
1≠t
(y, q) =
1
⁄x,⁄tp
2
.
Proof. Proposition 2 justifies restricting our search for an optimal mechanism to a search
for a mechanism that proportionally scales each quality component. We proceed by
first maximizing the principal’s worst-case payo  in a relaxed program without incentive
compatibility constraints. Second, we show that the resulting mechanism yields the same
payo  in the full program as it does in the relaxed program. In doing so, we establish that
this mechanism is optimal for the principal.
Consider the following maximization problem:
max
y,q
Ó
ﬁ(y, q)|(y, q) is individually rational for each u œ U(b)
Ô
. (A.5)
For each b = (x, p) œ B, define as follows:
ub(z) :=
1
max{r|z Ø rx}
2t
p.
Because x, ‚x are strongly horizontally di erentiated for each pair x, ‚x, type ux satisfies the
following equality for each z œ X0:
ub(z) =
Y__]__[
p z = x
0 z ”= x.
Consequently, ub œ U(b). Moreover, individual rationality demands that u(x) Ø ub(x) for each
u œ U(b). Thus, individual rationality of (y, q) for ub is necessary and su cient for individual
rationality for all u œ U(b). Accordingly, the problem presented in A.5 is equivalent to the
dimension of x. By markup, we mean the quantity p/c(x).
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following relaxed problem:
max
y,q
Ó
ﬁ(y, q)|(y, q) is individually rational for ub
Ô
.
This problem is equivalent to the following:
max
{⁄|⁄xœX}
⁄tp≠ ⁄c(x)
Necessary and su cient conditions for a solution ⁄ are as follows:
⁄ = ⁄b :=
A
p
tc(x)
B 1
1≠t
.
The corresponding allocation (y, q):
y = yb := ⁄bx
q = qb := ⁄tbp.
By hypothesis, ⁄b is strictly increasing in p. A direct verification reveals that for u œ U(b)
and bÕ = (xÕ, pÕ) œ B with p > pÕ, we have:
u(yb)≠ qb Ø u(ybÕ)≠ qbÕ . (A.6)
Moreover, if p > pÕ, a direct calculation reveals that:
ﬁ(yb, qb) > ﬁ(ybÕ , qbÕ). (A.7)
Assembling the pieces, let M be the mechanism that assigns allocations (xb, qb) to each
u œ U(b), where it is incentive compatible to do so. Inequalities A.6 and A.7 jointly imply
that if (y‚b, q‚b) is incentive compatible for u œ U(b), then the following inequality must hold:
ﬁ(y‚b, q‚b) Ø ﬁ(yb, qb).
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Thus, the mechanism that we have just constructed has the same payo  in the relaxed
problem without incentive compatibility constraints as it does in the full problem. Because
this mechanism is optimal for the relaxed problem, it is thus optimal for the full problem.
We emphasize two features of this solution. First, our assumption about markups has
the implication that more profitable allocations (x, p) œ B receive larger scaling factors ⁄.
Consequently, if the allocation intended for type u œ U(b) is incentive compatible for type
uÕ œ U(bÕ), then it must be the case that the allocation intended for those in U(b) yields
a strictly higher payo  for the principal than the allocation intended for those in U(bÕ).
Accordingly, any failures of incentive compatibility are profit improving for the principal, and
this feature drives why it is optimal to include only one allocation intended for each cell of
agents.
Second — and more importantly — we have deliberately chosen our hypotheses to deliver
a closed-form solution to the principal’s optimization problem. Inspection of the expression
for ⁄ above reveals that it is generically optimal to choose ⁄ so that ⁄y ”= x for any x œ X0.
Accordingly, this example again provides a demonstration that it is not optimal in general
for the principal in our model to use a mechanism M that corresponds exactly to one of the
observed choice sets Bk.
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APPENDIX B
Appendix to Chapter Two
This appendix is organized as follows. First, we present technical lemmas not stated in the
body of the text in section B.1. Second, we present proofs to propositions 4, 5, and 6 in
section B.2, and treat proposition 8 in section B.3. Finally, section B.4 addresses screening
by the principal, and section B.5 addresses the role of limited liability in our problem. Before
proceeding, we establish some notation and facts about our problem that will play a role in
our arguments throughout this appendix:
• Our proofs are complicated somewhat by the presence of the (”0, 0) action in A0, as ”0
evidently does not have full support. Accordingly, we use the following notation:
A(e) := {(F, eÕ) œ A0|eÕ Ø e}.
Because A(e) is compact, the full support assumption implies the following for positive
e ort levels e > 0, for all open sets O:
min
(F,e)œA(e)
PF [O] > 0.
• Given that contracts w : Y æ R+ are upper semicontinuous and the agent enjoys
limited liability, the range of w is compact for each contract w. We will make repeated
use of this fact throughout our arguments.
• For each · œ R+, define u·A as follows:
u·A(t) :=
Y__]__[
t t < ·
· t Ø ·.
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• For each ◊ œ R+, define u◊ as follows:
u◊(t) :=
Y__]__[
0 t < ◊
1 t Ø ◊.
Although the risk preferences u·A and u◊ are both excluded from our model because they fail
to be strictly increasing (and u◊ furthermore fails to be continuous), these types are nearby
to types in UA and U , respectively, and we make use of this fact in several of our proofs.
B.1 Lemmas omitted from text
In this section, we prove three technical lemmas. First, we establish the existence of a
solution to the agent’s maximization problem, using standard compactness and continuity
arguments. Second, we prove continuity results for both risk preference domains considered
in this paper, which support the proofs of the propositions presented in the body of the
paper. We emphasize that lemma 9 provides for the existence of a risk-averse risk preference
with the desired property, while lemma 10 potentially yields a risk-seeking risk preference.
Consequently, lemma 9 is not supplanted by its counterpart.
Lemma 8. For each type v, compact technology A, and contracts w, we have c(A|v, w) ”= ÿ.
Proof. Fix type v, technology A, and contract w. Define as follows:
M := sup
(F,e)œA
EF
Ë
v
1
w(y), e
2È
.
Because w is upper semicontinuous, it is bounded above. Thus, because v is continuous and
decreasing in e, we have that M <Œ. Let (Fn, en) be such that:
EFn
Ë
v
1
w(y), en
2È
æM.
As A is compact, there exists subsequence nk of n and (F ú, eú) œ A such that (Fnk , enk)æ
(F ú, eú). Because w is upper semicontinuous, we have that EF ú
Ë
v
1
w(y), eú
2È
Ø M. This
completes the proof.
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Lemma 9. Let K µ R+ and F µ  (K) each be compact. If maxF PF [t Ø · ] < 1, then there
exists u œ UA such that maxF EF [u(t)] < E”· [u(t)].
Proof. Let F and · be as described. Define F ú as follows:
F ú := inf
FœF F (t).
Note that PF ú [t Ø · ] = max
FœF PF [t Ø · ]. Because maxFœF PF [t Ø · ] < 1 by hypothesis, we have
the following:
E”· [u·A(t)] > EF ú [u·A(t)].
Let un œ UA converge pointwise to u·A on K. Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem
implies that for N su ciently large, we have the following:
E”· [uN(t)] > EF ú [uN(t)].
By construction, F ú first-order stochastically dominates each F œ F . Thus, we have the
following:
E”· [uN(t)] > max
FœF EF [uN(t)].
Lemma 10. Let K µ R+ and F µ  (K) each be compact. If maxF PF [t Ø ◊] < p, then
there exists u œ U such that maxF EF [u(t)] < E”p◊ [u(t)].
Proof. Let F , ◊, and p be as described. Define F ú as follows:
F ú := inf
FœF F (t).
Note that PF ú [t Ø ◊] = max
FœF PF [t Ø ◊]. Because p > maxFœF PF [t Ø ◊] by hypothesis, we have
the following:
E”p◊ [u
◊(t)] > EF ú [u◊(t)].
Let un œ U converge pointwise to u◊ on K. Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem
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implies that for N su ciently large, we have the following:
E”p◊ [uN(t)] > EF ú [uN(t)].
By construction, F ú first-order stochastically dominates each F œ F . Thus, we have the
following:
E”p◊ [uN(t)] > maxFœF EF [uN(t)].
B.2 Proofs omitted from text
B.2.1 Proposition 4
We prove proposition 4 for the general case in which V is any environment with risk aversion.
We o er two points of clarification. First, because every environment without risk aversion
includes as a subset an environment with risk aversion, the proof is valid for environments
without risk aversion, as well. Second, the proof admits the costless e ort environments (with
or without risk aversion) as special cases.
Proof of proposition 4. Let V be an environment with risk aversion. Fix ‘ > 0 and let x be a
maximizer for w on the set [0, ‘]. Let · = w(x). We exhibit a type v œ V and a technology
A œ A such that c(A|v, w) µ {(”0, 0), (”x, 0)}. After doing so, taking the limit xæ 0 yields
the desired result.
As w is upper semicontinuous and not flat at the bottom, there exists open set O and
constant m < · such that w(y) < m for y œ O. The following inequality holds for any e > 0,
per the full support assumption:
1 > max
(F,e)œA(e)
PF [w(y) Ø · ].
Lemma 9 implies that the following inequality holds for some risk preference u œ UA:
E”x
Ë
u
1
(w(y)
2È
> max
(F,e)œA(e)
EF
Ë
u
1
w(y)
2È
.
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Let v œ V have risk preference u. As v is decreasing in e, we have the following:
E”x
Ë
v
1
w(y), 0
2
> max
(F,e)œA(e)
EF
Ë
v
1
w(y), e
2È
. (B.1)
Define Ax = A ﬁ {(”x, 0)}. Note that because (”x, 0)æ (”0, 0), we have that Ax µ A1 for all
x su ciently small.
Let En √ 0. Inequality B.1 establishes that for each n, there exists agent type vn œ V
such that c(Ax|vn, w) ﬂ A(En) = ÿ. Let (Fn, en) œ c(Ax|vn, w). As Ax is compact, there
exists a subsequence nk of n and (F ú, eú) œ Ax such that (Fnk , enk) æ (F ú, eú). Moreover,
(F ú, eú) œ {(”0, 0), (”x, 0)}. Accordingly, we have the following:
ﬁ(A |V , w) Æ max
5
up
1
0≠ w(0)
2
, lim inf
xæ0 up
1
x≠ w(x)
26
.
As up is continuous and w(y) Ø 0 for all y, we conclude that ﬁ(A |V , w) Æ 0.
B.2.2 Proposition 5
We prove proposition 5 for the general case in which V is any environment without risk
aversion. Of course, this includes the costless e ort environment without risk aversion as a
special case.
Proof of proposition 5. Let V be an environment without risk aversion. As Y is compact and
w is upper semicontinuous, w attains its maximum M on Y . Let x be such that w(x) = M
and let ◊ = M . As w is not flat at the top, the following inequality holds for any e > 0 and
p > 0:
p > max
(F,e)œA(e)
PF [y Ø ◊].
Lemma 10 implies that the following inequality holds for some risk preference u œ U :
E”px
Ë
u
1
(w(y)
2È
> max
(F,e)œA(e)
EF
Ë
u
1
w(y)
2È
.
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Let v œ V have risk preference u. As v is decreasing in e, we have the following:
E”px
Ë
v
1
w(y), 0
È
> max
(F,e)œA(e)
EF
Ë
v
1
w(y), e
2È
. (B.2)
Define Ap = A ﬁ {(”px, 0)}. Note that because (”px, 0)æ (”0, 0), we have that Ap µ A1 for all
p su ciently small.
Let En √ 0. Inequality B.2 establishes that for each n, there exists agent type vn œ V
such that c(Ap|vn, w) ﬂ A(En) = ÿ. Let (Fn, en) œ c(Ap|vn, w). As Ap is compact, there
exists a subsequence nk of n and (F ú, eú) œ Ap such that (Fnk , enk) æ (F ú, eú). Moreover,
(F ú, eú) œ {(”0, 0), (”px, 0)}. Accordingly, we have the following:
ﬁ(A |V , w) Æ max
C
up
1
0≠ w(0)
2
, lim inf
pæ0
3
(1≠ p)up
1
0≠ w(0)
2
+ (p)up
1
x≠ w(x)
24D
.
As up is continuous and w(y) Ø 0 for all y, we conclude that ﬁ(A |V , w) Æ 0.
B.2.3 Proposition 6
We prove proposition 6 for the case in which V is the costless e ort environment without risk
aversion. Because the costless e ort environment with risk aversion is a subset of the costless
e ort environment without risk aversion, our proof is valid for the former case, as well.
Proof of proposition 6. Let V be the costless e ort environment without risk aversion, and
suppose that w be as described. Define as follows:
yL := max B(w)
yH := min T (w).
Next, let (F, e) œ A0 such that PF [y Ø yH ] > 0, noting that such an action must exist per
our hypothesis that w is flat at the top. Suppose that the following inequality holds for some
risk preference u and some F Õ œ  (Y):
EF Õ
Ë
u
1
w(y)
2
]
È
Ø EF
Ë
u
1
w(y)
2È
.
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Because w is increasing, it must be the case that PF Õ [y Ø x] Ø PF [y Ø x] for some x œ [yL, yH ].
As w(y) Æ y for all y œ Y , we obtain the following:
EF Õ [up
1
y ≠ w(y)
2
] Ø inf
xœ[yL,yH ]
3
PF [y Ø x]up
1
x≠ w(x)
24
.
As w is upper semicontinuous, x ≠ w(x) is lower semicontinuous. Consequently, x ≠ w(x)
achieves its minimum on [yL, yH ]. Moreover, we have w(y) < y for all y > 0. Thus, we have:
min
xœ[yL,yH ]
up
1
x≠ w(x)
2
> 0.
Finally, as PF [y Ø x] Ø PF [y Ø yH ] > 0 for all x œ [yL, yH ], we have that there exists ﬁ > 0
such that EF Õ [up
1
y ≠ w(y)
2
] Ø ﬁ, as desired.
B.2.4 Proposition 7
Proof of proposition 7. Let V and A be as described. Consider an arbitrary contract w with
at least two distinct transfer levels. We show how to improve w into a binary contract wÕ that
provides a larger revenue guarantee than w. Proceeding, choose y œ Y so that the following
inequality holds:
w(y) > inf
zœYw(z).
Let ◊ = w(x), and label as T µ Y the set of output levels that are assigned a transfer at least
◊:
T = {y|w(y) Ø ◊}.
Finally, let x = minT . For ‘ > 0 small, consider the following technology:
A = A0 ﬁ
Ó
(”p+‘x , 0)
Ô
.
Lemma 10 establishes the existence of some type v œ V such that:
c(A|v, w) =
Ó
(”p+‘x , 0)
Ô
.
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Thus, we obtain the following upper bound for the principal’s revenue guarantee when she
uses contract w:
ﬁú(A |V , w) Æ p · x.
Consider alternatively the following binary contract wÕ, with quota Q = T and bonus payment
b > 0:
wÕ(y) =
Y__]__[
0 y /œ Q
b y œ Q.
It is straightforward to verify that ﬁú(A |V , w) = p ·x. Thus, we have the following inequality,
as desired:
ﬁú(A |V , w) Æ ﬁú(A |V , wÕ).
Thus, we have established that there is no loss to the principal to restrict her search for a
contract that maximizes the revenue guarantee ﬁú to binary contracts. Furthermore, it is
simple to show that it is optimal to restrict attention further to increasing binary contracts.
Existence of an optimal binary contract then follows from the upper semicontinuity of the
quantity max
(F,e)œA0
PF [y Ø x] · x in x.
B.3 Costly e ort
This section is devoted to the proof of proposition 8. We assume that A1 =  (Y)◊R+, as is
consistent with the statement of the second part of proposition 8. In order to see that the
first part of the proposition holds without this restriction, observe that if A ú µ A , then
ﬁ(A ú|Vú, w) Ø ﬁ(A |Vú, w) for all contracts w.
We proceed to the construction of the environment V without risk aversion referenced
in the statement of proposition. As usual, we call type v quasilinear if it is of the following
form:
v(t, e) = u(t)≠ e.
Let (F ú, eú) œ A0 with eú > 0. For output yú and fixed transfer bú < yú, let Vú be exactly the
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set of quasilinear types v that satisfy the following inequality for some risk preference u œ U :
eú
PF ú [y Ø yú] Æ u(b
ú). (B.3)
Recall that for the purposes of assumption 4, we identify risk preferences that are a ne
transformations of one another, and so Vú is indeed a valid environment. One interpretation
of Vú is as the set of agent types that consists of exactly the set of quasilinear agent types
who prefer action (F ú, eú) to shirking under the following binary contract wú:
wú(y) = 1(y Ø yú)bú.
We emphasize, however, that wú is itself sub-optimal. The first step of the proof of proposition
8 is to improve an arbitrary contract into a binary contract:
Lemma 11. For any contract w, there exists a binary contract wÕ that provides a larger
guarantee against Vú.
Proof. Let w be a contract. If w is not flat at the bottom and flat at the top, ﬁ(A |Vú, w) Æ 0,
and the improvement is vacuous; see propositions 4 and 5, respectively. Similarly, if w is
constant, we have (”0, 0) œ c(A0|v, w) for all v, and hence ﬁ(A |V , w) Æ 0. Suppose instead
that w is flat at the bottom, flat at the top, and not constant. Define as follows:
Qú =
Ó
y|w(y) Ø bú
Ô
.
We construct our improved contract. Define wÕ : Y æ R+ as follows:
wÕ(y) = 1
1
Qú
2
bú.
Because w is a contract and thus upper semicontinuous, the set Qú is closed. Thus, wÕ is
itself upper semicontinuous and consequently a valid contract. Proceeding, choose A œ A
and v œ Vú arbitrarily. Let u be the risk preference belonging to type v i.e, v(t, e) = u(t)≠ e.
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Let (F ú, eú) œ c(A|v, wÕ). We obtain the following inequality:
PF ú [Qú]u(bú)≠ eú Ø max(F,e)œAPF [Q
ú]u(bú)≠ e. (B.4)
For p > PF ú [Qú], define as follows:
Fp = (1≠ p)”0 + p · ”minQú
Ap = Aﬁ
Ó
(Fp, eú)
Ô
.
By choice of Fp, we have:
lim inf
pæPF [Qú]
EFp
Ë
up
1
y ≠ w(y)
2È
Æ EF ú
Ë
up
1
y ≠ wÕ(y)
2È
.
Consequently, it is su cient for the purposes of our proof to establish the existence of an
agent type vp œ Vú such that (Fp, eú) œ c(Ap|vp, w). We proceed accordingly. First, define uú
as follows:
uú(t) := 1(t Ø bú)u(bú)
vú(t, e) := uú(t)≠ e.
Note the following:
EFp
Ë
vú
1
w(y), eú
2
] > max
(F,e)œA
EF
Ë
vú
1
w(y), e
2
].
Because uú is not strictly increasing, vú does not belong to Vú. However, there are types
nearby to vú that do belong to Vú, and this turns out to be su cient for our purposes. The
remainder of the proof is devoted to establishing this approximation. Let un æ uú in U , with
un Ø uú. Let vn(t, e) = un(t) ≠ e, noting that vn œ Vú, as desired. Our argument has two
steps. First, Lebesgue’s dominated converge theorem yields the following limit:
EFp
Ë
vn
1
w(y), eú
2È
æ EFp
Ë
vú
1
w(y), eú
2È
. (B.5)
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Second, we claim the following:
V (A|vn, w)æ max(F,e)œAEF
Ë
vú
1
w(y), e
2
]. (B.6)
To see why, choose (Fn, en) œ c(A|vn, w). Because A is compact, there exists subsequence nk
of n and ( ‚F, ‚e) œ A such that (Fnk , enk)æ ( ‚F, ‚e). To ease notation, we substitute n for nk.
We claim:
lim inf
n
EFn [un
1
w(y)
2
] Æ E‚F [uú1w(y)2]. (B.7)
Fix ‘ > 0, and let ·k æ bú. First, for each k, un ◆ uú outside of [·k, bú). Consequently, there
exists subsequence nk of n such that:
n Ø nk =∆
1
un(t)≠ uú(t) < ‘
2
’t /œ [·k, bú). (B.8)
Second, because Fnk æ ‚F and ·k æ bú, we have the following:
P‚F [t Ø bú] Ø lim infk PFnk [t Ø ·k]. (B.9)
Inequalities B.8 and B.9 jointly yield inequality B.7. Moreover, because un Ø u, the limit
holds with equality. As en æ ‚e, this is su cient to establish B.6. In turn, B.5 and B.6 jointly
yield the existence of vn such that (Fp, eú) œ c(Ap|vn, w). This completes the proof.
Having constructed an improvement of an arbitrary contract w to a binary contract wÕ,
the second step is to compute the guarantee provided by a binary contract, and show that
there exists an optimal such guarantee.
Proof of proposition 8. Lemma 11 establishes that if an optimal contract exists, there exists
an optimal binary contract of the form:
w(y) = 1(y Ø x)bú.
We compute the guarantee associated to such contracts, as a function of x. First, if x Æ bú,
then w does not provide a guarantee. To see why, consider technology A = A0 ﬁ {(”x, 0)}.
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For all v œ Vú, we have:
{(”x, 0)} œ c(A|v, w).
This is su cient to establish that w does not provide a guarantee if x Æ bú. More substantively,
suppose that x > bú. Let v œ Vú and suppose that (F Õ, eÕ) is preferred by v to each (F, e) œ A0:
EF Õ
Ë
u
1
w(y)
2È
≠ eÕ Ø max
(F,e)œA0
3
EF
Ë
u
1
w(y)
2È
≠ e
4
.
In turn, we obtain the following bound for PF Õ [y Ø x]:
PF Õ [y Ø x] Ø max(F,e)œA0
QaPF [y Ø x] + eÕ ≠ e
u(bú)
Rb. (B.10)
It will be convenient to define p(x) as follows:
p(x) :=
Qa max
(F,e)œA0
A
PF [y Ø x]≠ e
eú
PF ú [y Ø yú]
BRb.
The bound on the right-hand side of B.10 is minimized when eÕ = 0 and when inequality B.3
holds with equality. Substitution yields:
PF Õ [y Ø x] Ø p(x).
Proceeding, we have the following lower bound for the principal’s guarantee:
ﬁ(A |Vú, w) Ø p(x)up(x≠ bú).
To see that this bound is tight, let v œ Vú be any type for whom inequality B.3 holds with
equality. Consider action (F, e) =
1
”p(x)x , 0). We have the following:
(F, e) œ c
1
Aﬁ
Ó
(F, e)
Ô
|v, w
2
.
Thus, we obtain:
ﬁ(A |Vú, w) = p(x)up(x≠ bú)
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Per our construction of Vú, we have that p(x) > 0 for each x < yú. Consequently, if x œ (bú, yú),
we have ﬁ(A |Vú, w) > 0. This establishes the first part of our claim: that there exist binary
contracts that provide the principal with a guarantee against the environmentVú.
To see that the second part of our claim holds — that there exist binary contracts which
provide the principal with the largest possible payo  guarantee — note that because the
quantity PF [y Ø x] is upper semicontinuous in x for each F œ  (Y), p(x) is itself upper
semicontinuous per standard arguments. This is su cient to establish that there exists a
binary contract wú that maximizes ﬁ(A |Vú, w).
B.4 Screening
In the body of the text, we restrict our attention to analyzing the performance of individual
contracts. However, the agent in our problem is privately informed about both his type v and
his technology A. Provided that the agent observes his type and technology before choosing
a contract, this suggests that the principal might benefit from screening the agent with a
menu contracts W .
In this section, we allow for screening by the principal. We require that menus are
incentive compatible: that is, the contract w assigned to type v and technology A satisfies
the following set of inequalities:
v(A|v, w) Ø v(A|v, wÕ)’wÕ œW .
We label as wvA the contract assigned to the pair (v,A). The principal’s payo  for menu W
is as follows:
ﬁ(A |V ,W) := inf
V◊A
ﬁ(A|v, wvA).
We require menus to be compact in the sup-norm topology, which ensures that there is an
incentive compatible contract for each type-technology pair (v,A).
Our necessary conditions for menus are analogous to propositions 4 and 5. First, menus
that provide guarantees include contracts that are flat at the bottom:
Proposition 16. Consider any environment with risk aversion or any environment without
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risk aversion. If menu W guarantees the principal a positive payo , then W includes contracts
that are flat at the bottom.
We prove proposition 16 by considering environments with risk aversion. Because every
environment without risk aversion includes an environment with risk aversion as a subset,
our proof is valid for environments without risk aversion, as well.
Proof of proposition 16. Let V be any environment with risk aversion. Define as follows:
w0 = max
wœW
1
inf
yœY w(y)
2
.
If W contains a contract w such that w(y) = w0 for all y in some neighborhood B(w) of
output y = 0, then there is nothing to demonstrate. Suppose instead that W includes no
such contract. We claim W does not provide a guarantee.
By hypothesis, for all ‘ > 0 there exists x < ‘ and wx œ W such that wx(x) > w0. Set
· = wx(x). We claim that the following inequality holds for all E > 0:
E”x
Ë
u·A
1
wx(y)
2È
> sup
wœW
3
max
(F,e)œA(E)
EF
Ë
u·A
1
w(y)
2È4
. (B.11)
To see why, let wn be an arbitrary sequence in W . As W is compact, there exists subsequence
nk of n and wú œW such that wnk converges uniformly to wú. By our definition of w0 and
the upper semicontinuity of wú, there exists some open set O and some · Õ < · such that
wú(y) < · Õ for all y œ O. Moreover, as wnk converges uniformly to wú, there exists · ÕÕ < ·
such that wnk < · ÕÕ for all y œ O for all k su ciently large. As each (F, e) œ A(E) has full
support, we conclude that inequality B.11 holds.
Let un œ UA converge uniformly to u·A. Inequality B.11 extends to uN for N su ciently
large. The remainder of the argument is identical to the final steps of the proof of proposition
4.
Similarly, if the agent is not necessarily risk-averse, menus that provide guarantees include
contacts that are flat at the top:
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Proposition 17. Consider any environment without risk aversion. If menuW guarantees
the principal a positive payo , then W includes contracts that are flat at the top.
Proof. Let V be any environment without risk aversion. Define as follows:
w1 = max
wœW
1
max
yœY w(y)
2
.
If W contains a contract w such that PF [w(y) = w1] > 0 for some (F, e) œ A0, then there
is nothing to demonstrate. Suppose instead that W includes no such contract. We claim that
W does not provide a guarantee.
Set E > 0. Let T (E) = {w(F )|w œ W, (F, e) œ A(E)}, where we write w(F ) for the
distribution of transfers w(y) when output y ≥ F . Next, let T (E) be the pointwise infimum
of T (E).
First, because the pointwise infimum of a family of upper semicontinuous functions is itself
upper semicontinuous, we have that T (E) œ  (R+). Second, T (E) first-order stochastically
dominates T for each T œ T (E). Third, because menu W does not include any contracts
that are flat at the top, we have that PT (E)[w1] = 0.
Let (x, wx) œ Y ◊W be such that wx(x) = w1. For any ‘ > 0, lemma 10 implies that the
following inequality holds for some risk preference u œ U :
E”‘x
Ë
u
1
wx(y)
2È
> ET (E)[u(t)].
As T (E) first-order stochastically dominates T for each T œ T (E), we conclude the following:
E”‘x
Ë
u
1
wx(y)
2È
> sup
wœW
3
max
(F,e)œA(E)
EF
Ë
u
1
w(y)
2È4
.
The remainder of the argument is identical to the final steps of the proof of proposition 5.
Our model thus continues to predict the presence of contracts that are flat at the bottom
and flat at the top if the principal screens the agent with a menu of contracts.
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B.5 Limited liability
Our analysis demonstrates that it is challenging for the principal to provide the agent with
incentives for e ort without potentially providing him with incentives to take undesirable
risks. One prospective solution to these challenges is to sell the firm to the agent: that is,
for the principal to use a contract w(y) = y ≠ — that designates the agent the sole claimant
of output, in return for a fee — > 0. Under such an arrangement, the principal’s payo 
is independent of output, and so she need not be concerned with risk-taking by the agent.
Although such contracts are excluded by the limited liability constraint, this is inconsequential
because su ciently risk-averse agents refuse to purchase the firm from the principal in the
absence of limited liability.
Formally, relax the requirement that w(y) Ø 0, and replace it with the requirement that
w(y) Ø ≠l for l > 0. Suppose that the agent has outside option (”w0 , 0), with w0 Ø 0. This
yields the following individual rationality constraint:
V (A|v, w) Ø v(w0, 0). (B.12)
We say that a contract w provides limited liability if w(y) Ø w0 for all y œ Y . In our model,
contracts that provide a guarantee provide limited liability:
Proposition 18. Consider any environment with risk aversion or any environment without
risk aversion. If contract w guarantees the principal a positive payo , then w provides limited
liability.
We prove proposition 18 for environments with risk aversion. Because every environment
with risk aversion includes an environment without risk aversion as a subset, our proof is
valid for environments without risk aversion, as well.
Proof of proposition 18. Let V be any environment with risk aversion. Suppose that w(y) <
w0 for some y œ Y. Because w is upper semicontinuous, there exists some open set O and
some constant · < w0 such that w(y) < · on O. The following inequality holds for any e > 0,
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per the full support assumption:
max
(F,e)œA(e)
PF [w(y) Ø · ] < 1.
Lemma 9 implies that the following holds for risk preference u œ UA:
E”· [u(t)] > max(F,e)œA(e)EF
Ë
u
1
w(y)
2È
. (B.13)
Let v œ V have risk preference u. As v is decreasing in e, we have the following:
v(·, 0) > max
(F,e)œA(e)
EF
Ë
v
1
w(y), e
2È
. (B.14)
Let En √ 0. For each n, let vn œ V satisfy inequality B.14 for technology A(En). Let
(Fn, en) œ c(A0|vn, w). As A0 is compact, there exists subsequence nk of n and (F ú, eú) œ A0
such that (Fnk , enk)æ (F ú, eú). There are two cases to consider.
Case 1. Suppose first that eú > 0. For all k su ciently large, we have that enk > Enk .
Consequently, for all such k, we have (Fnk , enk) œ A(Enk). By construction,
inequality B.14 implies the following:
vnk(·, 0) > V (A0|vnk , w).
As vnk(·, 0) < vnk(w0, 0), this is a violation of the individual rationality constraint
B.12. Consequently, w does not provide a guarantee.
Case 2. Suppose second that (F ú, eú) = (”0, 0). There are two subcases.
Case i. First, suppose lim sup EFnk [w(y)] < w0. Jensen’s inequality implies the
following, for all k su ciently large:
unk(w0) > EFnk
Ë
unk
1
w(y)
2È
.
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As vnk is decreasing in e, we have the following:
vnk(w0, 0) > V (A0|vnk , w).
As this is a violation of the individual rationality constraint B.12, w
does not provide a guarantee.
Case ii. Second, suppose lim sup EFnk [w(y)] Ø w0. We have the following:
lim inf EFnk [y ≠ w(y)] Æ ≠w0.
Because up is concave, Jensen’s inequality then implies the following:
lim inf EFnk [up
1
y ≠ w(y)
2
] Æ up(≠w0).
As w0 Ø 0, w does not provide a guarantee.
The proof of proposition 18 demonstrates that if the agent is su ciently risk-averse, he
is unwilling to accept contracts that specify transfers smaller than w0 unless he can obtain
a transfer that is at least w0 by shirking. Consequently, if a contract w does not provide
limited liability, su ciently risk-averse agents either accept the contract and shirk, or reject
the contract outright. In either case, the contract does not provide a guarantee.1
We emphasize that while proposition 18 provides an explanation for contracts that are flat
at the bottom with minimum transfer w(0) Ø w0, our limited liability constraint demands
only that w(y) Ø ≠l. Because we allow for the case that w0 > ≠l, our limited liability
constraint does not bind in general. Contrast this result to existing work that finds debt
contracts to be optimal under binding limited liability constraints
1
Innes (1990); Poblete and
Spulber (2012)
2
.
1Although we do not pursue this line of analysis, proposition 18 suggests that the principal might screen
risk-averse agents by o ering contracts that do not provide limited liability.
112
B.6 Fixed technology
Consider an alternative environment in which A = {A0}: that is, the principal is not
uncertain about the agent’s production technology. Propositions 4 and 5 do not continue to
hold in general. We provide a counterexample.
Example 7. Suppose that A0 is ordered by first-order stochastic dominance ≤1:
F ≤1 F Õ ≈∆ e Ø eÕ ’(F, e), (F Õ, eÕ) œ A0.
Claim 4. Consider the costless e ort environment with risk aversion or the costless e ort
environment without risk aversion. Suppose contract w is strictly increasing and w(y) Æ y for
all output y, with equality only if y = 0. Then w guarantees the principal a positive payo .
We prove claim 4 for the costless e ort environment without risk aversion. Because this
environment includes the costless e ort environment with risk aversion as a subset, the proof
is valid for the latter environment, as well.
Proof of claim 4. As w is strictly increasing and A0 satisfies the first-order stochastic
dominance condition stated above, we have the following for every risk preference u:
EF Õ
Ë
u
1
w(y)
2
] Ø EF
Ë
u
1
w(y)
2
] ≈∆ eÕ Ø e.
As A0 is compact, it has a maximal-e ort action (F ú, eú). Under our stochastic dominance
condition, this action is unique. Moreover, because F ú has full support and w(y) < y for all
y > 0, we have the following:
EF ú
Ë
up
1
y ≠ w(y)
2È
> 0.
Let V be the costless e ort environment without risk aversion. We have ﬁ(A |V , w) =
EF ú
Ë
up
1
y ≠ w(y)
2
].
Thus, we see that the contract w fails to be flat at the bottom or flat at the top, yet
provides a guarantee in some environments.
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APPENDIX C
Appendix to Chapter Three
This appendix is divided into two sections. First, section C.1 provides technical material
relating to section 3.3. Second, section C.2 does so for section 3.4.
C.1 Proofs, section 3.3
This section proves the results of section 3.3. First, we state and prove two supporting
lemmas. After doing so, we prove proposition 9. Next comes a technical lemma, which
establishes the existence of our contracts of interest, which is followed by the proof of theorem
3, which characterizes the set of risk-aligned contracts as stochastic binary contracts with
weight ⁄ú. Lastly, we prove theorem 4, which is straightforward. For convenience, we present
the risk-aligned weight ⁄ú here:
⁄ú = ETL [ﬁ(y, t)]≠ ETL [ﬁ(0, t)]
ETL [ﬁ(y, t)]≠ ETL [ﬁ(0, t)] + ETH [ﬁ(Y , t)]≠ ETH [ﬁ(y, t)]
. (C.1)
Note that ⁄ú depends on the principal’s objective ﬁ and the rewards TL, TH .
C.1.1 Lemmas
Lemma 12. If w is payo  a ne, then uw, ﬁw : Y æ R are injective for all u œ U .
Proof. Suppose that w is payo  a ne. We have the following:
ﬁw(x) = ﬁw(z) ≈∆ uw(x) = uw(z)’u œ U (C.2)
≈∆ Tw(x) = Tw(z) (C.3)
≈∆ x = z. (C.4)
Line C.2 follows from criterion 2. Lemma 4 then yields line C.3. As ﬁ is strictly increasing in
y and Tw(x) = Tw(z), line C.4 follows.
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C.1.2 Proof of proposition 9
Proof of proposition 9 . First, we show that if w is risk-aligned, then w is payo  a ne.
Second, we show the converse. We proceed by contrapositive. Suppose that w is not payo 
a ne. There are three cases to consider.
Case 1. Suppose that for some type u œ U , there exists x œ Y such that:
uw(x) = (1≠ ⁄)uw(0) + ⁄uw(Y)
ﬁw(x) ”= (1≠ ⁄)ﬁw(0) + ⁄ﬁw(Y).
Set F = (1≠ ⁄)”0 + ⁄”Y and F Õ = ”x to see that w is not risk-aligned.
Case 2. Suppose that there is an a ne relationship between ﬁw and uw for all u œ U , but
–(u) = 0 for some risk type u. Criterion 2 implies directly that ﬁw is constant on Y .
We argue that it can not also be the case that uw is constant for all
u œ U . To see why, suppose that uw were constant for all u. Lemma 4 implies
that there exists T œ  (T ) such that Tw(y) = T for all y. However, because ﬁ is
strictly increasing in y, ﬁw is not constant. We conclude that there exists u œ U
such that uw is non-constant.
Accordingly, there exist x, z œ Y such that uw(x) ”= uw(z). Set F = ”x
and F Õ = ”z to see that w is not risk-aligned.
Case 3. Suppose that there is an a ne relationship between ﬁw and uw for all u, but
–(u) < 0 for some risk type u. Set F = ”0 and F Õ = ”Y to see that w is not
risk-aligned.
Conversely, suppose that w is payo  a ne. As –(u) > 0 for all u œ U , we have:
EF [ﬁw(y)] Ø EF Õ [ﬁw(y)] ≈∆ EF [uw(y)] Ø EF Õ [uw(y)].
Accordingly, w is risk-aligned.
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C.1.3 Proof of theorem 3
First, we prove that our stochastic binary contracts are indeed contracts:
Lemma 13. If T (y) =
1
1≠ ⁄(y)
2
TL + ⁄(y)TH for weight ⁄ and TL, TH œ  (T ), then there
exists a contract w with Tw = T .
Proof. We divide our proof into three parts. First, we show how our model embeds a universal
probability space. Second, we construct a function w : Y ◊ X æ T such that w(y, x) ≥ T (y)
for each y. Third, we verify that w is a contract.
Part 1. Recall that x = (x1, ..., xN) œ X µ RN . For 1 Æ n Æ N , let Gn be the marginal
distribution of xn, and note that Gn inherits continuity from G. Define f : X æ
[0, 1] as f(x) = Gn(xn). Because Gn is continuous, f(x) is uniformly distributed
on [0, 1] when x ≥ G. Moreover, f is continuous.
Part 2. Let T0 œ  (T ). We construct an upper semicontinuous function w˜ : X æ T such
that w˜(x) ≥ T0 when x ≥ G. Let T+ : [0, 1) æ T be the upper semicontinuous
generalized inverse of T0:
T+(p) = inf{t œ T |T0(t) > p}.
Let T ú be the extension of T+ to domain [0, 1] with T ú(1) = max T . As f(x) is
uniformly distributed over [0, 1], we have that T ú(f(x)) ≥ T0 when x ≥ G. Set
w˜(x) = T ú(f(x)) to obtain the desired function w˜.
Finally, for each y œ Y , let w˜y be such that w˜y(x) ≥ T (y), per the construction w˜
just given. Set w(y, x) = w˜y(x).
Part 3. We verify that w is upper semicontinuous, so that it is indeed a contract. We
show:
(yk, xk)æ (y, x) =∆ lim sup
k
w(yk, xk) Æ w(y, x).
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It is notationally convenient to introduce the following shorthand:
Ty := T (y)
Tn := T (yn).
If f(x) = 1, then w(y, x) = max T Ø w(yÕ, xÕ) for all (yÕ, xÕ). More substantively,
suppose that f(x) < 1. We proceed by contradiction. Let (yk, xk) æ (y, x).
Suppose that:
lim sup
k
w(yk, xk) > w(y, x).
First, by our definition of w, there exists tÕ œ T and subsequence kj of k such that:
inf{t|Tkj(t) > f(xkj)} > tÕ > inf{t|Ty(t) > f(x)}.
Thus, Tkj(tÕ) Æ f(xkj) for all j. Consequently, for all j we have:
PTkj [t Ø tÕ] Ø 1≠ f(xkj).
Second, there exists tÕÕ < tÕ and p > f(x) such that Ty(tÕÕ) = p. Accordingly, as
tÕ > tÕÕ, we have:
PTy [t Ø tÕ] Æ PTy [t > tÕÕ] = 1≠ p.
As f is continuous, f(xkj) æ f(x). Thus, PTkj [t Ø tÕ] > PTy [t Ø tÕ] for j large.
This contradicts that Tkj æ Ty. Thus, w is upper semicontinuous, as desired.
Second, we state the proof of the result:
Proof of theorem 3. We prove the theorem in three steps. First, we show that if w is payo 
a ne, then w is a stochastic binary contract with a particular weight ⁄ú. Second, we verify
such contracts are indeed payo  a ne. Third, we address remaining technical details.
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Part 1. Suppose that w is payo  a ne. Label as follows:
TL := Tw(0)
TH := Tw(Y).
Subtracting ﬁw(0) from ﬁw(Y) and rearranging criterion 2 yields:
–(u) = ﬁ
w(Y)≠ ﬁw(0)
uw(Y)≠ uw(0) . (C.5)
Lemma 12 establishes that uw, ﬁw are injective, which ensures that equation C.5 is
well-defined. Next, subtracting ﬁw(0) from ﬁw(y) and substituting the right-hand
side of equation C.5 into criterion 2 yields:
uw(y) =
A
1≠ ﬁ
w(y)≠ ﬁw(0)
ﬁw(Y)≠ ﬁw(0)
B
uw(0) +
A
ﬁw(y)≠ ﬁw(0)
ﬁw(Y)≠ ﬁw(0)
B
uw(Y). (C.6)
Define   : Y æ R as follows:
 (y) = ﬁ
w(y)≠ ﬁw(0)
ﬁw(Y)≠ ﬁw(0) . (C.7)
Substituting equation C.7 into equation C.6 yields:
⁄
u(t)dTw(y) =
⁄
u(t)d
51
1≠  (y)
2
TL +  (y)TH
6
’u œ U . (C.8)
Lemma 4 implies that the following equality is equivalent to equation C.81:
Tw(y) =
1
1≠  (y)
2
TL +  (y)TH . (C.9)
We are left to exhibit an expression   that solves the implicit equation C.7, and
verify that the corresponding function is a weight. First, direct substitution of C.9
1We have not yet argued that   œ [0, 1], and so it is not assured that the finite signed measure on the
right-hand side of equation C.5 is a probability distribution. However, because the set of finite signed measures
forms a vector space, we are free to use vector space operations as necessary to derive an equality for which
lemma 4 applies.
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into definitions 3.1 and 3.2 —wherein we define uw and ﬁw — respectively yields
the following:
ﬁw(y) =  (y)
1
ETH [ﬁ(y, t)]≠ ETL [ﬁ(y, t)]
2
+ ETL [ﬁ(y, t)] (C.10)
uw(y) =  (y)
1
ETH [u(t)]≠ ETL [u(t)]
2
+ ETL [u(t)]. (C.11)
Second, substitution of C.10 and C.11 into C.5 yields:
–(u) =
1
ETH [ﬁ(Y , t)]≠ ETL [ﬁ(Y , t)]
2
≠
1
ETH [ﬁ(0, t)]≠ ETL [ﬁ(0, t)]
2
ETH [u(t)]≠ ETL [u(t)]
. (C.12)
Next, rearranging C.5 gives the following:
ﬁw(y)≠ ﬁw(0) = –(u)
1
uw(y)≠ uw(0)
2
. (C.13)
Substitution of C.11 into C.13 gives:
ﬁw(y)≠ ﬁw(0) = –(u) (y)
1
ETH [u(t)]≠ ETL [u(t)]
2
. (C.14)
In turn, solving for  (y) yields:
 (y) = ﬁ
w(y)≠ ﬁw(0)
–(u)
1
ETH [u(t)]≠ ETL [u(t)]
2 . (C.15)
Finally, substituting definition 3.2 — in which we define ﬁw — and C.12 into C.15
yields the following expression for  (y):
 (y) = ETL [ﬁ(y, t)]≠ ETL [ﬁ(0, t)]
ETL [ﬁ(y, t)]≠ ETL [ﬁ(0, t)] + ETH [ﬁ(Y , t)]≠ ETH [ﬁ(y, t)]
.
Set ⁄ú :=  (y), and observe that ⁄ú coincides with C.1, presented at the beginning
of the appendix. Note that ⁄ú(0) = 0, ⁄ú(Y) = 1, and ⁄ú is strictly increasing
and continuous. Consequently, ⁄ú is a weight. Moreover, because –(u) > 0, w is
aligned at extremes. Thus, w is a stochastic binary contract.
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Part 2. Suppose that w is a stochastic binary contract with weight ⁄ú. By construction,
there is an a ne relationship between ﬁw and uw:
ﬁw(y) =
A
ﬁw(Y)≠ ﬁw(0)
uw(Y)≠ uw(0)
BA
uw(y)≠ uw(0)
B
+ ﬁw(0).
As w is a stochastic binary contract, w is aligned at extremes. By definition, we
have the following:
ﬁw(Y)≠ ﬁw(0)
uw(Y)≠ uw(0) > 0.
Consequently, w is payo  a ne.
Part 3. We have established that a contract is payo  a ne if and only if it is an stochastic
binary contract with weight ⁄ú. Proposition 9 establishes that a contract is risk-
aligned if and only if it is payo  a ne. Consequently, contracts are risk-aligned
if and only if they are stochastic binary contracts with weight ⁄ú. The final step
of the argument is to ensure that each stochastic binary contract with weight ⁄ú
is indeed a contract: that is, that there exists a contract w : Y ◊ X æ T that
induces the desired distribution of transfers Tw : Y æ  (T ). This is the content
of lemma 13.
C.1.4 Proof of theorem 4
Proof of theorem 4. Suppose that TH first-order stochastically dominates TL. Consequently,
uw(Y) > uw(0) for all u œ U . For increasing and continuous cost function C : T æ R with
C(0) = 0 and ETH [C(t)] < 1, define:
ﬁ(y, t) = ⁄(y)≠ C(t).
Note that w is aligned at extremes. Thus, w satisfies the criteria of definition 10. For all
F œ  (Y), the principal’s payo  is as follows:
EF [ﬁw(y)] =
1
1≠ EF [⁄(y)]
21
≠ ETL [C(t)]
2
+ EF [⁄(y)]
1
1≠ ETH [C(t)]
2
.
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Accordingly, we have the following, for all u œ U :
EF [uw(y)] Ø EF Õ [uw(y)] ≈∆ EF [⁄(y)] Ø EF Õ [⁄(y)]
≈∆ EF [ﬁw(y)] Ø EF Õ [ﬁw(y)].
We conclude that w is risk-aligned.
C.2 Proofs, section 3.4
The primary objective of this section is to prove theorem 5. The theorem is mostly an
implication of propositions 11 and 12, which we prove first. These propositions require a
series of lemmas, which we state and prove first, in the order in which they are invoked. After
doing so, we present a proof of theorem 14, which is mostly self-contained. First, we prove
that the agent’s problem has a solution:
Lemma 14. The agent’s problem 3.3 has a solution.
Proof. Let v = u(t)≠ k(e) be the agent’s type and let A œ A . Define as follows:
M := sup
(F,e)œA
EF [uw(y)]≠ k(e).
Let (Fn, en) œ A be such that EFn[uw(y)] ≠ k(en) æ M . As A is compact, there exists
subsequence nk of n and (F ú, eú) œ A such that (Fnk , enk) æ (F ú, eú). As uw is upper
semicontinuous and k is continuous, EF ú [uw(y)]≠ k(eú) ØM. We conclude that c(A|v, w) ”=
ÿ.
C.2.1 Notation and preliminaries
We assume throughout this section that the principal is financially risk-neutral, as in
assumption 11. Accordingly, risk-aligned contracts are stochastic binary contracts with
linear weights. Given agent type v and contract w, define Âvw, vw : E æ R as follows, wherein
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we use the shorthand TL := Tw(0) and TH := Tw(Y):
Âvw(e) :=
µ(e)
Y
A
ETH [u(t)]≠ ETL [u(t)]
B
+ ETL [u(t)]≠ k(e) (C.16)
 vw(e) :=
Qa Âvw(e)≠ ETL [u(t)]
ETH [u(t)]≠ ETL [u(t)]
RbAY ≠ (ETH [t]≠ ETL [t])
B
≠ ETL [t]. (C.17)
We introduce the following notation:
• A ú is the set of feasible technologies A such that F has support {0,Y} for all (F, e) œ A;
• Aú œ A ú is the feasible technology such that: (F, e) œ Aú if and only if e œ E and
EF [y] = µ(e).
C.2.2 Proof of proposition 10
Proof of proposition 10. First, we show that payo  a ne contracts are output a ne. This is
the substance of the proposition. Second, we prove the converse.
=∆ Suppose that w is payo  a ne.
Part 1. We claim that there exist functions –, — : U æ R such that the following
relationship holds for all u œ U :
ﬁw(y) = –(u)uw(y) + —(u). (C.18)
We proceed by contrapositive. Suppose that no such functions –, —
exist. Accordingly, there exists ⁄ œ (0, 1), u œ U , and a, b, c œ Y such
that:
uw(b) = (1≠ ⁄)uw(a) + ⁄uw(c)
ﬁw(b) ”= (1≠ ⁄)ﬁw(a) + ⁄ﬁw(c).
Let u0 œ U and define u– as follows, for each – œ (0, 1):
u– := (1≠ –)u0 + –u.
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Let F⁄ = (1≠ ⁄)”a + ⁄”c . For all F œ  (Y), we have:
EF [uw–(y)] = (1≠ –)EF [uw0 (y)] + –EF [uw(y)].
By construction, it can not be the case that both of the following
inequalities hold simultaneously:
EF⁄ [uw–(y)] = E”b [uw–(y)]
EF⁄ [uw0 (y)] = E”b [uw0 (y)].
As u– œ U for – > 0 su ciently near 0, w is not risk-aligned. Proposition
9 then implies that w is not payo  a ne. We conclude that the desired
functions –, — exist.
Part 2. We claim that there exists constants c ”= 0, d such that ﬁw(y) = cy + d.
Let u be the risk type u(t) = t. We have the following, for all contracts
w:
ﬁw(y) = y ≠ uw(y). (C.19)
Equating the right-hand side of equation C.19 with the right-hand side
of equation C.18 yields the following:
y ≠ b = (1 + a)uw(y). (C.20)
We claim that a /œ {≠1, 0}. To see why, note that a = ≠1 =∆ b = y.
As b is a constant, this can not be the case. We conclude that a ”= ≠1.
If a = 0, equation C.19 implies that ﬁw = b. However, lemma 12
establishes that ﬁw is injective when w is payo  a ne. We conclude
that a ”= 0. Rearranging equation C.20 and substituting for uw(y) in
equation C.19 yields the following:
ﬁw(y) =
A
a
a+ 1
B
y + b
a+ 1 . (C.21)
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Equation C.21 gives the desired constants c, d. Substitution into
criterion 2 yields the functions a, b : U æ R that satisfy criterion
3. Consequently, w is output a ne.
≈= Suppose that w is output a ne. Direct substitution of criterion 3 into criterion 2
reveals that there is an a ne relationship between ﬁw and uw, for each u œ U . The
sign restrictions that criterion 3 imposes on a(u) and a(ﬁ) ensure that –(u) > 0
for each u œ U . Accordingly, w is payo  a ne.
C.2.3 Proof of proposition 11
For each F œ  (Y), define F T as follows:
F T :=
A
1≠ EF [y]Y
B
”0 +
EF [y]
Y ”Y . (C.22)
Relatedly, for each A œ A , define AT as follows:
AT =
Ó
(F T , e)|(F, e) œ A
Ô
. (C.23)
Note that because EFT [y] = EF [y], AT œ A . Moreover, by construction, AT œ A ú.
Proof of proposition 11. Theorem 3 establishes that w is risk-aligned if and only if w is a
stochastic binary contract with weight ⁄RN , as defined in 3.9. Suppose that w is not a
stochastic binary contract with weight ⁄RN . Define wÕ as follows:
Tw
Õ(y) =
1
1≠ ⁄RN(y)
2
Tw(0) + ⁄RN(y)Tw(Y).
First, because A ú µ A , we have for all types v and all contracts w0:
V (A |v, w0) Æ V (A ú|v, w0) (C.24)
 (A |v, w0) Æ  (A ú|v, w0). (C.25)
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Second, by construction we have:
V (A ú|v, w) = V (A ú|v, wÕ) (C.26)
 (A ú|v, w) =  (A ú|v, wÕ). (C.27)
Third, we show:
V (A ú|v, wÕ) = V (A |v, wÕ) (C.28)
 (A ú|v, wÕ) =  (A |v, wÕ). (C.29)
Choose A œ A , and let AT be as defined in C.23. Because EF [uwÕ(y)] depends on F only
through EF [y], we have:
V (A|v, wÕ) = V (AT |v, wÕ). (C.30)
Moreover, because wÕ is risk-aligned per theorem 3, equation C.30 in turn yields:
 (A|v, wÕ) =  (AT |v, wÕ). (C.31)
Because we chose A œ A arbitrarily, C.30 is su cient for C.28, and C.31 is su cient for
C.29. Inequalities C.24, C.26, and C.28 jointly yield the following, as desired:
V (A |v, w) Æ V (A |v, wÕ).
Similarly, C.25, C.27, and C.29 jointly yield:
 (A |v, w) Æ  (A |v, wÕ).
This completes the proof.
C.2.4 Lemmas in support of proposition 12
Proposition 12 requires a series of technical lemmas. Before stating the lemmas, we describe
the dependencies between them. First, lemma 15 and lemma 16 are self-contained. Lemma 17
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depends on both of the aforementioned lemmas, and lemma 18 on lemma 17. Finally, lemma
19 depends on lemma 15 and lemma 17. First, lemma 15 provides necessary conditions for
contracts that provide a guarantee:
Lemma 15. If  (A |V , w) > 0, then:
1. ﬁw(Y) > ﬁw(0); and
2. uw(Y) > V (A |v, w) > uw(0) for all v œ V.
Proof. First, we claim that if w provides a guarantee, then ﬁw(Y) > ﬁw(0). To see why,
suppose that ﬁw(Y) Æ ﬁw(0). As ﬁw(0) Æ 0 for all contracts w, we have  (A |v, w) Æ 0.
Second, we claim that if w provides a guarantee, then uw(Y) > V (A |v, w). To see
why, note that there are feasible technologies A that satisfy F = ”Y for each (F, e) œ A.
Because k(e) > 0 for each e œ E , V (A|v, w) < uw(Y) for such technologies A. Consequently,
V (A |v, w) < uw(Y) for all v.
Finally, we claim that if w provides a guarantee, then V (A |v, w) > uw(0). To see why,
suppose that V (A |v, w) Æ uw(0). Then there exist feasible technologies A œ A such that
(”0, 0) œ c(A|v, w). Because that immediately implies that  (A |v, w) Æ 0, this contradicts
our hypothesis that w provides a guarantee.
Second, lemma 16 shows that except in uninteresting cases, worst-case output distributions
have zero e ort cost, and provide minimal utility to the agent:
Lemma 16. If  (A |v, w) > 0, then:
EF [uw(y)] > V (A |v, w) =∆ EF [ﬁw(y)] >  (A |v, w).
Proof. Let type v have risk type u. Let F œ  (Y) satisfy EF [uw(y)] > V (A |v, w). Define
F Õ as follows:
F Õ =
A
1≠ V (A |v, w)
EF [uw(y)]
B
”0 +
V (A |v, w)
EF [uw(y)]
F.
Note that:
EF Õ [uw(y)]≠ k(0) =
A
1≠ V (A |v, w)
EF [uw(y)]
B
uw(0) + V (A |v, w).
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Accordingly, EF Õ [uw(y)]≠ k(0) Ø V (A |v, w). Moreover, we have the following:
EF Õ [ﬁw(y)] =
A
1≠ V (A |v, w)
EF [uw(y)]
B
ﬁw(0) + V (A |v, w)
EF [uw(y)]
EF [ﬁw(y)].
First, because  (A |v, w) > 0, we have EF [ﬁw(y)] > 0. Moreover, as the agent enjoys limited
liability, we have ﬁw(0) Æ 0. Thus, EF Õ [ﬁw(y)] < EF [ﬁw(y)].
Second, because EF Õ [uw(y)] Ø V (A |v, w), there exists AÕ œ A such that (F Õ, 0) œ c(AÕ|v, w).
As ties are broken against the principal, this establishes that  (A |v, w) Æ EF Õ [ﬁw(y)]. We
conclude that  (A |v, w) < EF [ﬁw(y)].
Third, lemma 17 computes the guarantee belonging to a stochastic binary contract:
Lemma 17. If  (A |v, w) > 0 for risk-aligned stochastic binary contract w, then:
V (A |v, w) = max
1
Âvw
2
 (A |v, w) = max
1
 vw
2
.
Proof. The functions Âvw and  vw are as defined in section C.2.1. Theorem 3 implies that w
is risk-aligned if and only if w is a stochastic binary contract with weight ⁄RN , as defined in
3.9. Let w be such a contract, and suppose  (A |v, w) > 0.
First, we claim that V (A |v, w) = max
1
Âvw
2
. For all F œ  (Y), we have:
EF [uw(y)] =
1
1≠ EF [⁄RN(y)]
2
ETL [u(t)] + EF [⁄RN(y)]ETH [u(t)]
=
A
1≠ EF [y]Y
B
ETL [u(t)] +
EF [y]
Y ETH [u(t)].
As  (A |v, w) > 0, lemma 15 implies that ETH [u(t)] > ETL [u(t)]. Accordingly, V (Aú|v, w) =
V (A |v, w), where Aú is as defined in section C.2.1. We have:
V (A |v, w) = max
eœE
Qaµ(e)
Y
A
ETH [u(t)]≠ ETL [u(t)]
B
+ ETL [u(t)]≠ k(e)
Rb.
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Thus, V (A |v, w) = max
1
Âvw
2
. We claim that  (A |v, w) = max
1
 vw
2
. First, lemma 16
yields:
EF [ﬁw(y)] =  (A |v, w) =∆ EF [uw(y)] Æ V (A |v, w).
Second, there exists A œ A such that (F, e) œ c(A|v, w) if and only if:
EF [uw(y)]≠ k(e) Ø V (A |v, w).
Thus, we restrict our attention to actions (F, 0) with EF [uw(y)] = max
1
Âvw
2
. As w is
risk-aligned, we are free to consider a single such action. Set F as follows:
F =
Qa1≠ max
1
Âvw
2
≠ ETL [u(t)]
ETH [u(t)]≠ ETL [u(t)]
Rb”0 +
Qamax
1
Âvw
2
≠ ETL [u(t)]
ETH [u(t)]≠ ETL [u(t)]
Rb”Y .
As desired, EF [uw(y)] = max
1
Âvw
2
. We have the following:
EF [ﬁw(y)] =
Qamax
1
Âvw
2
≠ ETL [u(t)]
ETH [u(t)]≠ ETL [u(t)]
RbAY ≠ 1ETH [t]≠ ETL [t]2
B
≠ ETL [t]. (C.32)
The quantity on the right-hand side of 16 is  vw, evaluated at the value of e œ E that
maximizes Âvw. By construction, if  (A |v, w) > 0, then  vw is a positive a ne transformation
of Âvw. Thus, EF [ﬁw(y)] = max
1
 vw
2
.
Fourth, lemma 18 establishes the existence of contracts providing a guarantee:
Lemma 18. There exists a contract w with  (A |V , w) > 0 if and only if assumption 12 is
satisfied.
Proof. We first prove that there exists a contract that provides a guarantee if the gains from
trade assumption is satisfied. After doing so, we prove the converse statement.
≈= Suppose that the gains from trade assumption is satisfied. Let w be the stochastic
binary contract with Tw(Y) = T and Tw(0) = 0, where T is as described in the
statement of the assumption. Let w have risk-aligned weight ⁄RN , as defined in
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3.9. We have as follows, per lemma 17:
 (A |v, w) =
Qamax
eœE
µ(e)ET [u(t)]
Y ≠ k(e)
RbQaY ≠ ET [t]
ET [u(t)]
Rb
Ø µ
A
min E
RbQa 1
Y ≠ s
RbQaY ≠ ET [t]
Rb.
Accordingly,  (A |V , w) > 0.
=∆ Suppose that the gains from trade assumption is not satisfied. Accordingly, if
ET [t] < Y, for each ‘ > 0 there exists a type v‘ œ V with risk type u‘ such that
the following holds for all e œ E :
k(e) Ø (1≠ ‘)µ(e)ET [u‘(t)]Y .
Let Tw(Y) = T . Suppose first ET [t] < Y. Let Aú be as defined in section C.2.1.
For all ‘ > 0 there exists a type v‘ œ V such that V (Aú|v‘, w) < ET [u‘(t)]‘. Define
as follows:
F‘ := (1≠ ‘)”0 + ‘”Y
A‘ := Aú ﬁ {(F‘, 0)}.
We have c(A‘|v‘, w) = {(F‘, 0)}. Thus,  (A |V , w) Æ 0. Suppose instead that
ET [t] Ø Y. We have immediately that  (Aú|v, w) Æ 0 for all v. Accordingly,
 (A |V , w) Æ 0.
Finally, lemma 19 shows that within the class of stochastic binary contracts, it is optimal
to pay the agent nothing when he produces zero output:
Lemma 19. If  (A |V , w) > 0 and Tw(0) di ers from ”0 for risk-aligned stochastic binary
contract w, then there exists a risk-aligned stochastic binary contract wÕ with TwÕ(0) = ”0 and
 (A |V , wÕ) >  (A |V , w).
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Proof. Let w be as described. Define TL := Tw(0) and TH := Tw(Y). Let wÕ be as follows,
with risk-aligned weight ⁄RN as defined in 3.9:
Tw
Õ(y) =
1
1≠ ⁄RN(y)
2
”0 + ⁄RN (y)TH .
Theorem 3 implies that wÕ is risk-aligned. Let v œ V. Let e0 œ argmaxÂvw and e1 œ
argmaxÂvwÕ . We have:
µ(e1)
Y ETH [u(t)]≠ k(e1) Ø
µ(e0)
Y ETH [u(t)]≠ k(e0). (C.33)
Lemma 15 implies ETH [u(t)] > 0. Dividing inequality C.33 by ETH [u(t)] yields:
µ(e1)
Y ≠
k(e1)
ETH [u(t)]
>
µ(e0)
Y ≠
k(e0)
ETH [u(t)]
.
In turn, because ETL [u(t)] > 0, we have the following:
µ(e1)
Y ≠
k(e1)
ETH [u(t)]
>
µ(e0)
Y ≠
k(e0)
ETH [u(t)]≠ ETL [u(t)]
.
Direct substitution into our definition of  vw, presented in C.17, yields:
 vwÕ(e1)≠  vw(e0) >
A
1≠ µ(e0)Y +
k(e0)
ETH [u(t)]≠ ETL [u(t)]
RbETL [t]. (C.34)
As µ(max E) < Y , there exists constant   > 0 such that the right-hand side of inequality C.34
is at least   for all u œ U . Lemma 17 then establishes that  (A |V , wÕ) >  (A |V , w).
C.2.5 Proof of proposition 12
Proof of proposition 12. Suppose that the agent has regular preferences, and suppose that w
is not a stochastic binary contract with weight ⁄RN , as defined in 3.9.
We prove the proposition in two parts. First, we establish the existence of a risk-aligned
stochastic binary contract that typewise dominates w. Second, we improve this contract into
a stochastic bonus contract.
130
Part 1. Because w is not risk-aligned, proposition 9 and proposition 10 imply that w is
not output a ne. Thus, there exists type v œ V with risk type u and yú œ Y for
which one of the following inequalities holds:
uw(yú) <
A
1≠ y
ú
Y
B
uw(0) + y
ú
Y u
w(Y) (C.35)
uw(yú) >
A
1≠ y
ú
Y
B
uw(0) + y
ú
Y u
w(Y). (C.36)
Define wÕ as follows:
Tw
Õ(y) =
1
1≠ ⁄RN(y)
2
Tw(0) + ⁄RN(y)Tw(Y).
Proposition 11 demonstrates that the following inequalities hold for all v œ V :
V (A |v, w) Æ V (A |v, wÕ)
 (A |v, w) Æ  (A |v, wÕ). (C.37)
We proceed in two cases. We first show that if w provides a guarantee, then C.37
holds strictly for some type v œ V. In this case, we make use of the following
facts about wÕ. First, because proposition 11 implies that  A |v, wÕ) Ø  (A |v, w),
lemma 15 establishes that:
uw
Õ(Y) > V (A |v, wÕ) > uwÕ(0). (C.38)
Second, because EF [uw
Õ(y)] only depends on F through EF [y], we obtain:
V (Aú|v, wÕ) = V (A |v, wÕ).
Third, because w provides a guarantee, we have ﬁw(Y) > ﬁw(0). This inequalities
extend to wÕ by construction, and thus wÕ is aligned at extremes. Accordingly, wÕ
is risk-aligned per theorem 3.
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After treating the case in which the original contract w provides a guarantee, we
treat the less interesting cases in which w does not provide a guarantee. In the
latter case, the improved contract does not necessarily coincide with wÕ.
Case 1. Suppose that w provides a guarantee. Suppose further that inequality
C.35 holds. First, we claim that:
V (A |v, w) < V (A |v, wÕ). (C.39)
To see why, let A œ A ú satisfy V (A|v, w) = V (A ú|v, w).2 For each
(F, e) œ A, choose F˜ with support {0, yú,Y} and EF˜ [y] = EF [y]. Define
A˜ as follows:
A˜ =
Ó
(F˜ , e)|(F, e) œ A
Ô
.
By construction, A˜ œ A . Moreover, V (A˜|v, wÕ) = V (A |v, wÕ).
However, inequality C.35 implies that V (A˜|v, w) < V (A˜|v, wÕ). Thus,
we have C.39, as desired.
Second, let F ú have support {0,Y} and satisfy:
EF ú [uw
Õ(y)] = V (A |v, wÕ). (C.40)
Note that C.38 ensures the existence of such a distribution. Because wÕ
is risk-aligned per theorem 3, we have:
EF ú [ﬁw
Õ(y)] =  (A |v, wÕ). (C.41)
2For convenience, exclude (”0, 0) from A. This exclusion is inconsequential, because w provides a guarantee
and hence (”0, 0) /œ c(A|v, w).
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By our choice of support for F ú, we have:
EF ú [uw
Õ(y)] = EF ú [uw(y)] (C.42)
EF ú [ﬁw
Õ(y)] = EF ú [ﬁw(y)]. (C.43)
Combining C.39, C.40, and C.42 yields V (A |v, w) < EF ú [uw(y)].
Lemma 16 then implies that:
 (A |v, w) < EF ú [ﬁw(y)]. (C.44)
Finally, C.41, C.43, and C.44 yield:
 (A |v, w) <  (A |v, wÕ).
Case 2. Suppose that w provides a guarantee. Suppose further that inequality
C.36 and the following inequality both hold:
ﬁw(y) Æ
A
1≠ y
ú
Y
B
ﬁw(0) + y
ú
Y ﬁ
w(Y).
Let F have support {0, yú,Y} and F ú have support {0,Y}. Let F, F ú
satisfy the following equations, where Aú is as defined in section C.2.1:
EF [uw(y)] = V (Aú|v, w)
EF ú [uw(y)] = V (Aú|v, w).
As before, C.38 ensures the existence of such distributions. Next, by
choice of wÕ, we have:
EF ú [uw(y)] = EF ú [uw
Õ(y)]
EF ú [ﬁw(y)] = EF ú [ﬁw
Õ(y)].
As discussed at the beginning of the proof, wÕ is risk-aligned and satisfies
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V (Aú|v, wÕ) = V (A |v, wÕ). Thus, we have:
EF ú [uw
Õ(y)] = V (A |v, wÕ)
EF ú [ﬁw
Õ(y)] =  (A |v, wÕ).
However, per our choice of F , we have:
EF [ﬁw(y)] < EF ú [ﬁw(y)].
Set A = Aú ﬁ
Ó
(F, 0)
Ô
. As (F, 0) œ c(A|v, w), we have:
 (A |v, w) Æ  (A|v, w) <  (A |v, wÕ).
Case 3. Suppose that w provides a guarantee, and that inequality C.36 and the
following inequality both hold:
ﬁw(yú) >
A
1≠ y
ú
Y
B
ﬁw(0) + y
ú
Y ﬁ
w(Y). (C.45)
As the agent has regular preferences, U contains a risk-neutral type u˜.
Inequality C.45 then implies the following:
u˜w(y) <
A
1≠ y
ú
Y
B
u˜w(0) + y
ú
Y u˜
w(Y).
Thus, this case reduces to case 1.
Case 4. Suppose that w does not provide a guarantee. There are two subcases
to consider. First, if uw(0) Æ V (A |v, w) for all v œ V, then it is
su cient to consider any risk-aligned stochastic binary contract that
does provide a guarantee. The existence of such contracts is established
in lemma 18.
More substantively, suppose that  (A |v0, w) > 0 for some v0 œ V with
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risk type u0. We claim that the continuity assumption constituent to
definition 11 ensures the existence of some open set U0 µ U containing
u0 and some constant Ÿ > 0 such that:
u˜ œ U0 =∆  (A |v˜, w) > Ÿ,
where v˜ is the type corresponding to risk type u˜.
We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that no such pair (U0,Ÿ)
exists. Let vn ◆ v0 such that  (A |vn, w) < ‘ for ‘ arbitrarily small.
There exists a sequence of distributions Fn œ  (Y) such that:
EFn [ﬁw(y)] < ‘
EFn [uwn (y)] = V (A |vn, w).
It is straightforward to establish that V (A |vn, w)æ V (A |v0, w). Thus,
EFn[uw0 (y)] æ V (A |v0, w). Because  (Y) is sequentially compact,
there exists a sequence nk of n and a distribution F0 œ  (Y) such that
Fnk æ F0. Moreover, because uw0 : Y æ R is upper semicontinuous and
ﬁw : Y æ R is lower semicontinuous, we have:
EF0 [uw0 (y)] Ø V (A |v0, w).
EF0 [ﬁw(y)] Æ ‘.
Thus, there are technologies A œ A such that (F0, 0) œ c(A|v0, w).
Because ﬁ(A|v0, w) Æ ‘, this contradicts our hypothesis that
 (A |v0, w) > 0 and thus establishes the existence of the desired set U0
and constant Ÿ > 0. Let V0 be the corresponding set of agent types.
The problem of establishing that wÕ typewise dominates w against V0
reduces to case 1, case 2, or case 3 above. Because V ∏ V0, this is
su cient for typewise dominance against V . This completes part 1.
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Part 2. Thus far, we have established that if the agent has regular preferences, typewise
undominated contracts are stochastic binary contract with weight ⁄RN . Moreover,
if w is stochastic binary contract with weight ⁄RN that does not satisfy Tw(0) = ”0,
then lemma 19 establishes that w is not an optimal contract. Suppose that w is
as follows, for non-degenerate lottery T œ  (T ) and risk-aligned weight ⁄RN , as
defined in 3.9:
Tw(y) =
1
1≠ ⁄RN(y)
2
”0 + ⁄RN(y)T.
Set b = ET [t] and let wÕ be as follows:
Tw
Õ =
1
1≠ ⁄RN(y)
2
”0 + ⁄RN(y)”b.
First, let uRN œ U be risk-neutral. We have ET [uRN(t)] = uRN(b). Thus, for
corresponding type v, we have  (A |v, w) =  (A |v, wÕ). Next, let u œ U be
strictly risk-averse. For “ œ (0, 1), define as follows:
uú := (1≠ “)uRN + “u.
For “ su ciently small, uú œ U . Moreover, because uú is strictly concave, Jensen’s
inequality implies that ET [uú(t)] < uú(b). Let vú be the corresponding type
v œ V . Let e0 œ argmaxÂvw and e1 œ argmaxÂvwÕ . A direct calculation reveals the
following:
Âv
ú
wÕ(e1)
uú(b) >
Âv
ú
w (e0)
ET [uú(t)]
.
In turn, we obtain that  vúwÕ(e1) >  v
ú
w (e0) via direct substitution into C.17, wherein
we define  vw. Lemma 17 completes the proof.
C.2.6 Proof of theorem 5
First, we establish the existence of a contract maximizing the principal’s payo :
Lemma 20. The principal’s problem 3.8
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Proof. First, proposition 11 and lemma 19 jointly imply that it is without loss of generality to
restrict our search for an optimal contract to stochastic binary contracts w with Tw(0) = ”0
and risk-aligned weight ⁄RN , as defined in 3.9.
Second, we claim that there exists m > 0 such that  (A |V , w) Æ 0 if ETw(Y)[t] < m. Let
v œ V , and recall that v = u(t)≠ k(e), with k strictly increasing. Accordingly, k
1
min E
2
> 0.
The continuity of u implies the existence of m > 0 such that:
ET [t] < m =∆ ET [u(t)] < k(min E
2
.
Set A0 = Aú ﬁ {(”0, 0)}, where Aú is as defined in section C.2.1. If ET [u(t)] < m, and
Tw(Y) = T , we have c(A0|v, w) = {(”0, 0)}. This establishes the existence of the desired
constant m.
Consequently, we are free to further restrict our search to risk-aligned stochastic binary
contracts w with Tw(0) = ”0 and Tw(Y) œ T ú, defined as follows:
T ú :=
Ó
T œ  (T )|ET [t] œ [m,Y ]
Ô
.
For each v œ V with risk type u, define Âv : E ◊ T ú æ R and „v, v, V : T ú æ R as follows:
Âv(e, T ) := µ(e)Y ET [u(t)]≠ k(e)  
v(T ) := „
v(T )
ET [u(t)]
A
Y ≠ ET [t]
B
„v(T ) := max
eœE Â
v(e, T )  V(T ) := inf
vœV  
v(T ).
Note that Âv is continuous in both of its arguments. Consequently, „v is continuous, per
the Maximum Theorem. In turn,  v is continuous. As  V is the infimum of a family of
continuous functions, it is upper semicontinuous on T ú. Moreover, as T ú is compact,  V
achieves its maximum on T ú.
Let T ú be the maximizer for  V on T ú, and let wú be the risk-aligned stochastic binary
contract with Twú(0) = ”0 and Tw
ú(Y) = T ú. Similarly, let T œ T ú, and let w be the
risk-aligned stochastic binary contract with Tw(0) = ”0 and Tw(Y) = T . First, lemma 17
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establishes for each type v that:
 (A |v, wú) =  v(T ú)
 (A |v, w) =  v(T ).
Thus, by definition we have:
 (A |V , wú) =  V(T ú)
 (A |V , w) =  V(T ).
As T ú is a maximizer for  V , this completes the proof.
Finally, we assemble the pieces of the argument:
Proof of theorem 5. First, lemma 20 and proposition 11 jointly provide for the existence of
an optimal risk-aligned stochastic binary contract. Lemma 18, which establishes the existence
of contracts that guarantee the principal a positive payo , ensures that this optimality is not
vacuous
Second, if the agent has regular preferences, proposition 12 establishes that undominated
contracts are stochastic bonus contracts.
C.2.7 Proof of propositions 13 and 14
The contractW(A, v) chosen by the agent with technology A and type v satisfies the following
incentive compatibility condition:
V
1
A|v,W(A, v)
2
Ø V (A|v, w)’w œW .
We employ the following notation:
 (A|v,W) :=  
1
A|v,W(A, v)
2
 (A |V ,W) := inf
A◊V
 (A|v,W).
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Proof of proposition 13. Because we have already established via lemma 18 that there exist
contracts w with ﬁ(A |V , w) > 0, suppose that ﬁ(A |V ,W) > 0 as well. Let V be as described,
so that the problem admits a low-e ort type v0. Let u0 œ U be risk type associated to type
v0, and let w0 be the contract in W that is incentive compatible for type v0 and technology
Aú, as defined in section C.2.1. Define the contract w1 as follows:
Tw1(y) =
1
1≠ ⁄RN(y)
2
Tw0(0) + ⁄RN(y)Tw0(Y).
By definition, we have  (A |V ,W) Æ  (A |v0,W). Moreover, because w0 is incentive
compatible for type v0 and technology Aú, we have:
 (A |v0,W) Æ  (Aú|v0, w0).
Second, by construction we have:
V (A ú|v0, w1) = V (A ú|v0, w0)
 (A ú|v0, w1) =  (A ú|v0, w0)
Note that because W provides a guarantee, it must true that uw0 (Y) > V (A |v0, w0) > uw0 (0):
see lemma 15. Furthermore, per our choice of weight ⁄RN , EF [uw10 (y)] depends only on EF [y]
for all F œ  (Y). These two facts jointly yield the following:
V (A |v0, w1) = V (Aú|v0, w1).
In turn, because w1 is risk-aligned per theorem 3, we obtain the following:
 (A |v0, w1) =  (Aú|v0, w1).
Thus far, we have established:
 (A |v0,W) Æ  (A |v0, w1).
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Finally, if Tw1(0) ”= ”0, define w2 as follows:
Tw2(y) =
1
1≠ ⁄RN(y)
2
”0 + ⁄RN(y)Tw1(Y).
The calculations presented in lemma 19 are su cient to establish that  (A |v0, w1) Æ
 (A |v0, w2). Moreover, because v0 is a low-e ort type, lemma 17 establishes the following
for all v œ V :
 (A |v0, w2) Æ  (A |v, w2).
Assembling the inequalities established thusfar yields  (A |V ,W) Æ  (A |V , w2). This
completes the proof.
Proof of proposition 14. Let W be any menu of contracts. Let Wú µ W be the set of
contracts that are incentive compatible for some type v œ V and some technology A œ A ú,
with A ú as defined in section C.2.1.
For each w œWú, let wÕ be the stochastic binary contract with TwÕ(0) = Tw(0), TwÕ(Y) =
Tw(Y), and risk-aligned weight ⁄RN , as defined in 3.9. Let W Õ be the set of such contracts
wÕ. We claim that  (A |V ,W) Æ  (A |V ,W Õ). First, for all A œ A ú and v œ V , we have:
V (A|v,W) = V (A|v,W Õ)
 (A|v,W) =  (A|v,W Õ).
Accordingly, we have:
 (A ú|V ,W) =  (A ú|V ,W Õ). (C.46)
Second, because A ú µ A , for any menu of contracts W we have:
 (A |V ,W) Æ  (A ú|V ,W). (C.47)
We claim that inequality C.47 holds with equality for W Õ. Let A œ A , wÕ œW Õ, and v œ V .3
3We choose wÕ arbitrarily: it is not necessary for the purposes of our argument that wÕ be incentive
compatible for type v and technology A.
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For AT as defined inC.23, we have by construction:
V (AT |v, wÕ) = V (A|v, wÕ).
Furthermore, because wÕ is risk-aligned per theorem 3, we have:
 (AT |v, wÕ) =  (A|v, wÕ).
As A œ A , v œ V , and wÕ œW Õ were each chosen arbitrarily, we conclude that:
 (A ú|V ,W Õ) =  (A |V ,W Õ). (C.48)
Inequalities C.46,C.47, and C.48 jointly imply, as desired:
 (A |V ,W) Æ  (A |V ,W Õ).
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